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Sudan Conflict: SAF Gains Offset by RSF Resilience and Rising Humanitarian Harm

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-09-01 11:27Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

The SAF and RSF are very likely to remain in active combat over the next 30 days, with North Kordofan and North Darfur the main pressure points. Reported RSF defections and SAF control of the Export Road have not removed the RSF's capacity to reinforce positions, conduct drone attacks or contest El Fasher. Humanitarian conditions are very likely to worsen, while a broader regional war remains unlikely despite cross-border incidents involving Chad and possible military preparations in Ethiopia.

Executive summary

Recent reporting indicates continued SAF pressure along the Export Road and around El Obeid, reported defections of around 200 RSF fighters to the SAF, and RSF reinforcements near El Nahud. Control of El Fasher remains disputed because the SAF says it has completed preparations to retake the city while the RSF says it controls the last army strongholds. Fighting and drone activity are also reported in North Kordofan, North Darfur, West Darfur and Blue Nile. Humanitarian conditions are deteriorating, with thousands displaced from Bara, medical shortages in the town, more than 100,000 people facing displacement across Darfur and Kordofan, and severe nationwide food and assistance needs. Sudanese authorities lifted the Khartoum curfew and state of emergency after two years, but patrols, checkpoints and identity checks remain in place.

Change from previous assessment

Since the prior brief dated 31 August, new reporting adds the reported defection of around 200 RSF fighters, further detail on RSF reinforcements near El Nahud, the disputed SAF and RSF claims over El Fasher, and satellite reporting on expanded ENDF activity at Asosa. Confidence in the broader assessment of continued fighting rises from medium to high because reporting now covers Kordofan, Darfur and Blue Nile, although confidence in local control of El Fasher remains low. The humanitarian deterioration and civilian drone-harm judgements remain high confidence. The cross-border assessment remains low confidence, and a separate judgement on the 12 September arms-embargo vote has been added.

Key judgments

1. The SAF and RSF are very likely to remain in active combat over the next 30 days, with North Kordofan and North Darfur the primary pressure points and Blue Nile a secondary front. ACLED recorded more than 50 drone strikes across Kordofan in June, while recent reporting places heavy drone attacks and limited ground combat in North Kordofan, West Darfur, North Darfur and Blue Nile. Fighting is also reported around Bara and El Nahud. The status of El Fasher remains unresolved because the SAF announced preparations to retake the city while the RSF announced control of the last army strongholds. This contradiction lowers confidence in the local battlefield picture, not in the broader assessment that fighting will continue. (Confidence: high · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: SAF operations towards El Fasher or RSF attacks around Bara and El Nahud are reported or independently imaged. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: SAF and RSF announce and observe a verified cessation of attacks across North Kordofan, North Darfur and Blue Nile for 14 consecutive days. (0-30 days)

2. The reported defection of around 200 RSF fighters, including senior field commanders, is likely to improve the SAF's position around Kordofan but is unlikely to remove the RSF's ability to contest the area over the next 1-3 months. The fighters reportedly arrived from Kordofan in Omdurman with weapons and equipment, and ACLED describes a steady trend of RSF defections. RSF reinforcements reportedly reached El Nahud from Darfur, while August drone attacks showed that the RSF retains reach beyond Darfur. The defection account is not independently verified, and the battlefield picture remains contested. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: the SAF identifies additional RSF commanders joining its forces and displays or documents the transferred weapons and equipment. (0-30 days)
• I&W: Break: RSF reinforcements continue arriving at El Nahud or the RSF conducts further drone attacks against SAF-held cities. (0-30 days)

3. Humanitarian conditions in Darfur and Kordofan are very likely to worsen over the next 30 days. International organisations report more than 100,000 people facing displacement in Darfur and Kordofan. OCHA estimates that more than 8 million Sudanese need assistance, while separate reporting estimates that around 21 million require food assistance. RSF attacks on Bara displaced thousands, damaged the local medical response and prompted appeals for safe corridors, trauma kits and blood supplies. Sudan's Ministry of Human Resources and Social Welfare documented 224 cases of conflict-related sexual violence against children and said the recorded cases understate the true scale. Aggregate displacement figures of 13 million and 14 million are inconsistent, so the direction of deterioration is more reliable than any single national total. (Confidence: high · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: local health workers or international organisations report further displacement from Bara, El Nahud or El Fasher, alongside new appeals for medical supplies or safe corridors. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: medical supplies reach Bara, the local clinic resumes emergency care and no new displacement is reported from the main conflict areas for 30 days. (0-30 days)

4. Drone strikes by the SAF and RSF are very likely to continue causing civilian deaths and damage to essential infrastructure over the next 30 days. The UN documented around 1,400 civilian deaths in Sudan between January and June 2026, including 1,100 attributed to drone strikes. ACLED recorded more than 50 drone strikes across Kordofan in June, and reporting states that both forces have repeatedly hit markets, schools, fuel stations and water infrastructure. Recent reports attribute five civilian deaths in Bara to RSF attacks and report that strikes at Adekong market near the Chadian border killed and injured 12 people, with the SAF accused of responsibility. (Confidence: high · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: another drone strike hits a market, school, fuel station, water facility or medical site in Sudan and is documented by local, UN or major-media reporting. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: no civilian-targeting incidents are reported by UN, ACLED or local medical networks for 14 consecutive days. (0-30 days)

5. Cross-border tension involving Chad is likely to persist over the next 1-3 months, but a broader regional war is unlikely in that period. On 20 August, SAF officials said the SAF struck an RSF resupply convoy in Ennedi-Est, Chad, involving roughly 200 combat vehicles and UAE-linked weapons moving from Al-Kufra through Chad. The United States condemned reported SAF airstrikes inside Chad and the African Union warned of wider regional escalation, while Sudan's foreign ministry denied responsibility. Ethiopia's ENDF base at Asosa expanded military resources between 23 and 28 August, but the reporting does not establish that the activity is linked to operations in Sudan. This assessment rests on contradictory attribution for the Chad incident and limited reporting on the purpose of the Asosa expansion. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: another SAF or RSF strike is reported inside Chad, or Chadian forces respond militarily to activity linked to the Sudan conflict. (0-30 days)
• I&W: Break: Sudan and Chad establish a deconfliction arrangement and no further cross-border military incident is reported for 30 days. (0-30 days)

6. A nationwide ceasefire or comprehensive political settlement is unlikely over the next 30 days, despite continuing mediation. Rosemary DiCarlo described the SAF and RSF as locked in a zero-sum military logic. The UN is supporting a humanitarian truce effort involving the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE, while Pekka Haavisto is discussing prisoner exchanges and unilateral releases and Sudanese political and civilian actors are due to meet in Addis Ababa in September. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has ruled out the return of RSF leaders to government. These activities demonstrate diplomatic engagement but do not establish SAF-RSF consent or implementation. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: SAF or RSF leaders reject the Addis Ababa talks, prisoner exchanges or the humanitarian truce while attacks continue. (0-30 days)
• I&W: Break: the SAF and RSF sign and observe a nationwide ceasefire, complete a prisoner exchange or begin a direct negotiating process. (0-30 days)

7. An extension of the Darfur arms embargo to all of Sudan is unlikely to secure approval at the UN Security Council vote scheduled for 12 September. Massad Boulos has proposed applying Resolution 1591 to all parties and including drones, but Russia, China, Pakistan and the African Group object while the United States, UK and France support the wider proposal. The sanctions regime is therefore at risk of collapse unless members agree a narrower technical renewal. Confidence is medium because the positions are reported from diplomatic coverage and could change before the vote. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: Russia, China, Pakistan or the African Group maintain opposition during consultations or the 12 September vote rejects the wider embargo. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: the Security Council adopts a country-wide embargo or members publicly reach agreement on a substantive renewal covering all Sudan. (0-14 days)

Outlook & scenarios

Continued attritional war and worsening displacement (55%)

SAF and RSF operations continue around North Kordofan, North Darfur and Blue Nile without a decisive change in control. Drone strikes remain a principal source of civilian harm, while displacement from Bara, El Nahud and El Fasher adds to pressure on medical and food assistance.

SAF consolidation followed by pressure on El Fasher (22%)

The SAF uses control of the Export Road and further RSF defections to consolidate North Kordofan, then increases operations towards El Fasher. RSF reinforcements from Darfur and continued drone attacks prevent a rapid SAF victory and keep the city contested.

Limited humanitarian pause without a political settlement (15%)

UN-supported mediation produces localised humanitarian access, prisoner releases or a short truce. The SAF and RSF continue to reject a settlement that requires major political concessions, leaving combat outside the agreed areas.

Regionalisation wildcard (8%)

A further strike in Chad, a Chadian military response or operations linked to the ENDF build-up at Asosa widen the conflict's external dimension. The result is a low-probability, high-impact disruption to aid access and diplomatic efforts.

Recommendations

1. Prioritise daily collection on Bara, El Nahud, El Obeid, El Fasher, Kurmuk and Geisan. Compare SAF and RSF statements with local emergency and medical reporting, UN updates, ACLED data and satellite imagery.
2. Prepare a dedicated watch for the 12 September Resolution 1591 vote. Track public positions from the United States, UK, France, Russia, China, Pakistan and the African Group, and distinguish a technical renewal from a country-wide embargo.
3. Treat El Fasher as contested until independent evidence establishes control. Seek geolocated imagery, consistent local reporting and evidence of access by SAF or RSF forces before revising the battlefield assessment.
4. Maintain separate humanitarian series for food assistance, general assistance and displacement. Do not combine the 8 million, 21 million, 13 million and 14 million figures without recording their definitions and reporting dates.
5. Issue a rapid warning update after any reported strike in Ennedi-Est or elsewhere in Chad, any Chadian military response, or further expansion of the Asosa base. Keep the Chad attribution and the purpose of the Asosa activity analytically separate until corroborated.
6. Track whether the reported 200 RSF defections are followed by additional named commanders, weapons transfers or SAF territorial gains. Treat the current defection account as unverified until corroborated beyond SAF-linked or single-reporting streams.
7. Prioritise humanitarian access reporting from Bara and El Nahud, including clinic functionality, trauma-kit and blood-supply availability, market closures and Starlink access. Escalate the assessment if safe-corridor appeals or medical-service failures spread to El Fasher or other North Darfur locations.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is high because the core findings are supported by corroboration across UN, ACLED, major-media, local-media and NGO reporting. The strongest evidence concerns continued fighting, civilian harm from drone strikes and worsening humanitarian conditions. The main uncertainties are the competing SAF and RSF claims over El Fasher, conflicting accounts of Kurmuk, contradictory attribution of the 20 August strikes in Chad, inconsistent national displacement totals and the unconfirmed purpose of the ENDF build-up at Asosa.

Intelligence gaps

• [EEI 1.1 · PARTIAL] Observed concentrations and movement of armed units (size estimates, unit identifiers if visible) within X km of named towns/roads/airfields (e.g., El Fasher, Geneina, Nyala, Khartoum neighborhoods) including timestamps and direction of movement. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 1.4 · PARTIAL] Status of critical infrastructure and lines of communication: control or denial of named bridges, main highways (identify route numbers), airfields, fuel depots and telecommunication hubs and any reported sabotage/blockage incidents. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.1 · PARTIAL] Counts and locations of newly displaced persons arriving at formal sites, informal camps, border crossings or collective centers (daily/weekly arrivals, site coordinates), including demographics (women, children, elderly) where available. Recommended collection: humanitarian/UN OCHA reports
• [EEI 2.2 · UNCOVERED] Access impediments to humanitarian assistance: reported attacks on, blockages of, or denial of passage for named humanitarian convoys (dates, GPS locations, responsible actor if known) and closure status of specific routes. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.3 · PARTIAL] Functional status of medical infrastructure in named locations: number of operational hospitals/clinics, reported shortages of key medicines/blood, and hospital casualty/occupancy figures for the last 72 hours. Recommended collection: medical/health cluster reporting
• [EEI 3.2 · UNCOVERED] Imagery or on-the-ground confirmation of foreign military personnel or private military contractor bases/forward operating elements at specified coordinates or compounds, including vehicle/weapon types observed. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 3.3 · PARTIAL] Financial and sanctions-relevant indicators: atypical large transfers, use of designated front companies, or shipments routed through third states linked to procurement of weapons or fuel for RSF or SAF (transaction dates, parties, amounts where obtainable). Recommended collection: financial intelligence

Cited sources

[1] Arab News · How one highway could determine Sudan’s war — and the future of its fractured regions (A) · Fri Aug 28 2026 20:16:27 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:c84271faf22d [2] AllAfrica · Sudan War - a Conflict Sustained By Weapons, Fragmentation, and Diplomatic Inertia (B) · Wed Aug 26 2026 04:13:59 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:ca1ac956f646 [3] The Taiwan Times · RSF Assault on Bara, North Kordofan Kills Five Civilians, Displaces Thousands (D) · Mon Aug 31 2026 13:00:05 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:aa4923cf81c4 [4] Youm7 (اليوم السابع) · تدهور الأوضاع الإنسانية فى السودان. الدعم السريع تغلق أسواق بغرب كردفان وتوقف خدمة ستارلينك. توثيق 224 حالة عنف جنسى ضد الأطفال منذ اندلاع الحرب. الجيش السودانى يعلن اكتمال ترتيبات استعادة السيطرة على الفاشر (B) · Thu Aug 27 2026 05:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:7d7652f716eb [5] Sky News Arabia · "الدعم السريع" تعلن السيطرة على آخر معاقل الجيش في الفاشر (B) · sha256:f8d43ca59c78 [6] Daily News Egypt · Around 200 RSF Fighters Join Sudanese Army, Reports Say (B) · Mon Aug 31 2026 20:08:25 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:de1ea9b01724 [7] EEPA (Europe External Policy Advisors) via In-Depth News (IDN) · EEPA reports on ENDF base in Asosa expands military activity (C) · Mon Aug 31 2026 14:47:15 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:cb7f6fa1ade9 [8] Al Jazeera · The RSF’s defeat will not end Sudan’s war but merely fragment it (B) · Wed Aug 26 2026 07:26:45 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:7499be878bac [9] BBC · Sudan civil war: Trump envoy calls for country-wide arms embargo as drone attacks escalate (A) · Tue Aug 25 2026 12:45:47 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:5b31360655cd [10] Majalla (en.majalla.com) · A blanket US arms embargo on Sudan is not the answer (B) · sha256:b31bce17845a

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