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Sudan Conflict: Drone Warfare, Kordofan Pressure and Darfur Risk

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-09-14 16:21Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

The SAF and RSF are very likely to sustain long-range drone operations over the next 30 days, keeping civilian infrastructure in Kordofan and Darfur exposed. The SAF is likely to increase pressure towards named Darfur cities, while a 90-day ceasefire is unlikely to take effect amid conflicting accounts of government and RSF positions.

Executive summary

UN, official and major-media reporting confirms expanding long-range drone use by both the SAF and RSF, severe civilian casualties and damage to hospitals and essential infrastructure. The SAF has publicly identified El Fasher, Ed Daein, Nyala, El Geneina and Zalingei as operational priorities, but independent confirmation of an imminent advance into those cities is absent. Humanitarian conditions are very likely to worsen, although reported displacement totals differ materially. International pressure is increasing ahead of the 9 October sanctions deadline, while the status of a proposed ceasefire and nationwide arms embargo remains contested.

Change from previous assessment

Compared with the 13 September brief, the assessment that drone operations and humanitarian deterioration are very likely is unchanged. This brief raises the salience of Darfur as the SAF's next stated operational objective after Yasser Al-Atta named five cities and described preparations to advance, but keeps confidence at medium because the evidence is chiefly from one SAF interview. The ceasefire issue is now treated as a separate low-confidence judgment because reporting conflicts over whether the government approved or rejected the proposal and whether the RSF rejected it. The prior medium-confidence assessment on external support remains, with new SAF allegations concerning Assosa and cross-border vehicle movements but no stronger independent attribution.

Key judgments

1. The SAF and RSF are very likely to continue long-range drone operations over the next 30 days, with civilian infrastructure in Kalogie, El Obeid and Ad-Da'ein remaining exposed. The UN mission reports that both forces are using long-range drones beyond traditional front lines. Reported RSF strikes killed 114 people, including 60 children, at a kindergarten and hospital in Kalogie, while SAF attacks on Ad-Da'ein Teaching Hospital killed at least 70 people. Repeated RSF attacks damaged water and energy infrastructure in El Obeid. This forecast is supported by multilateral, official and major-media reporting, although attribution and cumulative casualty figures remain less certain. (Confidence: high · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: independently corroborated reporting records a new SAF or RSF long-range drone strike on Kalogie, El Obeid, Ad-Da'ein or another location beyond a traditional front line. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: verified reporting records a 14-day cessation of long-range drone launches by both the SAF and RSF. (0-30 days)

2. The SAF is likely to intensify ground pressure from Kordofan towards Darfur during the next 1-3 months, while the RSF is likely to contest the approach. Lieutenant General Yasser Al-Atta named El Fasher, Ed Daein, Nyala, El Geneina and Zalingei as SAF priorities and said the army was preparing to advance from all directions. Separate reporting says the SAF partially lifted the RSF siege of El Obeid, but the Export Road remains contested after RSF counterattacks. Confidence is medium because the Darfur advance and the claimed reopening of routes to Al-Rahad, Dilling and Kadougli come chiefly from one SAF interview, and independent confirmation of imminent entry into the named cities is absent. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: independent reporting documents SAF units or supply columns moving beyond Al-Rahad, Dilling or Kadougli towards El Fasher, Ed Daein, Nyala, El Geneina or Zalingei. (0-3 months)
• I&W: Break: verified reporting shows the Kordofan routes remain closed or the RSF restores the siege of El Obeid and halts SAF movement. (0-3 months)

3. Humanitarian conditions in Sudan are very likely to worsen over the next 30 days, especially in Kordofan and Darfur, as attacks damage civilian infrastructure and medical capacity. More than six million people are reported displaced within Sudan and another 4.5 million across borders, while a separate UN-linked figure reports more than 14 million displaced during the war. The totals are materially inconsistent and should not be combined or treated as a single count. WHO reports extensive damage to three Khartoum hospitals, and the UN has warned of an imminent risk of further attacks in Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur. Confidence is high for deterioration, but lower for any single aggregate displacement total. (Confidence: high · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: UN, WHO or major-media reporting records additional hospital, water or energy damage in El Obeid, Kalogie, Ad-Da'ein, Khartoum or Darfur. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: UN or WHO reporting confirms restored hospital capacity in Khartoum and no new civilian infrastructure damage in the named conflict areas for 14 consecutive days. (0-30 days)

4. A 90-day ceasefire covering Sudan is unlikely to take effect in the next 30 days. Al-Burhan said military leadership approved a proposal, while other reporting says the government rejected a modification to its terms and that the RSF rejected an initiative requiring withdrawal from cities and civilian areas. The contradictory accounts leave both the approval status and responsibility for the impasse unresolved. Confidence is low because the evidence is conflicting and relies heavily on statements relayed through major and local media rather than a jointly issued text. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: the Sudanese government and the RSF issue a jointly authenticated text setting a start date, withdrawal schedule and monitoring arrangements for a 90-day ceasefire. (0-30 days)
• I&W: Break: either side formally rejects a 90-day truce or hostilities continue through an announced start date without RSF withdrawal from cities and civilian areas. (0-30 days)

5. RSF cross-border support networks are likely to remain available over the next 1-3 months, but direct UAE state responsibility remains unproven. The UN fact-finding mission reported alleged support by individuals and entities in the UAE, Chad, southeastern Libya and Puntland, and found a transnational network facilitating RSF operations. It also reported recruitment and deployment of former Colombian military personnel. The UAE denies providing military support. SAF claims about RSF drone launches from Assosa, Ethiopia and RSF vehicles moving from Libya through Chad add warning but come from a single military source and lack corroboration in the supplied reporting. Confidence is medium. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: independent imagery, official investigations or corroborated reporting identifies foreign personnel, equipment or logistics linked to RSF operations at named locations in the UAE, Chad, southeastern Libya, Puntland or Assosa. (0-3 months)
• I&W: Break: credible reporting documents interruption of the named support network, withdrawal of foreign personnel and no new cross-border support activity for 30 consecutive days. (0-3 months)

6. International diplomatic and accountability pressure on the SAF and RSF is very likely to intensify through 9 October, while adoption of a nationwide UN arms embargo before 9 October is unlikely. The US is penholder, the UK backed a technical rollover of the sanctions regime to 9 October, and the UN fact-finding mission called for immediate enforcement of the Darfur embargo and its extension across Sudan. Al-Burhan says the proposed extension will not pass, so the policy outcome remains contested. Confidence is medium because the pressure trend is corroborated by official and UN reporting, but the vote outcome is unresolved. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: the Security Council tables or negotiates a nationwide embargo extension before 9 October while the UK and other members publicly support additional measures. (0-30 days)
• I&W: Break: the Security Council adopts a nationwide embargo before 9 October, or negotiations end without follow-on action beyond the technical rollover. (0-30 days)

Outlook & scenarios

Continued drone war and contested Kordofan front (55%)

The SAF and RSF sustain long-range drone attacks while ground fighting remains active in Kordofan and Blue Nile. El Obeid's water and energy systems, civilian sites in South Kordofan and Ad-Da'ein Teaching Hospital remain exposed. No nationwide ceasefire takes effect.

SAF push towards Darfur (25%)

The SAF advances from Kordofan towards El Fasher, Ed Daein, Nyala, El Geneina and Zalingei. The RSF responds with counterattacks around supply routes and urban approaches, producing renewed displacement and a wider Darfur campaign.

Time-bound ceasefire track (15%)

The Sudanese government and the RSF agree a time-bound ceasefire with RSF withdrawal from cities and civilian areas. Drone and ground attacks decline, but disputed control of Darfur and unresolved accountability findings leave implementation fragile.

Cross-border escalation wildcard (5%)

Low-probability, high-impact: allegations involving Assosa, Libya and Chad become operationally verified and trigger wider foreign involvement along cross-border routes. The immediate effect is a broader theatre and additional pressure on civilian supply routes.

Recommendations

1. Maintain a 0-14-day incident watch for long-range drone launches, impacts and air-defence activity involving the SAF and RSF around Kalogie, El Obeid, Ad-Da'ein and other sites beyond traditional front lines.
2. Track SAF movement and RSF counterattacks around Bara, El Obeid, Al-Rahad, Dilling and Kadougli, then compare claims of progress with independent reporting before assessing an advance towards El Fasher, Ed Daein, Nyala, El Geneina or Zalingei.
3. Report displacement figures as separate series, distinguishing internal displacement, cross-border movement and the higher UN-linked total. Do not combine the figures until the reporting periods and counting methods are reconciled.
4. Treat the 90-day ceasefire as unconfirmed until the Sudanese government and RSF issue a jointly authenticated text with a start date, withdrawal schedule and monitoring arrangements.
5. Separate UN-documented evidence of transnational support from SAF allegations about Assosa and Chad. Prioritise independent imagery, official investigations and corroborated reporting before attributing state responsibility.
6. Maintain a sanctions decision timeline through 9 October. Track the draft text, Council negotiations, UK and other member positions, and whether the outcome is a technical rollover or a nationwide embargo extension.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is high for the core assessment because UN investigations, UN Human Rights Office reporting, WHO reporting, official government statements and major-media accounts corroborate the expansion of drone warfare, civilian harm, infrastructure damage and humanitarian deterioration. Confidence is lower on the precise displacement total, the status of the proposed ceasefire, the timing of a SAF advance into Darfur and direct UAE state responsibility for RSF support.

Intelligence gaps

• [EEI 1.1 · PARTIAL] Observed concentrations and movement of armed units (size estimates, unit identifiers if visible) within X km of named towns/roads/airfields (e.g., El Fasher, Geneina, Nyala, Khartoum neighborhoods) including timestamps and direction of movement. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 1.2 · PARTIAL] Changes in employment of heavy weapons and systems: documented use or emplacement of artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, tanks, combat helicopters, and airstrikes at specific coordinates and times. Recommended collection: open-source/media
• [EEI 1.4 · PARTIAL] Status of critical infrastructure and lines of communication: control or denial of named bridges, main highways (identify route numbers), airfields, fuel depots and telecommunication hubs and any reported sabotage/blockage incidents. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.2 · UNCOVERED] Access impediments to humanitarian assistance: reported attacks on, blockages of, or denial of passage for named humanitarian convoys (dates, GPS locations, responsible actor if known) and closure status of specific routes. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.3 · PARTIAL] Functional status of medical infrastructure in named locations: number of operational hospitals/clinics, reported shortages of key medicines/blood, and hospital casualty/occupancy figures for the last 72 hours. Recommended collection: medical/health cluster reporting
• [EEI 3.1 · PARTIAL] Detection of flights, ships or overland convoys delivering military materiel or foreign personnel to named airfields, ports or border crossings (flight/IMO numbers, manifests if available, timestamps, route origin/destination). Recommended collection: air-traffic / maritime / border customs
• [EEI 3.2 · PARTIAL] Imagery or on-the-ground confirmation of foreign military personnel or private military contractor bases/forward operating elements at specified coordinates or compounds, including vehicle/weapon types observed. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 3.3 · PARTIAL] Financial and sanctions-relevant indicators: atypical large transfers, use of designated front companies, or shipments routed through third states linked to procurement of weapons or fuel for RSF or SAF (transaction dates, parties, amounts where obtainable). Recommended collection: financial intelligence

Cited sources

[1] anewz.tv · UN urges Sudan ceasefire as drone warfare escalates (B) · Wed Sep 09 2026 14:41:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:8229bc586daa [2] United Nations (UN News content republished by primanews.org) · Human rights chief Türk renews call for end to spiralling Sudan war (A) · Sun Sep 13 2026 23:29:29 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:dd6576659b4f [3] Government of the United Kingdom · The United Kingdom has long supported strengthening the UN sanctions regime: UK Explanation of Vote at the UN Security Council (A) · Fri Sep 11 2026 20:14:22 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:135b57e86d51 [4] Sudanhorizon (republishing an interview from Al-Shorouk with SAF Chief of Staff Yasser Al-Atta) · SAF Chief of Staff in an Interview with Al-Shorouk: No Future for the RSF in Sudan (B) · Mon Sep 14 2026 14:38:25 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:35189f37932c [5] Middle East Eye · RSF drone strikes shatter sense of optimism in Sudan's el-Obeid (B) · Tue Sep 08 2026 08:42:43 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:12366290a4c3 [6] News.az · Why is fighting in Sudan’s Blue Nile displacing nearly 100,000 people | News.az (D) · sha256:770a6004b7e8 [7] Alzaawia (الزاوية نت) · البرهان لأول مرة يكشف كواليس خروجه من القيادة العامة وهل كان داخل “بدروم” (D) · Thu Sep 10 2026 19:53:24 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:71939d4e3155 [8] Al Jazeera (aljazeera.net) · اعتبر اتهام استخدام السلاح الكيماوي ورقة ضغط. البرهان يرفض مقترحات جديدة للسلام (B) · Fri Sep 11 2026 12:35:33 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:ebefea29930a [9] المنصة السودانية (Almanasa Al Sudaniah) · البرهان يفضح البشير | المنصة السودانية (D) · Thu Sep 10 2026 21:55:04 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:146fb084a1a1 [10] Sahara Reporters · UN Demands Enforcement Of Darfur Arms Embargo As Sudan War Escalates (D) · sha256:8e5ac78d270e

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