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Sudan: Drone Warfare Intensifies in North Kordofan

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-08-25 12:13Z · Overall confidence: LOW

BLUF

The Rapid Support Forces' intensified drone campaign in North Kordofan, alongside reported Sudanese Armed Forces interceptions at Jargeira and Bara, indicates that drones are now central to the conflict. Civilian harm is already severe, with more than 1,000 deaths attributed to drone attacks in the first five months of 2026 and prolonged power outages in el-Obeid. The humanitarian emergency is likely to worsen, but overall confidence remains low because displacement totals, attribution and operational details are inconsistently reported.

Executive summary

During the reporting period, accounts described persistent drone attacks across North Kordofan as the Rapid Support Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces competed for control. The Sudanese Armed Forces reported shooting down long-range FH-95 drones at Jargeira and Bara, while strikes on el-Obeid's main transformer disrupted water pumping, health facilities and telecommunications. United Nations reporting attributes more than 1,000 civilian deaths in the first five months of 2026 to drone attacks, and an OCHA account attributes 80 per cent of civilian deaths in the first four months to armed drones. Fighting-driven displacement is compounding flood damage in Kordofan and Darfur. The core trend is supported by United Nations and major-media reporting, but conflicting displacement figures and limited independent confirmation of operational details constrain confidence.

Key judgments

1. Reported: The Rapid Support Forces have intensified long-range drone operations across North Kordofan, while the Sudanese Armed Forces have responded with air-defence interceptions at Jargeira and Bara. Reporting also places repeated attacks around Bara, Jabra El Sheikh and the export route towards el-Obeid. The source base includes United Nations-linked reporting and major-media accounts, but exact operator attribution and locations rely mainly on military statements and lack independent confirmation in the supplied material. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)

• I&W: Confirm: Within 0-14 days, Sudanese Armed Forces or United Nations reporting identifies another Rapid Support Forces long-range drone strike or interception in Bara, Jargeira, Jabra El Sheikh or along the route to el-Obeid. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: Official Sudanese Armed Forces corrections or independent reporting attributes the recent North Kordofan drone activity to another actor or withdraws the reported locations. (0-14 days)

2. Assessed: Armed drone strikes are likely to continue causing high civilian and essential-service costs in North Kordofan, with el-Obeid the clearest reported case. OCHA reporting attributes 80 per cent of civilian deaths in Sudan during the first four months of 2026 to armed drones, while United Nations reporting attributes more than 1,000 civilian deaths during the first five months to drone attacks. Major-media reporting links strikes on el-Obeid's main transformer to prolonged outages affecting water pumping, health facilities and telecommunications. The evidence combines multilateral reporting with major-media accounts, but the casualty measures are not independently reconciled. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: A new OCHA or United Nations report attributes civilian fatalities or attacks on markets, health facilities, power infrastructure or water systems in North Kordofan to armed drones. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: el-Obeid's main transformer remains operational and reporting records no renewed drone damage to power, water pumping, health facilities or telecommunications for 30 days. (0-30 days)

3. Assessed: Sudan's humanitarian emergency is likely to worsen over the next 1-3 months, especially in Kordofan and North Darfur, as fighting-driven displacement combines with seasonal flooding. More than 200,000 people were reported newly displaced across Kordofan, nearly 11,000 fled Umm Sumayma and Abu Haraz in three days, and displacement in Sheikan rose by 25 per cent over eight months. Heavy rains reportedly damaged nearly 1,350 homes in Tawila and displaced more than 1,000 families, while additional flooding affected Kabkabiya and Shangil Tobaya. The trend is supported by IOM, United Nations and major-media reporting, but confidence is reduced by differing estimates of 8.6 million internally displaced people, about 13 million displaced people and more than 14 million forcibly displaced people, as well as differing time frames for the 200,000-person displacement figure. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: IOM or United Nations reporting records additional displacement from Umm Sumayma, Abu Haraz, Sheikan or el-Obeid, or further flood damage in Tawila, Kabkabiya or Shangil Tobaya. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: IOM and United Nations reporting records a sustained decline in new displacement and no additional flood-related displacement in the named locations. (1-3 months)

4. Assessed: The United States is likely to continue pressing for broader Sudan arms restrictions before the Darfur embargo's 12 September 2026 expiry, while Security Council approval of an extension or expansion is roughly even chance. The United States has proposed extending the embargo to all Sudan, Sudan's UN envoy has urged a technical extension, and Russia has voiced scepticism about changes to the existing arrangement. This judgement rests on proposals and public positions rather than a recorded vote or commitments from other Security Council members, so the evidence is thin. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirm: Before 12 September, the Security Council circulates or adopts a resolution extending the Darfur embargo or expanding arms restrictions to all Sudan. (0-14 days)
• I&W: Break: The Darfur embargo expires on 12 September without an extension, or Russia publicly rejects the proposed extension or expansion. (0-21 days)

Outlook & scenarios

Continued drone-driven attrition (65%)

Over the next 0-3 months, the Rapid Support Forces sustain drone pressure around Bara, Jargeira, Jabra El Sheikh and the route towards el-Obeid. The Sudanese Armed Forces continue reporting interceptions, while damage to electricity and water infrastructure adds to displacement and humanitarian needs.

Limited diplomatic and humanitarian opening (30%)

A limited diplomatic opening is unlikely but remains possible before 12 September. The United States and Sudan's UN envoy secure a technical extension of the Darfur embargo, while the UN-backed Quad effort produces a temporary humanitarian pause. The pause does not end drone attacks or resolve the competition between the Rapid Support Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces.

Wildcard: regionalisation and embargo failure (15%)

A wider regionalisation of Sudan's war is very unlikely but high impact. External financial and military support draws neighbouring states deeper into the conflict while the Darfur embargo expires without renewal or expansion. New displacement into neighbouring countries and intensified attacks across Sudan follow.

Recommendations

1. Maintain a daily North Kordofan drone incident matrix covering Bara, Jargeira, Jabra El Sheikh, el-Obeid and the export route towards el-Obeid. Record the claimed operator, platform, location, date, interception or impact, and source quality. Separate Sudanese Armed Forces claims from independently corroborated reporting.
2. Use NASA FIRMS data as corroboration only. The supplied Africa product recorded eight thermal detections over five days, with no high-confidence detections, and NASA states that VIIRS records heat rather than cause. Do not treat a thermal detection as proof of a drone strike without location-specific reporting.
3. Prioritise humanitarian collection on electricity, water pumping, health facilities and telecommunications in el-Obeid. Pair infrastructure reporting with IOM displacement updates from Sheikan, Umm Sumayma and Abu Haraz, and flood reporting from Tawila, Kabkabiya and Shangil Tobaya.
4. Track the arms-embargo process against a fixed 12 September deadline. Maintain separate entries for the United States proposal to cover all Sudan, Sudan's request for a technical extension, Russia's position and any formal Security Council action.
5. Monitor the regional-spillover warning through new statements from Massad Boulos, United Nations reporting on cross-border displacement and evidence of external financial or military support. Treat any named neighbouring state, cross-border movement increase or formal support announcement as a priority update.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is low. The central assessment of intensified drone use and civilian harm draws on United Nations, OCHA, IOM and major-media reporting, including multiple accounts of attacks and interceptions in North Kordofan. Confidence is constrained by reliance on military claims for some operational details, the absence of independent confirmation for several locations and attributions, inconsistent casualty and displacement totals, and conflicting time frames. NASA thermal data cannot establish whether detections resulted from strikes, shelling, industrial fires or wildfires.

Cited sources

[1] allafrica.com · Sudan: 'SAF Shoots Down Two RSF Long-Range Drones in North Kordofan' (B) · sha256:2c0385a7d6e0 [2] miragenews.com · Drone Strikes, Atrocities Worsen Sudan Crisis: UNSC Warned (A) · sha256:4241bf1b4fbb [3] ABP Live · US Proposes Expanding UN Arms Embargo To Cover All Of Sudan Amid Intensifying War (B) · sha256:d247d5a18409 [4] anews.com.tr · 200,000 more displaced in Sudan amid escalating conflict: UN (A) · sha256:64e41fad5706 [5] United Nations · Aid workers under fire as drones reshape warfare (A) · sha256:d0b5b13fccd4 [6] allafrica.com · Sudan: 'The Warning Signs Are Impossible to Ignore' (A) · sha256:aead413733eb [7] Al Jazeera · Over 200,000 people newly displaced in Sudan’s Kordofan as fighting rages (A) · sha256:3dabd2c02390 [8] globalissues.org · Security Council LIVE: War, hunger, flooding escalates in Sudan (A) · sha256:c9f0ce957797 [9] Wikipedia · Sudanese civil war (2023–present) (B) · sha256:e865131690e1

Source content hashes were computed at collection time; the cited text is preserved unmodified for the life of this product.

Red cell review: CONCUR WITH COMMENT

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