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Sudan Conflict: North Kordofan Fighting and Rising Humanitarian Strain

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-09-18 22:06Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

Sudan's war is likely to remain active across North Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur through 18 October, with competing SAF and RSF claims preventing a verified judgement of decisive territorial change. Humanitarian pressure is very likely to worsen as fighting around El Obeid and Darfur combines with reduced food assistance and warnings that the aid system could fail within weeks.

Executive summary

The SAF announced gains in 11 areas of North Kordofan and sweeping operations west of El Obeid on 18 September, while RSF reporting placed Jabal Kadam under its control in Blue Nile and earlier RSF reporting claimed the capture of Bakori and Surkum bases. Reporting conflicts over El Obeid, where the RSF is described as surrounding the city while the SAF says it reopened routes and removed the threat. Humanitarian conditions are deteriorating, with 19.5 million people facing crisis food insecurity, WFP providing only half rations in Tawila, North Darfur, and IOM warning that the aid system could collapse within weeks. Sudanese officials continue to accuse Ethiopia of supporting RSF drone activity, but Addis Ababa rejects the allegations and Malik Agar has said Sudan does not want war with Ethiopia. Violence at Amiet market in Abyei killed 26 people and injured 82, prompting additional UNISFA deployments.

Change from previous assessment

Since the 17 September brief, the assessment adds SAF-reported gains and sweeping operations in North Kordofan, the reported RSF seizure of Jabal Kadam in Blue Nile, and a sharper contradiction over the security status of El Obeid. The humanitarian judgement is more urgent after the warning that the aid system could collapse within weeks and the report that Tawila is receiving only half rations. The Ethiopia judgement remains unlikely for direct war but now carries clearer indicators involving drone attacks on named dams and alleged launches from Assosa. The Abyei judgement is retained with updated reporting of 26 deaths and 82 injuries.

Key judgments

1. The SAF and RSF are likely to sustain active combat in North Kordofan and Blue Nile through 18 October 2026, while neither side has established a verified decisive advantage. On 18 September, the SAF announced control of 11 areas in North Kordofan and sweeping operations west of El Obeid. RSF reporting placed Jabal Kadam under RSF control, while earlier RSF reporting claimed the capture of the Bakori and Surkum army bases. The conflicting accounts over El Obeid, combined with limited independent verification of current front lines, lower confidence in the territorial picture. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: independent reporting records continued SAF operations west of El Obeid alongside RSF attacks or sustained RSF control claims around Jabal Kadam, Bakori or Surkum. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: either side demonstrates sustained control of the contested El Obeid approaches and the opposing force stops reporting effective operations in the area. (0-30 days)

2. The SAF is unlikely to establish control of all five major Darfur cities, El Fasher, Ed Daein, Nyala, El Geneina and Zalingei, by 18 October 2026. The SAF Chief of Staff has described entry into the cities as an imminent priority, but the reporting supplied here records intent rather than current control. The RSF siege and capture of El Fasher in late 2025, together with the reported readiness of Al-Nour Ahmed Adam's forces to fight alongside the SAF, indicates that any SAF advance into Darfur would face contested positions and allied-force dependence. Confidence is medium because the judgement rests partly on one SAF interview and older reporting on El Fasher. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: SAF statements continue to describe entry into the five cities as a future operation without reporting established control of any additional city. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: the SAF reports and independent sources corroborate established control of multiple named Darfur cities. (0-30 days)

3. Humanitarian pressure is very likely to worsen over the next one to three months, particularly in North Darfur and North Kordofan, with continued severe pressure in Blue Nile. UN agencies report 19.5 million people facing crisis food insecurity and 8.6 million internally displaced, while UNICEF's mid-2026 assessment recorded more than nine million internally displaced and a separate UN investigation reported more than 14 million displaced since the war began. These figures are not directly comparable because they use different definitions and timeframes. WFP is providing only half rations in Tawila, famine thresholds for malnutrition have been surpassed in Um Baru and Kernoi, and the IOM Director General warned that the aid system could collapse within weeks without action. The IOM estimate of 99,277 people displaced in Blue Nile is lower-confidence, but it adds to the pressure on Damazin and surrounding areas. (Confidence: high · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: WFP reports further ration reductions or access losses in Tawila, while UNICEF or other UN agencies report additional malnutrition threshold breaches in Um Baru or Kernoi. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: WFP restores full rations in Tawila and IOM reports that its minimum humanitarian pipeline is funded and operating without further interruption. (1-3 months)

4. A direct Sudan-Ethiopia war is unlikely through 18 October 2026, but cross-border military friction involving alleged RSF-linked drone activity is likely to persist. Sudanese officials have alleged that RSF drones and training activity operate from Assosa and other Ethiopian sites, and Sudan's Defence Ministry has reported a drone interception near Kurmuk while the SAF reported attacks targeting the Upper Atbara and Setit dam complex and Khashm al-Girba dam. Ethiopia rejects the accusations as baseless, and Malik Agar has said Sudan does not want war with Ethiopia. A Yale Humanitarian Research Lab report provides high-confidence evidence of activity consistent with Ethiopian military assistance to the RSF at an Asosa base, but responsibility for specific current attacks remains unconfirmed. Confidence is medium because the principal current allegations come from Sudanese officials and are contested by Ethiopia. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: another drone attack targets the Upper Atbara and Setit complex, Khashm al-Girba dam or Kurmuk, with evidence linking the launch to Assosa or another Ethiopian airfield. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: Sudanese and Ethiopian forces exchange fire across the border, or either government publicly abandons its stated opposition to direct war. (0-30 days)

5. Intercommunal violence in Abyei is likely to remain a localised but active flashpoint over the next 14 days. Violence at Amiet market killed 26 people and injured 82 after separate killings of a Ngok Dinka man and a Misseriya man, and UNISFA reinforced its presence in the market and surrounding areas. Confidence is medium because the assessment rests on one reported episode and the resulting UNISFA response, with no corroborated evidence here of sustained mobilisation beyond Amiet. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: further killings or armed clashes occur at Amiet market or in the surrounding Abyei area, prompting additional UNISFA deployments. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: UNISFA reports no further violence at Amiet and confirms that its reinforcement has stabilised the market area for the full 14-day period. (0-14 days)

Outlook & scenarios

Protracted multi-front war and humanitarian decline (55%)

The most likely outcome is continued SAF and RSF fighting around El Obeid, North Kordofan and Blue Nile, with neither side securing a decisive breakthrough. WFP ration reductions, displacement and malnutrition in North Darfur continue to worsen the humanitarian picture.

SAF consolidates North Kordofan but fails to clear Darfur (25%)

The SAF sustains its reported gains around El Obeid and advances towards the Darfur approaches, while the RSF retains positions in Blue Nile and the five major Darfur cities. The result is a stronger SAF position in central Sudan without a decisive national settlement.

High-impact regionalisation after a border incident (10%)

A further drone attack on Sudanese infrastructure, especially near the Ethiopian border, is attributed to an Ethiopian launch site and prompts direct Sudanese military action against Ethiopian positions. This would widen the war beyond RSF and SAF forces and sharply increase displacement and diplomatic pressure.

Limited political opening alongside continued fighting (10%)

Sudan's request for IGAD support develops into a domestic dialogue process, while armed movements that signed the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement begin integration into the SAF. Fighting continues, but the political track reduces the immediate risk of further fragmentation.

Recommendations

1. Maintain a daily control matrix for El Obeid, Jabal Kadam, Bakori, Surkum and the 11 North Kordofan areas named by the SAF. Separate SAF and RSF claims from independently corroborated evidence.
2. Prioritise humanitarian warning checks on WFP ration levels in Tawila, malnutrition indicators in Um Baru and Kernoi, the IOM funding pipeline and new displacement into Damazin.
3. Track the Sudan-Ethiopia border for drone launches, strikes on the Upper Atbara and Setit complex or Khashm al-Girba dam, activity at Assosa, and any change in Malik Agar's stated opposition to war.
4. Keep the five named Darfur cities as separate collection requirements rather than treating Darfur as a single front. Record any confirmed SAF entry, RSF withdrawal or population displacement for each city.
5. Monitor Amiet market and nearby Abyei communities for new killings, armed gatherings and additional UNISFA deployments during the next 14 days.
6. Do not treat the single NASA FIRMS thermal detection as proof of a strike or attribute it to either party. NASA FIRMS records heat, not cause, so use it only alongside location-specific reporting.
7. Report displacement figures with their definitions and dates. Distinguish current internally displaced people from total displaced people since the war began before comparing the figures.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is high for the central assessment that Sudan's war remains active and that humanitarian pressure is worsening. The picture draws on corroborated reporting from UN agencies, WFP, IOM, UNICEF, UNISFA, major media and NGO sources across military and humanitarian developments. Confidence is lower for current territorial control around El Obeid and Blue Nile, responsibility for alleged Ethiopia-linked drone activity, and the total displacement count because those claims are contested or use different definitions.

Intelligence gaps

• [EEI 1.1 · PARTIAL] Observed concentrations and movement of armed units (size estimates, unit identifiers if visible) within X km of named towns/roads/airfields (e.g., El Fasher, Geneina, Nyala, Khartoum neighborhoods) including timestamps and direction of movement. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 1.2 · PARTIAL] Changes in employment of heavy weapons and systems: documented use or emplacement of artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, tanks, combat helicopters, and airstrikes at specific coordinates and times. Recommended collection: open-source/media
• [EEI 1.4 · PARTIAL] Status of critical infrastructure and lines of communication: control or denial of named bridges, main highways (identify route numbers), airfields, fuel depots and telecommunication hubs and any reported sabotage/blockage incidents. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.1 · PARTIAL] Counts and locations of newly displaced persons arriving at formal sites, informal camps, border crossings or collective centers (daily/weekly arrivals, site coordinates), including demographics (women, children, elderly) where available. Recommended collection: humanitarian/UN OCHA reports
• [EEI 2.2 · UNCOVERED] Access impediments to humanitarian assistance: reported attacks on, blockages of, or denial of passage for named humanitarian convoys (dates, GPS locations, responsible actor if known) and closure status of specific routes. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.3 · UNCOVERED] Functional status of medical infrastructure in named locations: number of operational hospitals/clinics, reported shortages of key medicines/blood, and hospital casualty/occupancy figures for the last 72 hours. Recommended collection: medical/health cluster reporting
• [EEI 3.1 · PARTIAL] Detection of flights, ships or overland convoys delivering military materiel or foreign personnel to named airfields, ports or border crossings (flight/IMO numbers, manifests if available, timestamps, route origin/destination). Recommended collection: air-traffic / maritime / border customs
• [EEI 3.3 · PARTIAL] Financial and sanctions-relevant indicators: atypical large transfers, use of designated front companies, or shipments routed through third states linked to procurement of weapons or fuel for RSF or SAF (transaction dates, parties, amounts where obtainable). Recommended collection: financial intelligence

Cited sources

[1] Youm7 · السودان يواصل تحرير الأرض من قبضة مليشيات الدعم السريع. الجيش يسيطر على شمال كردفان. ويخلف خسائر فادحة في صفوف «الجنجويد» ويطارد بقايا فلوله حتى تخوم دارفور. عسكري منشق: حميدتى قرر الحرب من أجل تمزيق البلاد (B) · Fri Sep 18 2026 16:30:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:f594775ade2d [2] United Nations News · UN agencies warn humanitarian system in Sudan ‘could collapse’ (A) · Mon Sep 14 2026 19:27:01 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:fe86ccd69954 [3] Sudanhorizon · SAF Chief of Staff in an Interview with Al-Shorouk: No Future for the RSF in Sudan (D) · Mon Sep 14 2026 14:38:25 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:35189f37932c [4] Europe External Programme with Africa (EEPA), via International Press Service (IDN, indepthnews.net) · EEPA reports on protest urges EU to protect Eritreans in Libya (C) · Thu Sep 17 2026 13:20:06 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:380d80a55648 [5] News.az · Why is fighting in Sudan’s Blue Nile displacing nearly 100,000 people | News.az (D) · sha256:07ebf85ee8c1 [6] Modern Tokyo Times · Sudan Crisis and War – Darfur to Kordofan – Modern Tokyo Times (E) · sha256:55bcb866a248 [7] Sudan Horizon · Former RSF Leader: 70% of the militia’s members side with the SAF but They Fear Retribution (D) · Fri Sep 18 2026 09:06:13 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:e551960e086e [8] AllAfrica · Sudan Says It Does Not Want War With Ethiopia Amid Rising Tensions (D) · Thu Sep 17 2026 10:29:20 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:9ca15c4f7479 [9] The Eastleigh Voice · Sudan says it does not want war with Ethiopia amid rising tensions | The Eastleigh Voice (D) · Fri Sep 18 2026 08:18:31 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:04451fb21c48

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