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Sudan conflict SITREP: RSF entrenched in Darfur, SAF holds Khartoum; atrocity risk and hunger crisis persist

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-06-14 22:15Z · Overall confidence: MEDIUM

BLUF

The Rapid Support Forces very likely retain control across much of Darfur, including El Fasher since October 2025, while the Sudanese Armed Forces hold Khartoum and the east. A nationwide humanitarian catastrophe continues, with displacement in the tens of millions and acute hunger on a massive scale, alongside credible allegations of RSF atrocity crimes.

Executive summary

Open sources indicate the war that began in April 2023 remains active into 2026, with a de facto front line: RSF entrenched across most of Darfur, including Nyala, Geneina and, since October 2025, El Fasher, and SAF controlling Khartoum, Port Sudan and large parts of the east and centre. Displacement is around 12 million and acute hunger affects roughly 20 to 25 million people. Documented atrocities include over 15,000 civilians killed in the June 2023 Geneina massacre and extensive allegations against RSF of war crimes, ethnic targeting, systematic sexual violence and deliberate starvation. Reported death tolls specific to El Fasher ranging from at least 60,000 to about 70,000 remain uncorroborated and should be treated with caution. Allegations persist of external enabling to both sides, including RSF support networks linked to the UAE and foreign fighters, and reported TPLF‑aligned support to SAF. Western governments have determined RSF genocidal acts and imposed sanctions on entities tied to both camps. Satellite fire detections in the past 48 hours point to ongoing kinetic activity, although heat signatures alone cannot attribute cause.

Change from previous assessment

Correction to prior assessment: El Fasher is now treated as having fallen to RSF in October 2025, replacing the earlier depiction of a prolonged siege; confidence remains medium due to open‑source reliance. The brief adds detail on external enablers, including alleged UAE‑linked support to RSF and reported TPLF‑aligned backing to SAF, and incorporates recent satellite fire detections as current indicators. Initial assessment of abuse risks affecting aid operations in Chad is added.

Key judgments

1. RSF likely retains control of most of Darfur, including Nyala captured on 26 October 2023, Geneina captured in April, May 2023, and El Fasher captured in October 2025. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)

• I&W: Verifiable RSF administrative or security presence in El Fasher, Nyala or Geneina documented by geolocated imagery or on-the-ground reporting. (0-3 months)
• I&W: Credible reports of SAF units re-entering and holding central institutions in any of these cities. (0-3 months)

2. SAF very likely controls Khartoum, Port Sudan and large parts of eastern and central Sudan, having retaken the capital by March 2025, while hostilities continue in 2026. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)

• I&W: SAF media or third‑party reporting from inside Khartoum’s core government facilities showing routine control. (0-3 months)
• I&W: RSF footage or reporting showing sustained control of central Khartoum districts. (0-3 months)

3. Sudan almost certainly faces a nationwide humanitarian catastrophe, with roughly 12 million displaced and 20-25 million facing severe food insecurity, alongside ongoing mass‑atrocity risk in Darfur; casualty tallies for El Fasher remain highly uncertain. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: UN or WFP updates indicating food insecurity at or above the 20-25 million range and persistently constrained access in Darfur. (1-3 months)
• I&W: Independent investigations publishing corroborated victim counts for El Fasher that materially revise current unverified estimates. (1-6 months)

4. Both belligerents likely continue to benefit from external enablers: RSF from arms and foreign fighters linked to UAE networks, and SAF from reported TPLF‑aligned support; Khartoum’s 2025 filing against the UAE reflects this contested external dimension. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Credible interdictions or investigations revealing arms transfers or organised recruitment pipelines tied to RSF support. (1-6 months)
• I&W: Verified reporting of additional TPLF‑aligned deployments or material backing to SAF on Sudanese fronts. (1-6 months)

5. International accountability pressure is likely to persist, given the January 2025 US determination of RSF genocidal acts and sanctions by the US, UK, EU and Canada on entities linked to both sides. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: New designations or asset freezes targeting RSF or SAF‑linked individuals, companies or logistics nodes. (0-6 months)
• I&W: Public rollbacks or suspensions of Sudan‑related sanctions by any of these governments. (0-6 months)

6. Active combat is likely ongoing across parts of Sudan, consistent with continued hostilities and recent satellite fire detections, although heat signatures alone cannot attribute events. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Sustained or rising NASA VIIRS thermal detections in Darfur and greater Khartoum over consecutive 7-14 day windows. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Verified local ceasefire announcements matched by a sustained drop in satellite fire signatures. (0-1 month)

7. Aid operations supporting Sudanese refugees in Chad face medium‑term integrity and protection risks following documented abuse by NGO staff, which could disrupt assistance and retraumatise survivors. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Further suspensions, dismissals or access restrictions reported by NGOs or UN agencies in Chad’s Sudan border areas. (0-3 months)
• I&W: Publication of third‑party monitoring showing implemented safeguards and no new incidents over a quarter. (1-3 months)

Outlook & scenarios

Entrenched partition through 2026 (60%)

RSF consolidates control over Darfur, including El Fasher, Nyala and Geneina, while SAF maintains Khartoum, Port Sudan and the east. Lines harden, atrocities risk persists in Darfur, displacement grows and hunger remains at extreme levels. Sanctions and genocide determinations continue without decisive leverage to end the war.

SAF reclaims limited ground in Darfur (20%)

Building on retention of Khartoum and reported external backing, SAF mounts localised counter‑offensives that retake limited urban or logistical nodes in Darfur. RSF remains dominant in the region overall. Civilian harm and displacement spike around contested areas.

Negotiated freeze under external pressure (30%)

Sustained sanctions pressure and mounting humanitarian costs drive a mediated cessation of hostilities that freezes front lines. Humanitarian access modestly improves, but core political disputes and RSF control across Darfur remain unresolved.

Recommendations

1. Prioritise OSINT verification of RSF control in El Fasher, Nyala and Geneina using geolocation of imagery and administrative artefacts; catalogue dates and locations to track governance entrenchment over time.
2. Use NASA VIIRS FIRMS detections as a cueing layer for potential strikes or fires in Darfur and greater Khartoum, and cross‑check with local reporting before attributing cause.
3. Maintain a living map of allegations and verified incidents of RSF atrocity crimes in Darfur, separating reported events from assessed judgments, and flag uncorroborated casualty figures such as El Fasher tallies for targeted validation.
4. Track sanctions designations by the US, UK, EU and Canada linked to RSF and SAF networks, and build entity‑relationship charts to surface facilitators and potential exposure points.
5. Monitor reporting on external enablers, including suspected arms flows and foreign fighter deployments to RSF and any TPLF‑aligned support to SAF; log interdictions, court filings and credible investigations as confirmatory datapoints.
6. Engage humanitarian partners on safeguards and survivor‑centred protections in Chad’s Sudanese refugee response; monitor for operational disruptions following abuse findings and record any remedial measures.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is medium. Control of key cities and front‑line configuration relies largely on open‑source reporting with medium reliability, albeit with multiple corroborating claims for RSF’s capture of Nyala and El Fasher and SAF’s hold on Khartoum. Humanitarian scale indicators, particularly displacement and hunger, are supported by multiple reputable outlets, but casualty estimates for El Fasher vary widely and remain unverified. Allegations of external enabling are grounded in major media and NGO reporting but still contain elements that are contested or based on intelligence assessments, lowering confidence on specifics.

Alternative analysis (red cell)

Many of the key judgments rely on temporally limited, single‑cluster, or medium‑admiralty reports and contain unresolved contradictions in timing, casualties, and control. It is therefore reasonable to interpret the evidence more cautiously: RSF control across Darfur and alleged external enabling are unevenly corroborated, humanitarian figures are inconsistent across sources, and documented NGO abuses—while serious—do not yet prove system‑wide operational collapse without broader verification.

Intelligence gaps

• [EEI 1.1 · UNCOVERED] Observed concentrations and movement of armed units (size estimates, unit identifiers if visible) within X km of named towns/roads/airfields (e.g., El Fasher, Geneina, Nyala, Khartoum neighborhoods) including timestamps and direction of movement. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 1.2 · UNCOVERED] Changes in employment of heavy weapons and systems: documented use or emplacement of artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, tanks, combat helicopters, and airstrikes at specific coordinates and times. Recommended collection: open-source/media
• [EEI 1.3 · UNCOVERED] Reports or intercepts of orders, operational directives or public statements from RSF/SAF commanders indicating planned offensives, ceasefire acceptance/rejection, defensive postures or orders to withdraw from named locations. Recommended collection: signals/communications intercepts
• [EEI 1.4 · UNCOVERED] Status of critical infrastructure and lines of communication: control or denial of named bridges, main highways (identify route numbers), airfields, fuel depots and telecommunication hubs and any reported sabotage/blockage incidents. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.1 · UNCOVERED] Counts and locations of newly displaced persons arriving at formal sites, informal camps, border crossings or collective centers (daily/weekly arrivals, site coordinates), including demographics (women, children, elderly) where available. Recommended collection: humanitarian/UN OCHA reports
• [EEI 2.2 · UNCOVERED] Access impediments to humanitarian assistance: reported attacks on, blockages of, or denial of passage for named humanitarian convoys (dates, GPS locations, responsible actor if known) and closure status of specific routes. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.3 · UNCOVERED] Functional status of medical infrastructure in named locations: number of operational hospitals/clinics, reported shortages of key medicines/blood, and hospital casualty/occupancy figures for the last 72 hours. Recommended collection: medical/health cluster reporting
• [EEI 3.1 · UNCOVERED] Detection of flights, ships or overland convoys delivering military materiel or foreign personnel to named airfields, ports or border crossings (flight/IMO numbers, manifests if available, timestamps, route origin/destination). Recommended collection: air-traffic / maritime / border customs
• [EEI 3.2 · UNCOVERED] Imagery or on-the-ground confirmation of foreign military personnel or private military contractor bases/forward operating elements at specified coordinates or compounds, including vehicle/weapon types observed. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 3.3 · UNCOVERED] Financial and sanctions-relevant indicators: atypical large transfers, use of designated front companies, or shipments routed through third states linked to procurement of weapons or fuel for RSF or SAF (transaction dates, parties, amounts where obtainable). Recommended collection: financial intelligence

Cited sources

[1] Wikipedia · Sudanese civil war (2023–present) (B) · sha256:f93e5d7668ee [2] Wikipedia · Darfur campaign (2023–present) (B) · sha256:7bc207eb01e4 [3] dw.com · Mercenaries and defectors abound in Sudan war (A) · sha256:d97621ec1c10 [4] Wikipedia · Sudanese Armed Forces (C) · sha256:a5f3545892c5 [5] news.abplive.com · Sudan Conflict Intensifies Amid RSF Defections, UAE Rejects Allegations Of Arming Rebels (B) · sha256:dfc5fa7f9465 [6] Wikipedia · Darfur genocide (2023–present) (B) · sha256:da25d31cd28f [7] Wikipedia · Rapid Support Forces (B) · sha256:7c4390c5010b [8] The Reporter Ethiopia · Ethiopia’s Maritime Pursuit Grows Even More Convoluted | The Reporter Ethiopia (B) · sha256:226161ea9217 [9] NASA · NASA FIRMS thermal detections — Sudan (2d) (A) · sha256:09e0d124efcb [10] Associated Press · AP exclusive: Doctors Without Borders report found cases of abuse and exploitation by staff in Chad (A) · sha256:53ec7ac4218f

Source content hashes were computed at collection time; the cited text is preserved unmodified for the life of this product.

Red cell review: PARTIAL DISSENT — KJ-3 downgraded HIGH→MEDIUM (estimative_mismatch)

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