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Analysis · August 31, 2026 · Eurasia

Eurasia: US-Iran Exchanges Expand Regional and Maritime Risk

Analysis by Faris McDowall-Rose · Analyst, CrisisBrief · August 31, 2026

—High
BOTTOM LINE

The US-Iran exchange has moved from an extended pause to direct strikes: CENTCOM hit two launchers on Larak Island on 30 August or overnight into 31 August, and Iran responded with missiles towards US bases in Jordan. A further exchange is likely over 0-14 days. The Strait of Hormuz remains operationally restricted, while the claimed Iranian strike on Al-Minhad airbase in the UAE remains unresolved.

KEY JUDGMENTS
  • A further direct US-Iran military exchange is likely over the next 0-14 days. CENTCOM struck two Iranian launchers on Larak Island on 30 August or overnight into 31 August, according to conflicting date reports, after identifying preparations to deploy rockets carrying sea mines. The IRGC then reported missile and drone attacks against US bases in Jordan, and Jordanian authorities reported intercepting eight incoming missiles. Iranian officials have promised retaliation, while Donald Trump has promised powerful strikes after the Jordan attack. The UAE episode is less certain because the IRGC claimed a successful attack on Al-Minhad airbase, while the UAE Ministry of Defense denied that the base was struck and reported intercepting one drone. Confidence is medium because the exchange around Larak and Jordan is supported by multiple major-media and wire reports, but the timing, damage claims and UAE attack remain contested. (medium)
  • Commercial passage through the Strait of Hormuz is likely to remain restricted rather than fully open over the next 0-14 days, with a roughly even chance of selective or coordinated transits. Kpler recorded only five visible commodity vessels per day over the weekend, although 14 vessels transited on 28 August and some operators switched off AIS. CENTCOM and the US military say mine clearance has been completed, but US allies privately assess that mines probably remain. UKMTO reported a tanker hit by an unknown projectile, and the IRGC reported a tanker striking two mines. These conflicting accounts prevent a firm conclusion on the safety of the route. Confidence is medium because shipping data and official statements corroborate restricted traffic, while mine status and attribution of attacks remain unresolved. (medium)
  • Further attacks or attempted attacks against US positions in Jordan are likely over the next 0-14 days, while a successful Iranian strike on Al-Minhad airbase in the UAE remains unverified. The IRGC reported attacks on King Hussein and Al-Azraq airbases, and Jordanian authorities confirmed that eight missiles entered Jordanian airspace and were intercepted. Iranian state media and the IRGC separately claimed that dozens of drones struck US helicopters and personnel at Al-Minhad, but the UAE Ministry of Defense said the reports were false and that its air force intercepted one drone approaching from Iran. Pro-Iranian armed groups in Iraq have also been reported to have targeted US facilities outside Baghdad's direct control. Confidence is medium because Jordanian interception reporting is corroborated, whereas the UAE claim and the attribution of Iraqi attacks rely on contested or medium-confidence reporting. (medium)
  • The United States is very likely to expand economic pressure on Iran and at least one Iran-linked financial institution over the next 0-14 days, although implementation against third countries is likely to remain uneven. Donald Trump has declared an economic war on Iran, Scott Bessent has promised an economic onslaught against Iran and its trading partners, and the United States has threatened increased secondary sanctions. Bessent said Washington would sanction a second bank doing business with Iran, while the Treasury proposed severing Banque Misr's Emirati branches from the US financial system. Earlier reporting described existing sanctions as limited to selected companies and individuals, so the scale and timing of expansion remain uncertain. Confidence is medium because the policy direction is supported by multiple reports, but the sources disagree over whether broad measures have already been implemented. (medium)
  • China and Russia are likely to use the 31 August to 1 September SCO summit in Bishkek to press for a political settlement of the Iran crisis and promote alternative transport and energy routes, but direct SCO military support for Iran is unlikely. Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Narendra Modi and Masoud Pezeshkian are attending the summit, whose agenda includes the Middle East, regional security, energy and connectivity. SCO officials and ministers have previously called for diplomatic settlements, while summit discussions are expected to include the 7,200-kilometre International North-South Transport Corridor and the Northern Sea Route. The SCO's founding framework states that it is not a military alliance. Confidence is medium because summit attendance and the planned agenda are well reported, but the leaders' final positions and practical decisions are not yet known. (medium)
  • US military logistics demand is likely to remain elevated over the next 1-3 months, but the scale and destination of the requirement are uncertain. MARAD's 28 August memorandum describes a proposed approximately 170-day activation of Empire State VII beginning around 1 September for a classified national security mission, following a direct operational request from Military Sealift Command through US Fleet Forces Command. The mission remains under final review, and unconfirmed reporting linking the vessel to Diego Garcia has not been independently verified. Confidence is low because the mission is classified, final approval is pending and the assessment goes beyond the directly reported activation request. (low)

TLP:CLEAR · Disclosure is not limited.

Eurasia: US-Iran Exchanges Expand Regional and Maritime Risk

Time window: Last 1 day · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-08-31 18:15Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

The US-Iran exchange has moved from an extended pause to direct strikes: CENTCOM hit two launchers on Larak Island on 30 August or overnight into 31 August, and Iran responded with missiles towards US bases in Jordan. A further exchange is likely over 0-14 days. The Strait of Hormuz remains operationally restricted, while the claimed Iranian strike on Al-Minhad airbase in the UAE remains unresolved.

Executive summary

The United States and Iran exchanged strikes after a pause of about one month. CENTCOM described its Larak Island action as a limited strike against launchers preparing to deploy sea mines, while Iranian officials condemned the attack and the IRGC reported retaliatory strikes against US bases in Jordan. Jordan reported intercepting eight missiles, but claims of a successful attack on Al-Minhad airbase in the UAE conflict with an official Emirati denial. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains sharply reduced, with conflicting reporting on whether mine clearance has restored safe passage. The SCO summit in Bishkek gives China, Russia, India and Iran a diplomatic setting to discuss the conflict, alternative transport routes and pressure for a political settlement.

Change from previous assessment

Since the 30 August brief, the assessment of another direct US-Iran exchange has shifted from roughly even chance to likely because the reported pause ended with the Larak Island strike and an Iranian response against US positions in Jordan. The Hormuz judgement has been refined from likely closure to likely restricted passage, reflecting evidence of limited vessel movements alongside conflicting mine-clearance accounts. A separate judgement on regional spillover has been added because Jordanian and disputed UAE incidents now extend the risk beyond the Strait. The brief also adds the Bishkek SCO summit as a diplomatic and connectivity factor, and updates the logistics assessment with the proposed 170-day Empire State VII activation. Initial confidence in the classified logistics assessment remains low.

Key judgments

  1. A further direct US-Iran military exchange is likely over the next 0-14 days. CENTCOM struck two Iranian launchers on Larak Island on 30 August or overnight into 31 August, according to conflicting date reports, after identifying preparations to deploy rockets carrying sea mines. The IRGC then reported missile and drone attacks against US bases in Jordan, and Jordanian authorities reported intercepting eight incoming missiles. Iranian officials have promised retaliation, while Donald Trump has promised powerful strikes after the Jordan attack. The UAE episode is less certain because the IRGC claimed a successful attack on Al-Minhad airbase, while the UAE Ministry of Defense denied that the base was struck and reported intercepting one drone. Confidence is medium because the exchange around Larak and Jordan is supported by multiple major-media and wire reports, but the timing, damage claims and UAE attack remain contested. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
  • I&W: CENTCOM announces another strike on an Iranian site, or the IRGC announces and Jordanian authorities report another missile or drone event against King Hussein or Al-Azraq airbases. (0-14 days)
  • I&W: No additional US or Iranian strike is reported for 14 days, with both governments maintaining a public pause in military threats. (0-14 days)
  1. Commercial passage through the Strait of Hormuz is likely to remain restricted rather than fully open over the next 0-14 days, with a roughly even chance of selective or coordinated transits. Kpler recorded only five visible commodity vessels per day over the weekend, although 14 vessels transited on 28 August and some operators switched off AIS. CENTCOM and the US military say mine clearance has been completed, but US allies privately assess that mines probably remain. UKMTO reported a tanker hit by an unknown projectile, and the IRGC reported a tanker striking two mines. These conflicting accounts prevent a firm conclusion on the safety of the route. Confidence is medium because shipping data and official statements corroborate restricted traffic, while mine status and attribution of attacks remain unresolved. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
  • I&W: Kpler records visible commodity traffic at five vessels per day or below and UKMTO reports another incident involving a vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. (0-14 days)
  • I&W: Large crude carriers make sustained transits with AIS operating, while CENTCOM and independent shipping data confirm cleared routes without a new mine or projectile incident. (0-14 days)
  1. Further attacks or attempted attacks against US positions in Jordan are likely over the next 0-14 days, while a successful Iranian strike on Al-Minhad airbase in the UAE remains unverified. The IRGC reported attacks on King Hussein and Al-Azraq airbases, and Jordanian authorities confirmed that eight missiles entered Jordanian airspace and were intercepted. Iranian state media and the IRGC separately claimed that dozens of drones struck US helicopters and personnel at Al-Minhad, but the UAE Ministry of Defense said the reports were false and that its air force intercepted one drone approaching from Iran. Pro-Iranian armed groups in Iraq have also been reported to have targeted US facilities outside Baghdad's direct control. Confidence is medium because Jordanian interception reporting is corroborated, whereas the UAE claim and the attribution of Iraqi attacks rely on contested or medium-confidence reporting. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
  • I&W: The Jordanian Armed Forces report another interception or impact involving missiles or drones directed at King Hussein or Al-Azraq, or the UAE Ministry of Defense reports another Iranian-origin drone incident near Al-Minhad. (0-14 days)
  • I&W: Fourteen days pass without another reported interception, strike claim or security incident involving US positions in Jordan or the UAE. (0-14 days)
  1. The United States is very likely to expand economic pressure on Iran and at least one Iran-linked financial institution over the next 0-14 days, although implementation against third countries is likely to remain uneven. Donald Trump has declared an economic war on Iran, Scott Bessent has promised an economic onslaught against Iran and its trading partners, and the United States has threatened increased secondary sanctions. Bessent said Washington would sanction a second bank doing business with Iran, while the Treasury proposed severing Banque Misr's Emirati branches from the US financial system. Earlier reporting described existing sanctions as limited to selected companies and individuals, so the scale and timing of expansion remain uncertain. Confidence is medium because the policy direction is supported by multiple reports, but the sources disagree over whether broad measures have already been implemented. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
  • I&W: The US Treasury formally designates the second bank described by Scott Bessent or activates the proposed measure against Banque Misr's Emirati branches. (0-14 days)
  • I&W: No new bank designation or secondary-sanctions action is announced within 14 days, and Washington publicly limits measures to previously targeted companies and individuals. (0-14 days)
  1. China and Russia are likely to use the 31 August to 1 September SCO summit in Bishkek to press for a political settlement of the Iran crisis and promote alternative transport and energy routes, but direct SCO military support for Iran is unlikely. Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, Narendra Modi and Masoud Pezeshkian are attending the summit, whose agenda includes the Middle East, regional security, energy and connectivity. SCO officials and ministers have previously called for diplomatic settlements, while summit discussions are expected to include the 7,200-kilometre International North-South Transport Corridor and the Northern Sea Route. The SCO's founding framework states that it is not a military alliance. Confidence is medium because summit attendance and the planned agenda are well reported, but the leaders' final positions and practical decisions are not yet known. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
  • I&W: The Bishkek summit communiqué names the Iran crisis and calls for diplomatic settlement, while Putin, Xi and Pezeshkian announce practical cooperation on the International North-South Transport Corridor or the Northern Sea Route. (0-14 days)
  • I&W: The final summit record omits the Iran crisis and corridor projects, or SCO members issue no common position beyond existing general statements on diplomacy. (0-14 days)
  1. US military logistics demand is likely to remain elevated over the next 1-3 months, but the scale and destination of the requirement are uncertain. MARAD's 28 August memorandum describes a proposed approximately 170-day activation of Empire State VII beginning around 1 September for a classified national security mission, following a direct operational request from Military Sealift Command through US Fleet Forces Command. The mission remains under final review, and unconfirmed reporting linking the vessel to Diego Garcia has not been independently verified. Confidence is low because the mission is classified, final approval is pending and the assessment goes beyond the directly reported activation request. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)
  • I&W: The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment approves the request and MARAD removes Empire State VII from SUNY Maritime for the planned mission. (0-14 days)
  • I&W: The request is rejected or withdrawn, or MARAD confirms that Empire State VII will remain assigned to SUNY Maritime without a federal mission. (0-14 days)

Outlook & scenarios

Bounded exchange and restricted Hormuz (50%)

The United States conducts another limited strike against an Iranian military or mine-laying target, and Iran responds against US positions in Jordan or with another maritime action. Jordan remains the clearest confirmed spillover location. The Al-Minhad claim remains disputed. Large commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz stays limited, keeping oil prices and tanker rates above pre-crisis levels.

Diplomatic pause and selective transit (25%)

Iran uses Masoud Pezeshkian's presence at the Bishkek summit and Abbas Araghchi's stated openness to diplomacy to support a temporary pause. Washington retains economic pressure while avoiding an immediate major strike. Iran permits selected, coordinated vessel movements through the Strait of Hormuz, but free passage does not resume.

Regional expansion (15%)

The United States responds to the Jordan attack with broader strikes, while Iran or pro-Iranian armed groups in Iraq conduct further attacks against US facilities in Jordan, the UAE or Iraq. The disputed Al-Minhad reporting is followed by independently verified damage or casualties. Shipping incidents increase as the conflict reaches more bases and maritime routes.

Low-probability, high-impact mine incident (10%)

A tanker is independently confirmed to have struck a mine in the Strait of Hormuz after the US declaration that routes were cleared. Major carriers suspend additional transits, visible traffic falls below the reported weekend level and the United States conducts further strikes against Iranian mine-laying capabilities. Oil prices and tanker freight rates rise from their 31 August levels.

Recommendations

  1. Maintain a 0-14 day warning watch on CENTCOM and IRGC statements, with separate event lines for Larak Island, King Hussein, Al-Azraq and Al-Minhad. Do not combine the Jordanian and UAE incidents until independent evidence resolves the conflicting accounts.
  2. Treat the Strait of Hormuz as operationally restricted for collection and planning purposes. Track daily Kpler vessel counts, AIS activity, UKMTO incident reports and any fresh mine-clearance statements. Do not treat the US clearance announcement as proof that all lanes are safe.
  3. Prioritise confirmation of any further Iranian missile or drone activity against Jordanian or Emirati airbases. Seek evidence of impacts, casualties and infrastructure damage rather than relying on statements from the reported attacker or target government alone.
  4. Track US Treasury action against the second bank identified by Scott Bessent and any measure affecting Banque Misr's Emirati branches. Record announced policy, legal implementation and third-country compliance as separate developments.
  5. Monitor the Bishkek SCO communiqué and bilateral meetings involving Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Masoud Pezeshkian for language on the Iran conflict, diplomatic settlement, the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Northern Sea Route. Do not infer military alignment from SCO political statements.
  6. Reassess US logistics pressure if the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment approves the Empire State VII request. Keep the vessel's confirmed classified mission separate from unconfirmed reporting about a Diego Garcia role.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is high because the core developments are supported by multiple independent major-media, wire-service and trade-publication reports. The US strike on Larak Island, the Iranian response towards Jordan, the Jordanian interception report and the sharp decline in Hormuz traffic are corroborated across source types. The main uncertainties concern the exact timing of the Larak and Jordan attacks, damage claims, the reported Al-Minhad strike, the actual mine status of the Strait of Hormuz, the scope of forthcoming sanctions and the classified Empire State VII mission.

Intelligence gaps

  • [EEI 1.2 · PARTIAL] Changes in US or Iranian force posture indicating preparation for further attacks, including aircraft dispersal, missile-unit movement, naval sortie activity, or air-defense activation. Recommended collection: satellite imagery/aviation and maritime tracking
  • [EEI 1.4 · UNCOVERED] Evidence of mobilization or operational tasking by Iranian-aligned armed groups against US personnel, bases, or partners. Recommended collection: local reporting/social media/human intelligence
  • [EEI 2.2 · UNCOVERED] Orders, threats, targeting claims, or attack preparations by Iranian proxy groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, or the Gulf. Recommended collection: group statements/local reporting
  • [EEI 2.3 · PARTIAL] Iranian diplomatic messages, intermediary contacts, or de-escalation proposals directed to the United States or regional governments. Recommended collection: diplomatic reporting/official statements
  • [EEI 2.4 · PARTIAL] Changes in Iranian military alert levels, command activity, weapons dispersal, or continuity-of-government measures. Recommended collection: signals intelligence/satellite imagery
  • [EEI 3.1 · UNCOVERED] Arrival or departure of US carrier strike groups, bombers, air-defense units, special operations forces, or additional personnel in the region. Recommended collection: maritime and aviation tracking
  • [EEI 3.2 · UNCOVERED] Changes to US force-protection conditions, base access, evacuation plans, embassy staffing, or noncombatant evacuation preparations. Recommended collection: official notices/diplomatic reporting
  • [EEI 3.3 · PARTIAL] Presidential, Pentagon, or theater-command statements describing authorized response options, expanded objectives, or revised rules of engagement. Recommended collection: official statements
  • [EEI 4.3 · PARTIAL] Regional government decisions to close airspace or waterways, raise military readiness, expel personnel, or request additional US or allied forces. Recommended collection: official statements/aviation and maritime notices
  • [EEI 4.4 · PARTIAL] Sustained movements in oil and gas prices, tanker freight rates, or reported disruptions to production and export facilities attributable to the military exchanges. Recommended collection: energy-market reporting

Cited sources

[1] Deutsche Welle (DW) · США нанесли первый за месяц удар по Ирану (A) · Sun Aug 30 2026 22:30:45 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:e7b5809481e0 [2] Meduza · США и Иран впервые за месяц обменялись ударами (B) · Mon Aug 31 2026 12:18:40 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:4f7aa7c26e31 [3] gCaptain (republishing Bloomberg) · US and Iran Exchange Attacks for First Time in About a Month (A) · Mon Aug 31 2026 07:48:20 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:fea2cd8c43a6 [4] UNIAN · США впервые за долгое время атаковали иранские пусковые установки в районе Ормуза, – CNN (B) · Mon Aug 31 2026 09:18:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:efc67b5aeef2 [5] dahab.pro · Новости Иордании, обзор СМИ (D) · sha256:9a1a6d10cfc7 [6] Эксперт (expert.ru) · США и Иран обменялись ударами впервые за месяц | Эксперт (B) · Mon Aug 31 2026 06:33:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:d197ca89f451 [7] gCaptain (republishing Reuters reporting) · Vessels Crossing Strait Of Hormuz Drop To 5 Per Day (B) · Sun Aug 30 2026 23:42:52 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:fc3284ee1442 [8] Deutsche Welle (DW) · Иран заявил об атаках на американские цели в ОАЭ и Иордании (A) · Mon Aug 31 2026 07:15:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:e49d754abacf [9] News Mail.ru · КСИР заявил об ответных ударах по базам США в Иордании и ОАЭ (B) · Mon Aug 31 2026 06:45:11 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:8018c391e5ba [10] EurReflect · US-Iran Tensions Escalate (D) · Mon Aug 31 2026 12:42:27 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:1c450875af40 [11] Báo Thanh Hóa (republished on vietnam.vn) · Ирак обязался завершить вывод всех американских войск к концу сентября. (D) · Mon Aug 31 2026 04:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:ce7381817970 [12] TRT World · What to watch at SCO summit as Eurasian bloc marks 25th anniversary (B) · Mon Aug 31 2026 09:16:18 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:ee0c66fb6be6 [13] Al Jazeera · Xi, Modi and Putin attend SCO summit: What’s on the agenda? (A) · Mon Aug 31 2026 08:47:03 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:fcbb9dda79f5 [14] Plataforma Media · Putin and Xi are meeting in Bishkek as Iran and the U.S. trade strikes. Here's what's on the table at the summit (with video) (B) · Mon Aug 31 2026 11:19:30 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:f2c5b0252faf [15] South China Morning Post · What to expect as China’s Xi Jinping attends SCO summit in Bishkek (A) · Mon Aug 31 2026 04:00:13 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:1a6bd2d95dc3 [16] Khaama Press · SCO Leaders Gather in Kyrgyzstan as China, Russia and Iran Push Multipolar Agenda - Khaama Press (D) · Mon Aug 31 2026 13:20:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:3c8aa389f81f [17] gCaptain · MARAD Says No Other Suitable Ship Available for Classified Empire State VII Mission (C) · Mon Aug 31 2026 16:58:25 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:f635ab882998

Source content hashes were computed at collection time; the cited text is preserved unmodified for the life of this product.

Red cell review: CONCUR WITH COMMENT

TLP:CLEAR

Cited sources

17 sources cited · drawn from 80 assessed open sources · graded on the NATO Admiralty reliability scale (A best → F).

  1. [1]AgCaptain (republishing Bloomberg)US and Iran Exchange Attacks for First Time in About a Monthgcaptain.com ↗
  2. [2]CgCaptainMARAD Says No Other Suitable Ship Available for Classified Empire State VII Missiongcaptain.com ↗
  3. [3]BgCaptain (republishing Reuters reporting)Vessels Crossing Strait Of Hormuz Drop To 5 Per Daygcaptain.com ↗
  4. [4]AAl JazeeraXi, Modi and Putin attend SCO summit: What’s on the agenda?aljazeera.com ↗
  5. [5]ADeutsche Welle (DW)Иран заявил об атаках на американские цели в ОАЭ и Иорданииamp.dw.com ↗
  6. [6]Ddahab.proНовости Иордании, обзор СМИdahab.pro ↗
  7. [7]ADeutsche Welle (DW)США нанесли первый за месяц удар по Ирануdw.com ↗
  8. [8]BPlataforma MediaPutin and Xi are meeting in Bishkek as Iran and the U.S. trade strikes. Here's what's on the table at the summit (with video)plataformamedia.com ↗
  9. [9]BMeduzaСША и Иран впервые за месяц обменялись ударамиmeduza.io ↗
  10. [10]BNews Mail.ruКСИР заявил об ответных ударах по базам США в Иордании и ОАЭnews.mail.ru ↗
  11. [11]BTRT WorldWhat to watch at SCO summit as Eurasian bloc marks 25th anniversarytrtworld.com ↗
  12. [12]BUNIANСША впервые за долгое время атаковали иранские пусковые установки в районе Ормуза, – CNNunian.net ↗
  13. [13]BЭксперт (expert.ru)США и Иран обменялись ударами впервые за месяц | Экспертexpert.ru ↗
  14. [14]DBáo Thanh Hóa (republished on vietnam.vn)Ирак обязался завершить вывод всех американских войск к концу сентября.vietnam.vn ↗
  15. [15]DEurReflectUS-Iran Tensions Escalateeureflect.com ↗
  16. [16]DKhaama PressSCO Leaders Gather in Kyrgyzstan as China, Russia and Iran Push Multipolar Agenda - Khaama Presskhaama.com ↗
  17. [17]ASouth China Morning PostWhat to expect as China’s Xi Jinping attends SCO summit in Bishkekamp.scmp.com ↗

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UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT-DERIVED // FOUO