The latest geopolitical risk analysis as it’s published — every assessment backed by a claim-level evidence ledger, drawn from satellite, maritime, energy and open sources. Read the ten newest in full, free.
Very likely (75-90%) that US forces expanded strike operations inside Iran on 16-17 July 2026 and are enforcing a maritime blockade that has reduced i
Very likely (70-85%), confidence: moderate, successive US CENTCOM strike waves inside Iran on 8-12 July 2026 and Iranian missile/drone reprisals have
Very likely (65-80%; moderate confidence) that reciprocal US-CENTCOM strikes (26-28 June) and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maritime
China’s capability build-out and recent history of drills around Taiwan point to a sustained, assertive maritime posture. The risk of a near-term close-quarters incident is likely elevated as allied presence and diplomatic friction intensify across the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.
No corroborated reporting in this 24-hour window confirms a fresh surge of jihadist attacks in West Africa. NASA heat detections are non-attributive, while background shows enduring jihadist networks in Mali and the wider Sahel and existing frameworks for a potential military response.
Russia‑linked hybrid activity in Europe remains elevated. Documented sabotage cases, fresh airspace restrictions over the eastern Gulf of Finland, and eastern‑flank border pressure point to a likely continuation of grey‑zone operations against European infrastructure and cohesion.
Gaza air operations continued into 17-18 July while arrangements for Israel’s withdrawal pilots in southern Lebanon remain contested. Concurrent US, Iran strikes in and around the Strait of Hormuz have expanded maritime risk and likely raise the chance of derailment on the Israel, Lebanon track in the near term.
JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front conducted coordinated multi-city attacks in Mali on 25 April and again on 4 July, and JNIM struck Niamey International Airport on 18 June. Mali’s forces retook Anéfis on 10 July after a siege featuring car bombs and drones, reportedly with direct Russian ‘African Legion’ support. Civilian harm and displacement are already high and very likely to worsen in the near term.
U.S. forces are striking infrastructure inside Iran for a seventh straight night and Iran is hitting or attempting to hit U.S. and partner targets in Kuwait, Jordan and beyond, driving up maritime risk and oil prices. Israel’s more aggressive security posture narrows room for near-term de-escalation as Tehran signals Houthi leverage over the Red Sea.
Beijing and Manila are hardening positions around Scarborough Shoal and the 2016 arbitration ruling, with China retaining de facto control and the Philippines escalating diplomatic pressure alongside partner messaging. A coast guard confrontation near Huangyan Island is likely in the near term.
Washington and Tehran have entered at least a seventh straight night of reciprocal strikes centred on southern Iran and the Gulf, while Iran is avoiding direct attacks on Israel. Maritime risk around the Strait of Hormuz is acute, with reduced transits and US blockade enforcement, and a Houthi move against Bab el‑Mandeb is likely if US attacks on Iranian power infrastructure persist.
Ukraine very likely sustained an intensified deep-strike and maritime interdiction campaign that is disrupting Russian fuel flows and rear-area assets, while Russia likely maintained mass strikes against Ukrainian cities including Kyiv. The front line is likely to remain largely static in the near term despite competing claims of Russian breakthroughs and Ukrainian counter-attacks, as Kyiv adjusts to a mid-week leadership reshuffle.
Civilian risk in Niger’s Tillabéri belt is likely to remain high in the near term amid IS Sahel lethality and first-time IS, JNIM clashes, while Mali’s April multi-target attacks show insurgents retain reach. The Alliance of Sahel States is very likely to sustain estrangement from Western partners into the next quarter, reinforced by Burkina Faso’s June break with France and the departure of French diplomats by 6 July.