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Dual Chokepoint Crisis: Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-09-12 06:08Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

The reported Houthi seizure of Mokha and movement onto Perim and Zuqar has coincided with a sharp fall in Bab el-Mandeb traffic, while Iranian restrictions and US-Iranian attacks have severely constrained the Strait of Hormuz. Brent remained above $100 per barrel through 11 September, and tanker rates reached record levels, making the next 14 days a period of elevated energy, shipping and escalation risk.

Executive summary

Between 8 and 11 September, Houthi forces reportedly captured Mokha, moved onto Perim Island, took Zuqar Island and captured Dhubab on Yemen's Red Sea coast. Kpler recorded six commercial vessels through Bab el-Mandeb on 10 September, down from 30 the previous day. Hormuz traffic also fell sharply, although UKMTO, AIS and US-facilitated transit figures use different methods and produce conflicting totals. Iran reported attacks on 10 ships after US Central Command said it destroyed five Iranian tankers, while US Central Command denied that US vessels were hit. A reported 10 September incident near Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline remains unconfirmed by Saudi authorities and Aramco. Brent reached $109.51 per barrel on 9 September and settled at $107.63 on 10 September, while VLCC rates from the Gulf of Oman to China reached roughly $11.50 per barrel.

Key judgments

1. It is likely that Houthi territorial gains at Mokha, Perim Island, Zuqar Island and Dhubab have materially increased Ansar Allah's ability to threaten commercial shipping through Bab el-Mandeb, although the extent of physical control over the entire strait remains disputed. The reported fall in traffic from 30 to six commercial vessels on 10 September is consistent with an immediate operational effect. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirming indicator: Within 0-14 days, Kpler records six or fewer commercial vessels through Bab el-Mandeb on multiple days and independent reporting confirms Houthi presence on Perim, Zuqar or Dhubab. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Breaking indicator: Within 0-14 days, commercial traffic returns from six towards 30 vessels per day and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces reoccupy one of the reported Houthi positions. (0-14 days)

2. It is very likely that the Strait of Hormuz is operating under severe disruption rather than a fully closed blockade. UKMTO reported traffic at roughly 20 per cent of the pre-conflict norm, while preliminary tracking recorded seven vessels on 10 September, but AIS-off movements and US-facilitated passages make the precise volume uncertain. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirming indicator: Over 0-14 days, UKMTO continues to assess Hormuz as severe while AIS-visible traffic remains in single digits or around 20 per cent of the pre-conflict norm. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Breaking indicator: Verified reporting records no commercial or US-facilitated passage through Hormuz for three consecutive days, or traffic returns towards the pre-conflict norm for seven days. (0-14 days)

3. It is likely that the dual-chokepoint crisis will sustain high energy and maritime transport costs over the next 14 days. Brent was reported at $109.51 per barrel on 9 September and $104 on 11 September, US diesel exceeded $6 per gallon, and VLCC rates from the Gulf of Oman to China reached roughly $11.50 per barrel, the highest level reported since that rate series began. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirming indicator: Within 0-14 days, Brent remains above $100 per barrel, US diesel remains above $6 per gallon and Gulf of Oman to China VLCC rates remain near the reported Worldscale 450 level. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Breaking indicator: Within 0-14 days, Brent falls below $100 per barrel and VLCC rates retreat materially from the reported record level while Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz traffic rises. (0-14 days)

4. It is likely that military escalation will continue through the near term despite the planned Oman discussions on safe shipping routes. The immediate risks are further Houthi attacks on Abha, Jazan, Najran, Khamis Mushait or Saudi oil infrastructure, and further Iranian attacks on shipping followed by US retaliation against Iranian tankers. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirming indicator: Within 0-14 days, a new Houthi strike is reported against Abha, Jazan, Najran, Khamis Mushait or the East-West Pipeline, or Iran reports another attack on a vessel followed by a US tanker strike. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Breaking indicator: The Oman discussions produce an agreed safe-shipping arrangement and no new Houthi, Iranian or US strike is reported for seven consecutive days. (0-14 days)

5. It is likely that a fire or smoke event occurred near Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline on 10 September, but it is unlikely that current reporting establishes a Houthi or Iraqi origin. This judgement rests on satellite imagery and statements from two US officials, while Saudi authorities and Aramco did not confirm that the pipeline was attacked, making the attribution thin and uncorroborated. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirming indicator: Within 0-14 days, Saudi authorities or Aramco confirm damage at a pumping station and Saudi export or pipeline throughput falls from recent levels. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Breaking indicator: Saudi authorities or Aramco confirm that the smoke was unrelated to pipeline damage and throughput remains stable. (0-14 days)

6. It is very likely that global maritime risk now extends beyond Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. The IMO reported simultaneous danger in the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, waters off Somalia and the Black Sea, while piracy near Somalia and drone attacks on Black Sea oil tankers and grain vessels are adding separate risks to commercial shipping. (Confidence: high · REPORTED)

• I&W: Confirming indicator: Within 0-14 days, Ukrainian grain ports remain at one or two vessels per day, piracy reports continue near Somalia and new drone attacks are reported against Black Sea tankers or grain vessels. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Breaking indicator: Within 0-14 days, Ukrainian grain-port traffic returns towards the expected 20 to 30 vessels per day and no new piracy or Black Sea vessel attack is reported. (0-14 days)

Outlook & scenarios

Prolonged dual-chokepoint disruption (55%)

Houthi forces retain positions around Mokha, Perim, Zuqar and Dhubab, and Bab el-Mandeb traffic remains near the reported six-vessel level on repeated days. Iran maintains restrictions around Hormuz, US-facilitated passages remain limited, and Brent stays above $100 while tanker rates remain elevated.

Managed partial reopening (25%)

The Oman discussions produce limited safe-shipping arrangements. US-facilitated Hormuz passages increase, Bab el-Mandeb traffic rises above the reported six-vessel level, and Houthi restrictions remain focused on Saudi vessels. Energy and freight prices ease without returning immediately to pre-conflict levels.

Wider regional escalation (15%)

Houthi forces conduct further attacks against Saudi cities or oil infrastructure, Iran attacks additional vessels, and the United States responds against Iranian tankers or other Iranian-linked assets. Saudi Arabia renews requests for direct US military action, and traffic through both chokepoints falls further.

Near-total closure of both chokepoints (5%)

Low-probability, high-impact wildcard. Confirmed Houthi control of the Bab el-Mandeb approaches coincides with a complete halt in Hormuz commercial and US-facilitated passages. Saudi rerouting through Yanbu and northern Red Sea routes cannot offset the disruption, producing a sharp additional rise in oil and freight costs and wider stress across global shipping.

Recommendations

1. Maintain separate daily baselines for AIS-visible Hormuz traffic, US-facilitated passages and UKMTO's total reported transits. Present the figures as distinct measures because the current data cannot support a single reliable traffic estimate.
2. Prioritise independent confirmation of Houthi positions at Mokha, Perim Island, Zuqar Island and Dhubab. Track whether the Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces return to any of these locations and whether Houthi statements translate into verified vessel restrictions or attacks.
3. Treat the reported East-West Pipeline incident as unconfirmed. Do not use the Iraqi launch-origin assessment as established attribution until Saudi authorities or Aramco confirm damage and additional evidence links the incident to Houthi forces or an Iraqi launch site.
4. Track Brent, WTI, US diesel, Gulf crude exports, Yanbu loadings and VLCC rates as separate indicators. Flag a sustained Brent price above $100 alongside record tanker rates as evidence of continuing market stress, not as proof of a total chokepoint closure.
5. Prepare a daily maritime spillover watch covering piracy near Somalia, Black Sea attacks on tankers and grain vessels, and Ukrainian grain-port traffic. Report whether naval concentration around Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb is coinciding with reduced protection elsewhere.
6. Review the outcome of the Oman safe-shipping discussions and compare any Iranian, Houthi, US and Gulf Arab commitments with actual vessel movements over the following seven days. Treat renewed attacks or a failure to increase verified passages as evidence that diplomacy has not reduced operational risk.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is high because the central developments are corroborated by independent official, multilateral, wire-service and maritime-monitoring reporting. EIA and IEA data support the energy-flow and supply disruption picture, while IMO, UKMTO, Kpler and satellite reporting support the maritime-risk assessment. The main uncertainties concern the precise volume of Hormuz traffic, the extent and timing of Houthi control around Perim and Zuqar, the cause of the East-West Pipeline smoke event, and differences between intraday and settlement oil prices.

Cited sources

[1] Коммерсантъ (Kommersant) · Газета «Коммерсантъ» (A) · Fri Sep 11 2026 15:09:26 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:93e0396820d5 [2] Fox News · Iran-backed terror group’s latest territorial grab threatens second global shipping chokepoint (B) · Thu Sep 10 2026 19:03:56 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:355972b3045e [3] Reuters (republished by gCaptain) · Yemen's Houthis Reach Strategic Island at Mouth of Vital Shipping Lane (A) · Fri Sep 11 2026 17:16:25 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:b6884d433a8a [4] Reuters (republished by gCaptain) · Oil Tanker Rates Hit Record Highs Following Iran, US Shipping Attacks (A) · Fri Sep 11 2026 18:21:06 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:10c354bef9ba [5] Malay Mail · The world is still trapped between the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz — Phar Kim Beng (B) · Fri Sep 11 2026 10:51:37 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:0e4a9eafbfdc [6] Meduza · Хуситы взяли под контроль Баб-эль-Мандебский пролив — один из ключевых маршрутов вывоза нефти на Ближнем Востоке (B) · Fri Sep 11 2026 16:41:54 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:0bbcec2a0665 [7] gCaptain · U.S.-Facilitated Hormuz Transits Help Lift Gulf Crude Exports Above 10 Million Bpd (C) · Fri Sep 11 2026 17:25:50 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:35a26604d1d1 [8] BBC · Oil hits $100 a barrel for first time since July after US and Houthi strikes (A) · Wed Sep 09 2026 00:41:53 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:1b4931b03459 [9] The Guardian · Iran claims to have attacked 10 ships near strait of Hormuz after US strikes (A) · Wed Sep 09 2026 16:18:14 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:c73de216d658 [10] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) · EIA crude oil spot prices — 2026-09-09 (A) · sha256:ac28286ac672 [11] The Economic Times · New problem shaping up for the oil market as Hormuz remains shut (B) · Fri Sep 11 2026 14:40:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:115baa0de1bd [12] Defence Security Asia · Saudi Petroline Strike Exposes Global Oil Supply’s Double Chokepoint - Defence Security Asia (C) · Fri Sep 11 2026 17:45:26 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:154c1a0c3b35 [13] Euronews (Russian service) · Хуситы захватили крупнейший остров в Баб-эль-Мандебском проливе (A) · Fri Sep 11 2026 13:13:33 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:08ec3c8e7f76 [14] BBC News Russian Service · Зачем хуситы пытаются блокировать Баб-эль-Мандебский пролив? Текстовая версия подкаста «Что это было» - BBC News Русская служба (A) · Fri Sep 11 2026 16:47:06 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:c449813c2c5c [15] United Nations (UN News) · Ships and seafarers increasingly caught in the crossfire of unrelated wars (A) · Wed Sep 09 2026 01:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:074ea9f771de

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