The latest geopolitical risk analysis as it’s published — every assessment backed by a claim-level evidence ledger, drawn from satellite, maritime, energy and open sources. Read the ten newest in full, free.
The Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain functionally restricted over the next 72 hours, despite Qatar-Iran and Oman-Iran diplomacy, with moderat
Very likely, with moderate confidence, ordinary commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz will remain materially below pre-war levels through 7
Very likely (65-80%; moderate confidence) that reciprocal US-CENTCOM strikes (26-28 June) and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maritime
China is likely to sustain coercive pressure on Taiwan through military activity and political influence, but the supplied record for 21 to 28 August 2026 does not establish a new dated PLA live-fire exercise or an imminent amphibious operation. Taiwan's NT$240 billion unmanned-systems budget and Beijing's 24 August PLA Rocket Force procurement notice are the main new developments, while current operational reporting remains sparse and partly undated.
Russian-linked hybrid activity affecting Europe is very likely continuing and increasingly targets defence, industrial and logistics infrastructure, although the supplied reporting does not establish a single Kremlin-directed campaign. A direct Russian invasion of Latvia is unlikely in the next three months, while further sabotage attempts, coercive threats and defensive hardening remain the principal near-term concerns.
US-Iran military confrontation is likely to remain elevated over the next 14 days, while the Strait of Hormuz remains dangerous despite US reports of mine clearance. Commercial traffic is continuing, but high tanker earnings, conflicting flow estimates and a SEVERE maritime threat assessment indicate that reliable normalisation is unlikely soon.
Jihadist violence in Niger, particularly in Tillabéri, is likely to remain elevated, with JNIM reporting an attack on Niamey’s international airport and adjoining military complex. The approved reporting still does not establish a coordinated jihadist surge across West Africa, while Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso appear likely to rely on their AES framework rather than restore Western military partnerships.
Commercial shipping risk in the southern Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb is very likely to remain elevated over the next 0-14 days. Traffic was below normal on 27 August 2026, but the approaches to the Suez Canal remained operational, indicating constrained passage rather than a confirmed system-wide closure. Houthi responsibility for the 24 August tanker fire 63 nautical miles west of Yanbu remains unresolved.
The conflict is likely to remain active over the next 0-14 days, with Israeli military activity in Syria and the US-Iran contest over the Strait of Hormuz the clearest routes to wider instability. Normal commercial traffic through Hormuz is unlikely to return quickly, even as US mine clearance and Iran-Oman-Qatar talks create a roughly even chance of limited, controlled passage.
The conflict is likely to remain active and geographically distributed over the next 14 days. The Strait of Hormuz is partially navigable, but very likely to remain functionally restricted rather than fully open, while Qatar and Oman pursue limited arrangements that are unlikely to produce a full settlement soon.
The record now supports a very likely assessment that Russian forces have conducted a sustained, high-volume strike cycle against Ukraine, centred on the Kyiv region, with more than 20 air-raid alerts and attacks reported for over 40 hours. The campaign is likely placing greater weight on logistics and infrastructure, but exact strike volume and casualty totals remain uncertain because the record conflicts on drone counts and mixes 2026 reporting with entries dated 2023.
The Strait of Hormuz is likely to remain only partially usable rather than fully normalised over the next 0-14 days. Another direct US-Iran military exchange remains roughly even chance, while US sanctions pressure is likely to intensify.
Nigeria is likely to remain the immediate centre of jihadist-linked security pressure, with recent reporting of civilian killings and a major assault on a military base. New reporting on Niger and Mali broadens the threat picture, but does not establish a coordinated West Africa-wide offensive. The United States is preparing to withdraw about 200 troops from Nigeria by late September, increasing uncertainty over intelligence support while smaller teams are expected to continue cooperation.