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Analysis · September 11, 2026 · Red Sea

Red Sea shipping disruption: Houthi advance raises selective closure risk

Analysis by Faris McDowall-Rose · Analyst, CrisisBrief · September 11, 2026

—High
BOTTOM LINE

Very likely, Houthi control of Mokha and reported movement towards Dhubab will keep commercial access through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab selectively constrained over the next 0-14 days, but not fully closed. The 28 commodity vessels recorded crossing on 9 September indicate that the immediate risk is selective rerouting, particularly for Saudi-linked cargo, alongside higher freight and insurance costs.

KEY JUDGMENTS
  • Very likely, access through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab will remain selectively constrained rather than fully closed over the next 0-14 days. The Houthi seizure of Mokha, reported movement towards Dhubab and nearby islands, and the declared blockade against Saudi shipping raise the threat to Saudi-linked cargo. At the same time, ship-tracking data recorded 28 commodity vessels crossing on 9 September, with 16 entering and 12 exiting, close to the recent ten-day average of 27. Confidence is medium because the evidence supports continued disruption but leaves the scope of the blockade and the proportion of traffic still moving unresolved. (medium)
  • Likely, the Houthi position around Mokha, Hodeidah and the southern Red Sea islands will increase the danger to Saudi-linked shipping and sustain rerouting around Africa over the next 0-14 days. Reports of Houthi movement towards Perim and Hanish, attacks on Hanish, and the group's control of Hodeidah provide additional positions from which to pressure shipping. Major operators including Hapag-Lloyd, MSC, Maersk, BP and Frontline have already rerouted vessels, while some supertankers are adding more than three weeks to voyages to Asia. Confidence is medium because reporting on Houthi movement onto Perim and Hanish is less corroborated, and the Houthis publicly limit their stated maritime target set to Saudi-linked shipping. (medium)
  • Likely, Saudi Arabia will continue using the East-West pipeline and Red Sea terminals while reducing exposed maritime transit through Bab al-Mandab over the next 0-14 days. The pipeline moves about 5 million to 7 million barrels per day and provides an alternative to Hormuz, but reports also describe renewed Houthi threats curtailing Yanbu shipments, some Saudi crude vessels avoiding the waterway and temporary suspension of operations at attacked Saudi energy facilities. Confidence is medium because reporting shows opposing trends: Saudi Arabia is relying more heavily on Red Sea routes after Hormuz disruption, while Houthi threats are limiting some Red Sea movements. (medium)
  • Likely, freight and energy price pressure will remain elevated for the next 1-3 months, although the Houthi contribution cannot be separated from the wider US-Iran maritime conflict. Supertanker earnings on the Middle East-to-China route have reached nearly $800,000 per day, VLCCs on the US Gulf to Asia route have been offered at a record $29.5 million, and Kpler expects VLCC earnings to remain above $100,000 per day into next year. Brent crude has risen above $100 per barrel, with separate reporting placing it above $105 and at $109. Confidence is medium because the market response reflects both Red Sea disruption and attacks around the Strait of Hormuz. (medium)
  • Likely, continued Saudi-Houthi fighting will worsen humanitarian pressure in Yemen and further restrict access to assistance over the next 0-14 days. The International Organization for Migration reported about 18,500 people displaced in Taiz and Hodeida, the World Health Organization reported more than 1,000 people killed or wounded and tens of thousands displaced, and more than 22 million Yemenis require humanitarian assistance. UK reporting also states that Houthi detention of 73 UN staff and other personnel is obstructing aid. Confidence is medium because casualty and displacement reporting is compiled from different sources and the wider humanitarian effects are not attributable solely to maritime disruption. (medium)

TLP:CLEAR · Disclosure is not limited.

Red Sea shipping disruption: Houthi advance raises selective closure risk

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-09-11 01:08Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

Very likely, Houthi control of Mokha and reported movement towards Dhubab will keep commercial access through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab selectively constrained over the next 0-14 days, but not fully closed. The 28 commodity vessels recorded crossing on 9 September indicate that the immediate risk is selective rerouting, particularly for Saudi-linked cargo, alongside higher freight and insurance costs.

Executive summary

The risk picture has worsened since the previous brief because the Houthis have reportedly captured Mokha, moved towards Dhubab and attacked or advanced towards Red Sea islands near Bab al-Mandab. The group has declared a blockade of Saudi shipping, while also stating that its maritime actions target Saudi-linked vessels rather than all traffic. Shipping data recorded 28 commodity vessels crossing Bab al-Mandab on 9 September, close to the recent daily average, showing that the waterway remains in use despite sustained disruption and extensive rerouting around Africa. Saudi Arabia is using its East-West pipeline and Red Sea terminals, but reports also indicate that Houthi threats have curtailed Yanbu shipments and caused some Saudi crude vessels to avoid the waterway. Freight rates and Brent crude remain elevated, with supertanker earnings near $800,000 per day and Brent reported above $100 per barrel.

Change from previous assessment

Since the 10 September brief, the assessment has shifted from continued Houthi attacks and a declared blockade to a higher geographic threat following the reported capture of Mokha and movement towards Dhubab and Red Sea islands. The assessment now gives greater weight to selective rerouting and the exposure of Saudi-linked cargo, while lowering confidence that the disruption represents a broad closure because 28 commodity vessels crossed Bab al-Mandab on 9 September, near the recent daily average. The judgments on continued disruption, alternative Saudi oil routes, elevated market pressure and humanitarian costs remain active.

Key judgments

  1. Very likely, access through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab will remain selectively constrained rather than fully closed over the next 0-14 days. The Houthi seizure of Mokha, reported movement towards Dhubab and nearby islands, and the declared blockade against Saudi shipping raise the threat to Saudi-linked cargo. At the same time, ship-tracking data recorded 28 commodity vessels crossing on 9 September, with 16 entering and 12 exiting, close to the recent ten-day average of 27. Confidence is medium because the evidence supports continued disruption but leaves the scope of the blockade and the proportion of traffic still moving unresolved. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
  • I&W: CONFIRM: Daily tracking records fewer than 27 commodity vessels crossing Bab al-Mandab for three consecutive days, alongside additional Saudi-linked vessels altering course or avoiding the waterway. (0-14 days)
  • I&W: BREAK: Daily crossings remain close to or above 27 without new documented course diversions, attacks on Saudi-linked vessels or expanded Houthi restrictions. (0-14 days)
  1. Likely, the Houthi position around Mokha, Hodeidah and the southern Red Sea islands will increase the danger to Saudi-linked shipping and sustain rerouting around Africa over the next 0-14 days. Reports of Houthi movement towards Perim and Hanish, attacks on Hanish, and the group's control of Hodeidah provide additional positions from which to pressure shipping. Major operators including Hapag-Lloyd, MSC, Maersk, BP and Frontline have already rerouted vessels, while some supertankers are adding more than three weeks to voyages to Asia. Confidence is medium because reporting on Houthi movement onto Perim and Hanish is less corroborated, and the Houthis publicly limit their stated maritime target set to Saudi-linked shipping. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
  • I&W: CONFIRM: Houthi forces establish a verified presence in Dhubab, Perim or Hanish, or launch a new attack from the Mokha and southern Red Sea area against a commercial or Saudi-linked vessel. (0-14 days)
  • I&W: BREAK: Saudi-backed or Yemeni government forces retake Mokha or prevent further Houthi movement towards Dhubab and the Red Sea islands, with major operators restoring Bab al-Mandab transits. (0-14 days)
  1. Likely, Saudi Arabia will continue using the East-West pipeline and Red Sea terminals while reducing exposed maritime transit through Bab al-Mandab over the next 0-14 days. The pipeline moves about 5 million to 7 million barrels per day and provides an alternative to Hormuz, but reports also describe renewed Houthi threats curtailing Yanbu shipments, some Saudi crude vessels avoiding the waterway and temporary suspension of operations at attacked Saudi energy facilities. Confidence is medium because reporting shows opposing trends: Saudi Arabia is relying more heavily on Red Sea routes after Hormuz disruption, while Houthi threats are limiting some Red Sea movements. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
  • I&W: CONFIRM: Saudi crude loading at Yanbu declines while the East-West pipeline continues carrying oil towards Red Sea terminals and additional tankers alter course away from Bab al-Mandab. (0-14 days)
  • I&W: BREAK: Saudi crude vessels resume regular Bab al-Mandab transits and Yanbu loading returns without new Houthi threats or reported interruptions at the Jazan refinery and associated facilities. (0-14 days)
  1. Likely, freight and energy price pressure will remain elevated for the next 1-3 months, although the Houthi contribution cannot be separated from the wider US-Iran maritime conflict. Supertanker earnings on the Middle East-to-China route have reached nearly $800,000 per day, VLCCs on the US Gulf to Asia route have been offered at a record $29.5 million, and Kpler expects VLCC earnings to remain above $100,000 per day into next year. Brent crude has risen above $100 per barrel, with separate reporting placing it above $105 and at $109. Confidence is medium because the market response reflects both Red Sea disruption and attacks around the Strait of Hormuz. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
  • I&W: CONFIRM: VLCC earnings remain above $100,000 per day for four consecutive weeks, with Middle East-to-China earnings near $800,000 per day and Brent remaining above $100 per barrel. (1-3 months)
  • I&W: BREAK: Freight earnings fall below $100,000 per day, Brent returns below $100 per barrel and major operators report sustained restoration of Bab al-Mandab voyages. (1-3 months)
  1. Likely, continued Saudi-Houthi fighting will worsen humanitarian pressure in Yemen and further restrict access to assistance over the next 0-14 days. The International Organization for Migration reported about 18,500 people displaced in Taiz and Hodeida, the World Health Organization reported more than 1,000 people killed or wounded and tens of thousands displaced, and more than 22 million Yemenis require humanitarian assistance. UK reporting also states that Houthi detention of 73 UN staff and other personnel is obstructing aid. Confidence is medium because casualty and displacement reporting is compiled from different sources and the wider humanitarian effects are not attributable solely to maritime disruption. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
  • I&W: CONFIRM: New displacement reporting from Taiz, Hodeida and the West Coast coincides with additional restrictions on UN or NGO access and further Houthi or Saudi-led attacks near coastal supply routes. (0-14 days)
  • I&W: BREAK: Humanitarian agencies report restored access to affected coastal areas, no new displacement surge and a halt in attacks affecting aid routes. (0-14 days)

Outlook & scenarios

Constrained passage and selective rerouting (55%)

Houthi forces retain Mokha and continue pressure towards Dhubab without closing Bab al-Mandab. Saudi-linked vessels face the greatest exposure, while other commercial traffic continues at reduced or irregular levels. Major operators maintain Cape of Good Hope diversions, and freight rates remain elevated.

Further Houthi consolidation near the chokepoint (25%)

Houthi forces consolidate Mokha, advance towards Dhubab or secure positions on Perim and Hanish. Saudi-backed forces withdraw further south, and additional Saudi crude vessels avoid Bab al-Mandab. The result is a sharper fall in transits, wider rerouting and higher insurance costs.

Partial containment without normalisation (15%)

Saudi authorities sustain their pledge to keep Bab al-Mandab open, while Yemeni government forces and regional partners contain further Houthi movement. Daily traffic remains near the recent average of 27 commodity vessels, but Saudi-linked shipping continues to face restrictions and elevated costs.

Regional maritime cascade (5%)

A new Houthi attack on a commercial or Saudi-linked vessel coincides with continued attacks in the Strait of Hormuz and increased piracy near Somalia. Operators treat the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and adjacent routes as a connected risk area, producing a wider and more persistent diversion of shipping.

Recommendations

  1. Maintain a daily Bab al-Mandab traffic series using the recent ten-day average of 27 commodity vessels as the baseline. Report vessels entering and exiting separately, and distinguish total traffic from Saudi-linked cargo.
  2. Prioritise independent confirmation of Houthi control or movement around Mokha, Dhubab, Perim and Hanish. Record port operations, road access towards Taiz and the position of Saudi-backed forces separately from claims by Houthi media.
  3. Track Saudi oil logistics as two distinct measures: East-West pipeline deliveries to Yanbu and other Red Sea terminals, and actual tanker movements through Bab al-Mandab. Do not treat increased pipeline use as proof that maritime transit has recovered.
  4. Separate the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz drivers in market assessments. Attribute changes in Brent, VLCC earnings, charter fees and rerouting costs to the specific route and incident supported by reporting.
  5. Expand the maritime watchlist to include the Gulf of Aden and Somali coast. Monitor the Glamor hijacking, the five vessels reported held in Somali coastal waters and MSCIO's warning covering waters within 150 nautical miles of the Somali coast between Mogadishu and Hafun.
  6. Include humanitarian access in the shipping disruption picture. Track displacement around Taiz, Hodeida and the West Coast, detention of UN and NGO personnel, and any interruption to coastal aid routes.

Confidence & uncertainty

High headline confidence is warranted for the core assessment because reporting from AP, Reuters, BBC, Lloyd's List, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the International Maritime Organization, the International Organization for Migration and ship-tracking data consistently records Houthi territorial gains, attacks on Saudi-linked interests and continuing maritime disruption. The main uncertainties concern the scope of the declared blockade, the extent of Houthi control over nearby islands, conflicting accounts of Saudi oil-route use and the separate contribution of the US-Iran conflict to freight and energy prices.

Intelligence gaps

  • [EEI 1.1 · PARTIAL] Incidents of hostile action against commercial vessels: vessel name/IMO, position (lat/long), time/date, observable damage or casualties, and weapon type reported (missile, drone, small-arms, explosive-laden boat). Recommended collection: maritime/AIS
  • [EEI 1.2 · PARTIAL] Public Houthi claims of attacks or warnings tied to specific dates/routes, including social-media posts, official statements, and timing relative to merchant transits. Recommended collection: open-source/social_media
  • [EEI 1.3 · PARTIAL] Unusual Houthi force posture indicators along Yemen’s Red Sea coast: movement or concentration of small boats, visible coastal missile/rocket emplacements, or logistics buildup at known launch sites (locations, timestamps). Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
  • [EEI 1.4 · UNCOVERED] Intercepts or communications indicating orders, targeting lists, or intent to strike merchant shipping (messages referencing specific vessel classes, companies, or chokepoints). Recommended collection: signals/communications
  • [EEI 2.1 · UNCOVERED] Reports or visual confirmation of floating or moored mines and debris fields in shipping lanes or approaches to Bab-el-Mandeb, with geolocation and time. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
  • [EEI 2.2 · UNCOVERED] Detection of mine-laying activity: small vessels loitering in lane approaches, unexpected AIS track patterns consistent with mine deployment, or salvage/mining vessels operating in the area. Recommended collection: maritime/AIS
  • [EEI 2.3 · UNCOVERED] Hydrographic notices, naval warnings, or port authority advisories closing lanes or imposing route restrictions (text of Notice to Mariners, issuing agency, effective times/areas). Recommended collection: naval/port_authority
  • [EEI 2.4 · UNCOVERED] Naval or commercial reports of mine-countermeasure operations or confirmed mine removal events (location, time, platforms involved). Recommended collection: naval/intelligence
  • [EEI 3.1 · UNCOVERED] Movements and presence of foreign warships and support vessels: names/classes, task group compositions, patrol areas and timelines, and whether vessels are conducting escort or interdiction operations. Recommended collection: naval/intelligence
  • [EEI 3.2 · PARTIAL] Official announcements or directives from states/coalitions regarding convoys, armed escorts, protected corridor establishment, or changes to rules of engagement for merchant protection. Recommended collection: diplomatic/public_affairs
  • [EEI 3.3 · UNCOVERED] Recorded interactions between naval forces and vessels in the corridor (hailings, boardings, warnings, defensive strikes), including timestamps and outcomes. Recommended collection: maritime/AIS
  • [EEI 3.4 · UNCOVERED] Planned or ongoing multinational exercises, air ISR sorties, or logistics moves that increase or decrease naval capacity in the area (exercise name, participating units, dates, locations). Recommended collection: open-source/military_reporting
  • [EEI 4.1 · PARTIAL] Transit volume and pattern changes: number of commercial transits per day/week through Bab-el-Mandeb and southern Red Sea compared with baseline, and instances of rerouting around Africa (position/time data). Recommended collection: maritime/AIS
  • [EEI 4.2 · UNCOVERED] War-risk and hull insurance coverage changes: issuance refusals, premium increases for Red Sea transits, or explicit route exclusions by underwriters (policy notices or market rate data with dates). Recommended collection: commercial/insurance_data
  • [EEI 4.3 · UNCOVERED] Freight and charter market signals tied to the corridor: spot rates for container, tanker, and dry bulk routes affected by Red Sea disruptions, and reported port congestion or turnaround-time increases at nearby hubs. Recommended collection: commercial/market_data
  • [EEI 4.4 · PARTIAL] Incidents of cargo denial or diversion for critical goods (crude oil, refined products, LNG, high-value container cargo) including vessel IDs, cargo type, reroute/turnback actions, and economic impact estimates where available. Recommended collection: maritime/AIS

Cited sources

[1] The Associated Press (republished by Spectrum News) · Iran-backed Houthi rebels take strategic port city in Yemen (A) · Thu Sep 10 2026 15:39:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:6e48f4ead637 [2] Euronews · Houthis blitz Yemen's Red Sea coastline in push to seize Bab el-Mandeb (B) · Thu Sep 10 2026 15:59:44 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:f1ee0ae908b7 [3] Newscord · Iran-Backed Houthis Seize Mokha, Threatening Bab Al-Mandab Strait Shipping (B) · Thu Sep 10 2026 13:23:13 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:ef8c885f65fb [4] Ynetnews · Houthis seize key Yemeni port, close in on Red Sea chokepoint (B) · Thu Sep 10 2026 08:39:50 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:eeb73daf7aab [5] The Express Tribune (tribune.com.pk) · Explainer Why is the Bab el Mandeb Strait so important (B) · Thu Sep 10 2026 15:08:57 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:6a6e5c5c6a21 [6] Business Insider Africa · Houthis advance towards strait separating Yemen from Djibouti, putting 12% of global trade at risk (B) · Thu Sep 10 2026 09:44:38 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:e6630a93c29e [7] Muslim Network TV · Houthis threaten key Red Sea route amid energy crisis - Muslim Network TV (B) · Thu Sep 10 2026 22:53:50 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:c55c4da8f37e [8] The Economic Times · Why is the Bab el-Mandeb Strait so important? (B) · Thu Sep 10 2026 12:19:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:2ad130efe2dd [9] BBC · Yemen's Houthis reportedly seize strategic Red Sea port of Mokha (A) · Thu Sep 10 2026 15:38:56 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:8ea9825184a7 [10] Lloyd's List · Houthis push towards Bab el Mandeb after seizure of Mokha, raising fears for Red Sea shipping (B) · Thu Sep 10 2026 20:50:56 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:5dd5a2ccceb7 [11] Gulf News · Houthis seize Mocha: How Yemen port gave its name to world-famous coffee (A) · Thu Sep 10 2026 11:18:05 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:db66e49e28fb [12] Bloomberg (republished by gCaptain) · Surging Tanker Rates Signal Deepening Global Energy Crisis (A) · Thu Sep 10 2026 16:34:46 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:58bd8bbbe846 [13] Bloomberg (republished by gCaptain) · Surging Tanker Rates Signal a Deepening Global Energy Crisis (A) · Thu Sep 10 2026 12:08:55 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:09839846099d [14] Al Jazeera · The Houthis are testing the limits of Saudi restraint (B) · Thu Sep 10 2026 11:17:23 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:1c38f6d15256 [15] The Maritime Executive · Two Tankers Attacked on Omani Route in Strait of Hormuz, Brent Hits $108 (C) · sha256:8bd3d8207da7 [16] Outlook India · Why Perim Island Matters As Houthis Push To Capture Yemen’s Mocha Port (B) · Thu Sep 10 2026 10:45:22 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:ac6231ff1ff3 [17] NPR · Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia ignite fires at oil facilities and wound 73 people (A) · Tue Sep 08 2026 09:09:46 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:d7dce3e4bac2 [18] KFOX-TV (kfoxtv.com) · Iran-aligned fighters capture Yemen port near vital global trade route (D) · Thu Sep 10 2026 21:02:41 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:c6c018abc643 [19] Government of the United Kingdom · The United Kingdom strongly condemns the Houthis’ decision to resume conflict in Yemen and their continued strikes on Saudi Arabia: UK statement at the UN Security Council (A) · Thu Sep 10 2026 20:13:28 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:89c4b87166a4 [20] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), UK Government · FCDO statement on the situation in Yemen: 10 September (A) · Thu Sep 10 2026 09:38:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:144e86f8e191

Source content hashes were computed at collection time; the cited text is preserved unmodified for the life of this product.

Red cell review: CONCUR WITH COMMENT

TLP:CLEAR

Cited sources

20 sources cited · drawn from 80 assessed open sources · graded on the NATO Admiralty reliability scale (A best → F).

  1. [1]ABloomberg (republished by gCaptain)Surging Tanker Rates Signal a Deepening Global Energy Crisisgcaptain.com ↗
  2. [2]ABloomberg (republished by gCaptain)Surging Tanker Rates Signal Deepening Global Energy Crisisgcaptain.com ↗
  3. [3]BMuslim Network TVHouthis threaten key Red Sea route amid energy crisis - Muslim Network TVmuslimnetwork.tv ↗
  4. [4]BBusiness Insider AfricaHouthis advance towards strait separating Yemen from Djibouti, putting 12% of global trade at riskafrica.businessinsider.com ↗
  5. [5]BNewscordIran-Backed Houthis Seize Mokha, Threatening Bab Al-Mandab Strait Shippingnewscord.org ↗
  6. [6]AThe Associated Press (republished by Spectrum News)Iran-backed Houthi rebels take strategic port city in Yemenspectrumlocalnews.com ↗
  7. [7]CThe Maritime ExecutiveTwo Tankers Attacked on Omani Route in Strait of Hormuz, Brent Hits $108maritime-executive.com ↗
  8. [8]ABBCYemen's Houthis reportedly seize strategic Red Sea port of Mokhabbc.co.uk ↗
  9. [9]AGovernment of the United KingdomThe United Kingdom strongly condemns the Houthis’ decision to resume conflict in Yemen and their continued strikes on Saudi Arabia: UK statement at the UN Security Councilgov.uk ↗
  10. [10]ANPRHouthi attacks on Saudi Arabia ignite fires at oil facilities and wound 73 peoplenpr.org ↗
  11. [11]BThe Economic TimesWhy is the Bab el-Mandeb Strait so important?economictimes.indiatimes.com ↗
  12. [12]BThe Express Tribune (tribune.com.pk)Explainer Why is the Bab el Mandeb Strait so importanttribune.com.pk ↗
  13. [13]BAl JazeeraThe Houthis are testing the limits of Saudi restraintaljazeera.com ↗
  14. [14]BEuronewsHouthis blitz Yemen's Red Sea coastline in push to seize Bab el-Mandebeuronews.com ↗
  15. [15]AForeign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), UK GovernmentFCDO statement on the situation in Yemen: 10 Septembergov.uk ↗
  16. [16]AGulf NewsHouthis seize Mocha: How Yemen port gave its name to world-famous coffeegulfnews.com ↗
  17. [17]DKFOX-TV (kfoxtv.com)Iran-aligned fighters capture Yemen port near vital global trade routekfoxtv.com ↗
  18. [18]BLloyd's ListHouthis push towards Bab el Mandeb after seizure of Mokha, raising fears for Red Sea shippinglloydslist.com ↗
  19. [19]BOutlook IndiaWhy Perim Island Matters As Houthis Push To Capture Yemen’s Mocha Portoutlookindia.com ↗
  20. [20]BYnetnewsHouthis seize key Yemeni port, close in on Red Sea chokepointynetnews.com ↗

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UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT-DERIVED // FOUO