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Sudan Conflict: External Drone Support, Kordofan Pressure and Aid Risk

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-09-22 22:11Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

The Sudan conflict is likely to remain protracted as foreign-supplied drones, weapons and personnel sustain both the SAF and RSF. RSF pressure around El Obeid and contested fighting in Kordofan will likely continue, while humanitarian conditions are very likely to worsen as aid access remains exposed and the Adré crossing authorisation approaches expiry.

Executive summary

Reporting during the period indicates a more externally supplied and drone-enabled conflict. The RSF continues to attack El Obeid and has claimed gains west of the city, while the SAF reports gains in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. New reporting also describes Pakistani, Iranian, Turkish and Egyptian-linked systems supporting SAF operations, although the status of the reported Pakistan-Sudan arms package remains disputed. The humanitarian system is on the brink of collapse, with more than 33 million people requiring assistance, around 20 million facing acute food insecurity and displacement estimates ranging from over 11 million to 14 million. US and multilateral calls for a humanitarian truce remain active, but the SAF leadership's stated intention to continue fighting limits near-term prospects for a nationwide agreement.

Change from previous assessment

The core judgments from the previous brief are retained: humanitarian conditions are worsening, Kordofan fighting remains contested, external support is sustaining the conflict and a near-term nationwide ceasefire is unlikely. This assessment adds a likely SAF capability gain from reported Pakistani, Iranian, Turkish and Egyptian-linked drone and air systems, while lowering confidence in the exact status of the Pakistan-Sudan arms package because April reporting of a hold conflicts with reported summer deliveries. It also gives greater weight to the expiry risk surrounding the Adré crossing authorisation and to the current dispute over alleged Ethiopian support for RSF drone operations.

Key judgments

1. Foreign support is very likely to sustain SAF and RSF military operations over the next 1-3 months. The reported networks include private entities, logistics intermediaries and recruiters operating from Colombia and the UAE, with transit through Chad, southeastern Libya and Somalia. Up to 2,000 former Colombian military contractors have reportedly operated combat drones, artillery and advanced weapons systems alongside RSF units in Darfur and Kordofan. The UN Fact-Finding Mission has also reported that external support sustains operations involving serious violations and international crimes. Confidence is medium because the core finding is supported by multiple sources, but the extent of UAE government direction remains contested and some network reporting rests on think-tank analysis. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: Within 1-3 months, independent reporting or imagery identifies additional foreign personnel, drone components or weapons moving through Chad, southeastern Libya or Somalia to RSF-held areas. (1-3 months)
• I&W: Break: Within 1-3 months, independent investigations document a sustained halt in external deliveries and no new foreign personnel or weapons entering RSF-held areas. (1-3 months)

2. The RSF is likely to maintain drone and ground pressure on El Obeid and nearby Kordofan positions over the next 14 days, despite SAF claims of gains in South Kordofan and a repelled RSF attack in Blue Nile. The RSF has been reported to attack El Obeid, a city of around half a million people, strike hospitals and schools, degrade electricity, fuel and water infrastructure, and claim a major victory at Abu Qauod west of the city. Confidence is medium because the battlefield picture relies partly on party claims and local reporting, with no independent confirmation of the competing territorial assertions. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: New RSF drone strikes hit hospitals, schools, electricity, fuel or water facilities in El Obeid or nearby North Kordofan within the next 14 days. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: Independent imagery and multiple non-party sources show sustained SAF control of Abu Qauod and restored access or functioning of key infrastructure in El Obeid within the next 14 days. (0-14 days)

3. Humanitarian conditions are very likely to worsen across Darfur and Kordofan over the next 14 days and across Sudan over the next 1-3 months. More than 33 million people reportedly require humanitarian assistance, the UN says the humanitarian system is on the brink of collapse, and attacks have affected hospitals, markets, fuel depots, power stations and humanitarian routes. The Adré border crossing authorisation is due to expire in September. Displacement estimates remain unresolved, with one set of reporting citing 14 million forcibly displaced and another citing over 11 million displaced within Sudan or to surrounding countries. Confidence is high on the direction of deterioration because official, UN-linked, major-media and humanitarian reporting converge, but medium confidence applies to the precise displacement total. (Confidence: high · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: The Adré crossing authorisation expires in September without a reported extension, or a further attack disrupts a World Food Programme convoy within the next 14 days. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: The Adré authorisation is renewed and UN reporting records sustained humanitarian access into Darfur and Kordofan over the next 1-3 months. (1-3 months)

4. A nationwide SAF-RSF humanitarian truce is unlikely over the next 30 days, although limited diplomatic efforts and local access arrangements remain possible. The United States has renewed calls for a 90-day humanitarian truce and committed $375 million to humanitarian efforts, while the AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, EU and UN have conducted consultations and a good offices mission to Khartoum. Against this, Gen Abdel Fattah Al Burhan has vowed to continue fighting until the RSF is defeated, and the May 2023 Jeddah Declaration collapsed after repeated violations. Confidence is medium because diplomatic activity is well documented, but current reporting does not establish RSF acceptance or either side's ability to enforce a truce. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: SAF and RSF representatives issue written acceptance of a 90-day truce and establish a monitored arrangement for aid access within 30 days. (0-30 days)
• I&W: Break: Gen Abdel Fattah Al Burhan or RSF leaders announce a new offensive while rejecting the US truce proposal, or fighting prevents the Quintet from securing an access arrangement. (0-30 days)

5. A direct Sudan-Ethiopia war is very unlikely over the next 30 days, while allegations of Ethiopian support for RSF drone operations are likely to persist. Sudanese officials have accused Ethiopia of hosting RSF training camps and drone operations, and Sudan's Defence Ministry reported that a hostile drone near Kurmuk was launched from Ethiopian territory. Reuters and Yale HRL have separately reported evidence pointing to alleged Ethiopian support. Ethiopia and the UAE deny providing support, and Malik Agar has said Sudan does not want war with Ethiopia. Confidence is medium because the claims and denials are separately reported but the alleged launch sites and training camps lack independent verification. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: Sudanese officials issue new accusations of RSF operations from Ethiopia and Sudanese defences report another drone approaching from the Ethiopian border within 30 days. (0-30 days)
• I&W: Break: Sudanese and Ethiopian forces exchange fire, conduct cross-border strikes or announce military mobilisation linked to the alleged drone activity within 30 days. (0-30 days)

6. The SAF is likely to retain access to multiple foreign-supplied drone and air capabilities over the next 1-3 months, but the scale and timing of deliveries remain unresolved. Reporting says the SAF received Pakistani-made Mohafiz armoured vehicles and Shahpar reconnaissance drones during the summer as part of a reported $1.5 billion package, while satellite imagery showed Iranian-designed Mohajer-6 airframes at Wadi Sayyidna and reporting attributes more than $120 million in equipment to Baykar. This conflicts with earlier reporting that Pakistan placed the package on hold in April and with reporting that the SAF halted Iranian purchases. Confidence is medium because the presence of some platforms is supported by imagery or major-media reporting, but the status of the Pakistani and Iranian supply arrangements is contested. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: New satellite imagery or official records identify Shahpar drones, Mohafiz vehicles, K-8 aircraft or additional unmanned systems at SAF facilities within 1-3 months. (1-3 months)
• I&W: Break: Pakistani or Sudanese records confirm that the reported arms package remained halted and independent reporting finds no further Pakistani deliveries or Iranian-origin systems entering SAF service within 1-3 months. (1-3 months)

Outlook & scenarios

Contested Kordofan attrition (45%)

The likely path over the next 1-3 months is continued SAF-RSF fighting around El Obeid, Abu Qauod, South Kordofan and North Darfur, with both sides claiming local gains and drones striking urban and civilian infrastructure. Foreign supply networks sustain operational capacity without producing a decisive breakthrough.

Humanitarian access shock (30%)

A likely deterioration follows the expiry or disruption of the Adré crossing authorisation, further attacks on humanitarian routes and declining access to hospitals, fuel and water. Darfur and Kordofan face the greatest near-term exposure, while displacement and acute food insecurity continue to rise.

Limited diplomatic opening (15%)

US pressure, Quintet mediation and the proposed arms embargo expansion produce a limited arrangement for humanitarian access or local pauses. A nationwide ceasefire remains unlikely because the SAF leadership continues to reject a settlement before defeating the RSF and external military support remains available.

Regionalisation through a border incident (10%)

The low-probability, high-impact wildcard is a Sudanese-Ethiopian confrontation following another alleged RSF drone launch or a cross-border strike. Such an incident would widen the conflict beyond Sudan's internal front and complicate truce diplomacy, although a direct war remains very unlikely in the next 30 days.

Recommendations

1. Maintain a daily, separate track for reported and independently corroborated developments around El Obeid, Abu Qauod, South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Ambro. Give priority to evidence that confirms control of named locations, infrastructure damage and repeat drone activity.
2. Reconcile the conflicting Pakistan-Sudan arms reporting before treating the reported $1.5 billion package as fully delivered. Track Wadi Sayyidna imagery, Shahpar and Mohafiz sightings, K-8 aircraft reporting, Baykar-linked systems and evidence concerning the reported halt in Iranian purchases.
3. Use both the 14 million and over 11 million displacement figures only with their stated scope and methodology. Do not merge them into a single estimate until the difference between total forced displacement and displacement within Sudan or neighbouring countries is resolved.
4. Treat the Adré crossing authorisation, attacks on World Food Programme convoys and the status of humanitarian routes as immediate warning indicators. Escalate reporting if the authorisation expires without renewal or if attacks prevent aid movement into Darfur.
5. Monitor whether the United States, the Quintet, SAF and RSF move from statements to verifiable truce measures. Require written acceptance, an access mechanism and evidence of compliance before assessing that diplomacy has altered battlefield behaviour.
6. Track the Sudan-Ethiopia border separately from the internal conflict. Seek independent confirmation of alleged drone launch locations, training camps and any cross-border exchange before attributing responsibility or assessing a regional war risk.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is high for the core assessment because the main developments are supported by converging official government, UN-linked, major-media, humanitarian and think-tank reporting. The direction of risk is consistent across the conflict's external support, humanitarian deterioration and continued fighting. The principal uncertainties are the precise displacement total, the status of the reported Pakistan-Sudan arms package, the timing of Iranian procurement changes, battlefield control around El Obeid and the attribution of alleged Ethiopian support to the RSF.

Intelligence gaps

• [EEI 1.1 · PARTIAL] Observed concentrations and movement of armed units (size estimates, unit identifiers if visible) within X km of named towns/roads/airfields (e.g., El Fasher, Geneina, Nyala, Khartoum neighborhoods) including timestamps and direction of movement. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 1.4 · PARTIAL] Status of critical infrastructure and lines of communication: control or denial of named bridges, main highways (identify route numbers), airfields, fuel depots and telecommunication hubs and any reported sabotage/blockage incidents. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.1 · PARTIAL] Counts and locations of newly displaced persons arriving at formal sites, informal camps, border crossings or collective centers (daily/weekly arrivals, site coordinates), including demographics (women, children, elderly) where available. Recommended collection: humanitarian/UN OCHA reports
• [EEI 2.2 · PARTIAL] Access impediments to humanitarian assistance: reported attacks on, blockages of, or denial of passage for named humanitarian convoys (dates, GPS locations, responsible actor if known) and closure status of specific routes. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.3 · PARTIAL] Functional status of medical infrastructure in named locations: number of operational hospitals/clinics, reported shortages of key medicines/blood, and hospital casualty/occupancy figures for the last 72 hours. Recommended collection: medical/health cluster reporting
• [EEI 3.1 · PARTIAL] Detection of flights, ships or overland convoys delivering military materiel or foreign personnel to named airfields, ports or border crossings (flight/IMO numbers, manifests if available, timestamps, route origin/destination). Recommended collection: air-traffic / maritime / border customs
• [EEI 3.2 · PARTIAL] Imagery or on-the-ground confirmation of foreign military personnel or private military contractor bases/forward operating elements at specified coordinates or compounds, including vehicle/weapon types observed. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 3.3 · PARTIAL] Financial and sanctions-relevant indicators: atypical large transfers, use of designated front companies, or shipments routed through third states linked to procurement of weapons or fuel for RSF or SAF (transaction dates, parties, amounts where obtainable). Recommended collection: financial intelligence

Cited sources

[1] UK Government (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office) · Foreign Secretary speech on Sudan at the UN General Assembly as part of High Level Week (A) · Mon Sep 21 2026 23:42:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:fad94b9ce811 [2] The National · UN ready to investigate use of chemical weapons in Sudan civil war (A) · Mon Sep 21 2026 16:05:17 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:9985d675ac78 [3] Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI) · External Support Networks Sustain Sudan’s Multi-Faceted Conflict — Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI) (C) · Mon Sep 21 2026 05:01:56 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:8dcfc4c77b51 [4] Fair Observer · As Iran’s War Drains Its Arsenal, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan Rearm Sudan’s Army (B) · Tue Sep 22 2026 13:58:39 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:840c0f2c95ec [5] Inter Press Service (IPS), republished on Global Issues · Sudan: Blood on Foreign Powers’ Hands (C) · Mon Sep 21 2026 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:95c3c783d45c [6] Al Jazeera · Why do Sudan’s humanitarian truces keep failing and who is to blame? (A) · Mon Sep 21 2026 11:22:40 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:9c89a146715f [7] Jamaica Inquirer · Why do Sudan’s humanitarian truces keep failing and who is to blame?  - Jamaica Inquirer – Daily Jamaica News (D) · Mon Sep 21 2026 11:59:41 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:92f58ca43e6d [8] 3ayin.com · Ayin network – شبكة عاين (F) · Wed Sep 16 2026 09:13:08 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:d703b08437b9 [9] The Eastleigh Voice · Sudan says it does not want war with Ethiopia amid rising tensions | The Eastleigh Voice (D) · Fri Sep 18 2026 08:18:31 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:cb16285a43e9 [10] inkl.com · Saudi-Sudanese Maritime Border Talks Resurface Amid Shifting Wartime Alliances (B) · Tue Sep 22 2026 04:58:32 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:f34cfd4ccb7a

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