Open-source intelligence · Weekly

Weekly intelligence briefings

Weekly open-source intelligence briefings synthesizing the week's major developments — patterns, trends, and strategic analysis. New briefing every week.

Weekly · September 7, 2026

US-Iran Warship and Tanker Exchange Intensifies, Hormuz Traffic Falls to a Fraction of Baseline

Very likely, with moderate confidence, direct US-Iran maritime exchanges intensified between 5 and 6 September, when the IRGC reported missile fire against two US Navy vessels and US Central Command reported strikes on three Iranian tankers. Strait of Hormuz traffic is very likely to remain severely constrained over the next 14 days, but the supplied evidence does not establish a complete closure. Russia-Ukraine strikes, Houthi pressure near Bab al-Mandab, Sudanese civilian harm, Niger's military vulnerability and European Russian-linked hybrid pressure also persisted.

Weekly · August 31, 2026

Hormuz Stays Functionally Restricted as Niamey Mutiny Ends and Strike Tempo Rises

Very likely, with moderate confidence, the week's main trajectory was continued cross-theatre pressure without a confirmed decisive escalation: the Strait of Hormuz remained functionally restricted rather than demonstrably closed, Russia and Ukraine sustained high-volume strikes, and Niger's military government likely contained the Niamey mutiny. Gaza, southern Lebanon, the Red Sea and European hybrid activity remained active, while no new armed incident around Taiwan or direct Russian attack on NATO was established.

Weekly · August 24, 2026

Hormuz traffic stays restricted as US-Iran pressure, Red Sea attacks and Ukraine strikes continue

Very likely, with moderate confidence, ordinary commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz will remain materially below pre-war levels through 7 September 2026 as Iranian passage controls, US Central Command enforcement and conflicting claims over tanker movements persist. US-Iran and Israel-Iran hostilities, Israeli operations in southern Lebanon and Syria, Ukraine-Russia long-range strikes, and JNIM and FLA pressure on Malian forces continued during 17 to 24 August, but the supplied evidence does not establish a complete Hormuz closure, a new PLA armed operation around Taiwan, verified RSF battlefield gains, or a confirmed Sudan-Chad cross-border attack.

Weekly · July 13, 2026

US‑CENTCOM strikes 8-12 July compress Strait of Hormuz traffic; Maersk limited Suez return; JNIM offensive in Mali, Ukraine deep strikes, RSF consolidation (8-13 July 2026)

Very likely (70-85%), confidence: moderate, successive US CENTCOM strike waves inside Iran on 8-12 July 2026 and Iranian missile/drone reprisals have materially reduced commercial transits through the Strait of Hormuz and raised shipping risk across Hormuz and the southern Red Sea. Very likely (70-85%), confidence: moderate, coordinated JNIM and Azawad Liberation Front operations in Mali (4 July) and Ukraine’s 10-11 July deep strikes against Russian energy and Azov shipping will sustain pressure on regional logistics and energy flows for the next 1-4 weeks.

Weekly · July 6, 2026

Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea contested; RSF poised to assault El Obeid; JNIM and Russia sustain high‑tempo operations, weekly 29 Jun to 6 Jul 2026

Very likely (70-90%) the Strait of Hormuz and the southern Red Sea will remain contested and hazardous to commercial shipping over the next 1 to 4 weeks, sustaining route diversions, naval escorts and elevated war‑risk premiums, moderate confidence. Very likely (75-90%) the Rapid Support Forces will launch a ground assault on El Obeid within 72 hours; if the RSF capture the city, mass civilian killings and a major humanitarian collapse are almost certain (95-99%), high confidence.

Weekly · June 29, 2026

US‑Iran strikes (25-28 June), Iran’s 30‑day Hormuz claim and mine hazards raise shipping risk; RSF reinforces El Obeid; China normalises east‑of‑Taiwan patrols

Very likely the 17-18 June Islamabad Memorandum between Washington and Tehran has effectively fractured after Iran‑linked one‑way drone strikes on merchant shipping (including the Singapore‑flagged M/V Ever Lovely on 25 June and the Panama‑flagged VLCC Kiku) and U.S. strikes on Iranian military sites on 26-28 June; the Strait of Hormuz will remain a contested, high‑risk corridor for the next 1-4 weeks, constraining throughput and keeping war‑risk premiums elevated (very likely, moderate confidence). The Rapid Support Forces are very likely to mount a ground assault on El Obeid within 1-3 weeks, creating a high risk of mass civilian casualties and a major humanitarian collapse if the city falls (very likely, high confidence).

Weekly · June 22, 2026

US‑Iran interim memorandum begins contested reopening of the Strait of Hormuz; Houthi Red Sea threats persist as Niamey airport attack and RSF build‑up raise risks

An interim US‑Iran memorandum announced 18 June 2026 has likely (65%) begun a contested, partial reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority permit and insurance rules; mine clearance and IRGC gatekeeping mean throughput will remain constrained and war‑risk premiums elevated in the near term (likely, moderate confidence). Separately, the 18 June 2026 assault on Niamey’s Diori Hamani International Airport, claimed by Jama'at Nusrat al‑Islam wal‑Muslimin (JNIM), and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) concentrations around El Obeid very likely (85%) increase the near‑term probability of follow‑on urban attacks in Niamey and an imminent RSF assault on El Obeid with a high risk of mass atrocities if the city is taken (very likely, high confidence).

Weekly · June 15, 2026

Houthi Red Sea ban and US‑Iran strikes keep Bab el‑Mandeb and Hormuz at crisis risk; Taiwan HIMARS, Scarborough platform raise Indo‑Pacific friction

The Houthis are very likely to enforce their 8-10 June ban on Israeli‑linked shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el‑Mandeb, sustaining operator avoidance, Suez re‑routing and higher freight and insurance costs (very likely, moderate confidence). Renewed U.S.‑Iran exchanges, including a U.S. disabling strike on the tanker M/T Settebello, have made the Strait of Hormuz a contested, high‑hazard corridor, elevating the risk of maritime miscalculation (likely, moderate confidence). Taiwan and South China Sea grey‑zone pressure intensified this week, Taiwan fired U.S. HIMARS into the Strait on 10 June and China installed a floating platform at Scarborough Shoal, increasing the near‑term chance of short, dangerous encounters at sea (likely, moderate confidence).

Weekly · June 9, 2026

2-9 Jun 2026: PRC gray‑zone pressure near Taiwan; Houthi Red Sea ‘ban’ resumes; Ukraine deep strikes; RSF retain Darfur

Very likely escalation in two maritime corridors: PRC/China Coast Guard activity around Taiwan’s southern/eastern approaches and Houthi/Ansar Allah’s 8 Jun ‘complete ban’ on Israeli navigation in the Red Sea, while Ukraine expanded deep strikes and RSF almost certainly held Darfur. Maritime miscalculation and trade‑disruption risk is very likely elevated into July (moderate confidence).