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Sudan: Kordofan pressure and a tightening aid outlook

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-09-21 22:09Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

The SAF is likely to consolidate recently reported gains in North and South Kordofan, while RSF drone activity continues to threaten Al-Obeid and civilian infrastructure. Humanitarian conditions are very likely to worsen within the next two weeks as IOM supplies approach exhaustion and WFP warns of an operational scale-back. External support networks will likely sustain the conflict, but UAE government involvement remains contested.

Executive summary

Combat remains active across Kordofan and Darfur. The SAF has been reported to capture positions near Sudri and Dilling, while the RSF has conducted repeated drone operations against Al-Obeid. Sudan's humanitarian crisis is deepening, with around 14 million people displaced, 20 million facing acute hunger and humanitarian corridor supplies expected to run out within less than two weeks. Foreign-linked networks continue to provide personnel, weapons and logistics to the RSF, although the UAE denies state support. Diplomatic activity is continuing, but there is no reported evidence that SAF or RSF leaders have accepted a nationwide ceasefire.

Change from previous assessment

The assessment now places the humanitarian supply warning on a shorter, explicit less-than-two-week horizon and incorporates WFP's warning of an operational scale-back. It adds reported SAF gains at Al-Jumama, Al-Mamsuka, Al-Qa'a and Al-Farshaya, the SAF approach to Sudri and continued RSF pressure on Al-Obeid. The external-support judgement is reinforced by reporting on up to 2,000 Colombian contractors and FFM-Sudan findings, while the dispute over UAE state involvement remains unresolved. A new judgement covers the UK's £39 million Sudan Stability Programme, which expands long-term civilian-focused engagement but is very unlikely to affect battlefield activity within 30 days.

Key judgments

1. The SAF is likely to consolidate its newly reported positions in North and South Kordofan over the next 14 days, but this is unlikely to end RSF pressure on Al-Obeid. The SAF has been reported to seize Al-Jumama, Al-Mamsuka, Al-Qa'a and Al-Farshaya and to approach Sudri, while the RSF conducted repeated drone operations against Al-Obeid that degraded electricity, fuel and water infrastructure. These battlefield reports rely mainly on party-linked or single-source reporting and lack independent confirmation. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirmation would come from independent reporting or geolocated imagery showing SAF forces still holding Al-Jumama, Al-Mamsuka, Al-Qa'a and Al-Farshaya, with access towards Sudri. (0-14 days)
• I&W: The assessment would be broken by verified RSF recapture of any of those positions or renewed RSF attacks that further disable Al-Obeid's electricity, fuel or water systems. (0-14 days)

2. Humanitarian conditions are very likely to worsen across Sudan, particularly in Darfur and Kordofan, within the next two weeks. IOM warned that humanitarian corridor supplies will run out within less than two weeks, WFP warned of a scale-back in coming weeks, and UN reporting places displacement at around 14 million and acute hunger at 20 million. Around 135,000 people face catastrophic food insecurity, 14 areas in Darfur and Kordofan remain at risk of famine, and UNICEF reported that malnutrition famine thresholds have been exceeded in Um Baru and Kernoi. Displacement totals remain methodologically inconsistent because other reporting gives a lower figure of more than 11 million. (Confidence: high · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirmation would come from IOM reporting that corridor supplies have been exhausted, alongside a WFP announcement that operations or rations have been reduced. (0-14 days)
• I&W: The assessment would be broken by documented replenishment of the corridor and continued WFP operations without a scale-back. (0-14 days)

3. Foreign-linked networks are likely to sustain RSF military capacity in Darfur and Kordofan over the next 1-3 months, but the evidence does not establish direct UAE government control of every network or shipment. FFM-Sudan found reasonable grounds to believe that private entities, logistics intermediaries and recruiters operating from Colombia and the UAE used transit locations in Chad, southeastern Libya and Somalia to deliver personnel, training, weapons and logistics to the RSF. Separate reporting documented up to 2,000 former Colombian military contractors operating drones, artillery and advanced weapons alongside RSF units. The UAE repeatedly denies providing military support, creating a material attribution dispute. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirmation would come from new reporting of Colombian contractor deployments, weapons transfers or logistics movements through Chad, southeastern Libya or Somalia in support of RSF operations. (1-3 months)
• I&W: The assessment would weaken if credible monitoring records no further personnel or weapons movements through the named transit locations and documents the dismantling of the relevant networks. (1-3 months)

4. Further civilian deaths and displacement in Darfur and Kordofan are very likely over the next 1-3 months. Reported incidents include RSF drone strikes in Kalogi that killed 114 people, including approximately 60 children, and SAF strikes in Al-Da'ein that killed at least 70 people and destroyed a major hospital. OHCHR recorded more than 1,000 civilian deaths from drone strikes between January and May 2026, while the UN Fact-Finding Mission attributed at least 60,000 deaths to the RSF massacre after the capture of El Fasher and described the violence as bearing the hallmarks of genocide. Confidence is medium because the direction of risk is supported by multiple sources, but several casualty figures and attributions depend on NGO or think-tank reporting. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirmation would come from new, independently corroborated SAF or RSF strikes causing civilian casualties in Darfur or Kordofan, followed by new arrivals in Tawila or other displacement sites. (0-14 days)
• I&W: The assessment would weaken if independently verified reporting records a sustained cessation of strikes on populated areas and no new displacement from Darfur or Kordofan. (1-3 months)

5. The AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, EU and UN are likely to keep ceasefire diplomacy active over the next 30 days, but a nationwide SAF-RSF ceasefire is unlikely in that period. The Quintet has conducted consultations and a good offices mission to Khartoum, while Massad Boulos called for the UN Security Council to stop external financial and military support, including drones, from entering Sudan. Continued foreign support and the absence of reported SAF or RSF acceptance of a truce limit the prospects for rapid implementation. Confidence is low because current reporting documents diplomatic activity but does not establish either party's willingness to accept or enforce a ceasefire. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirmation would come from formal SAF and RSF acceptance of a nationwide truce, publication of implementation arrangements and verified reductions in fighting across Darfur and Kordofan. (0-30 days)
• I&W: The assessment would be reinforced by continued SAF and RSF operations during or immediately after Quintet consultations, with no jointly endorsed monitoring mechanism. (0-30 days)

6. A direct Sudan-Ethiopia war is very unlikely over the next 30 days, while allegations that Ethiopian territory supports RSF drone operations are likely to persist. Sudanese officials have alleged that Ethiopia hosts RSF drone activity and training camps, and Sudan's Defence Ministry reported shooting down a drone allegedly launched from Ethiopian territory near Kurmuk. Ethiopia rejected the accusations as baseless, and General Malik Agar stated that Sudan does not want war with Ethiopia. This judgement rests on local-media reporting, official allegations and a direct denial, with no independent verification of the alleged launch sites. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirmation of regional escalation would require a verified cross-border strike, a publicly documented Ethiopian military response or independently confirmed RSF drone activity launched from Ethiopian territory. (0-30 days)
• I&W: The assessment would be reinforced by further official denials, continued statements against war and no verified cross-border military action. (0-30 days)

7. The UK's £39 million, five-year Sudan Stability Programme is likely to expand support for inter-Sudanese dialogue, local governance and civilian protection, but is very unlikely to alter SAF-RSF battlefield dynamics within 30 days. The programme runs from 2026 to 2031 and includes an indicative allocation of up to £25 million for outcomes 2 and 3. The immediate effect will depend on the application process and subsequent awards rather than on the programme announcement itself. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Confirmation would come from the FCDO publishing clarification responses on 2 October and announcing selected implementing organisations before or after the 16 October expressions-of-interest deadline. (0-30 days)
• I&W: The assessment would weaken if the programme is suspended, materially redirected or produces no implementable civilian dialogue or protection activity after awards. (1-3 months)

Outlook & scenarios

Continued fragmented SAF-RSF fighting (65%)

The SAF consolidates positions around Al-Jumama, Al-Mamsuka, Al-Qa'a, Al-Farshaya and the approaches to Sudri, while the RSF retains the capacity to strike Al-Obeid and conduct drone operations in Kordofan. Fighting remains localised but active across Kordofan and Darfur over the next 14 days.

Humanitarian supply shock and renewed displacement (55%)

IOM humanitarian corridor supplies run out within two weeks and WFP operations contract. New displacement reaches Tawila and other sites in North Darfur, while famine risks deepen in Um Baru, Kernoi and vulnerable areas of Kordofan. This scenario overlaps with continued fighting.

Constrained diplomatic activity without a national ceasefire (30%)

The Quintet, the US and the UK maintain diplomatic and civilian protection initiatives, but SAF and RSF leaders do not accept a nationwide truce. The UK Stability Programme advances through its application process while battlefield operations continue.

Regional spillover from Ethiopia allegations (10%)

Sudanese allegations of RSF drone activity or training camps in Ethiopia produce a verified cross-border incident near Blue Nile or Kurmuk. Ethiopia responds diplomatically or militarily, creating a wider crisis despite Sudanese statements opposing war. This is a low-probability, high-impact wildcard.

Recommendations

1. Maintain a 14-day battlefield tracker for Al-Jumama, Al-Mamsuka, Al-Qa'a, Al-Farshaya, Sudri and Al-Obeid. Separate SAF and RSF claims from independently corroborated control indicators, including geolocated imagery and consistent reporting from more than one source.
2. Prioritise humanitarian warning collection on the IOM corridor, WFP operating levels, food availability in West Kordofan and new arrivals in Tawila. Treat early October as the planning horizon for a possible supply interruption.
3. Use 14 million as the current displacement planning figure while retaining the lower figure of more than 11 million as a definitional or earlier estimate. Do not combine the two figures without recording the reporting date and whether they count internal displacement, cross-border displacement or both.
4. Track external support with separate attribution categories for UAE-based private entities, UAE military facilities and direct UAE government activity. Do not treat evidence of transit through the UAE or use of a UAE-based company as proof of state direction without additional corroboration.
5. Monitor Kurmuk and Blue Nile for three specific triggers: a verified cross-border strike, confirmed RSF drone launch activity from Ethiopia and an Ethiopian military response. Report official allegations separately from independently verified activity.
6. Track the UK Sudan Stability Programme against its stated milestones: clarification responses on 2 October, expressions of interest by 16 October and subsequent award announcements. Assess the programme as a longer-term civilian protection and governance effort, not as an immediate conflict de-escalation mechanism.
7. Prepare contingency analysis for simultaneous SAF gains in Kordofan, continued RSF drone attacks on Al-Obeid and an IOM supply interruption. This combination presents the clearest near-term risk of military pressure translating into additional civilian displacement.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is high because the core humanitarian picture is corroborated by UN, UNICEF, WFP and IOM reporting, while the conflict's continuation and external support networks are supported by multiple institutional, media and analytical sources. The main uncertainties concern the exact displacement total, the durability of reported SAF territorial gains, the degree of UAE government involvement in RSF support networks and the credibility of allegations concerning Ethiopian territory. These uncertainties lower confidence in specific battlefield, attribution and diplomatic judgements without materially changing the overall assessment.

Intelligence gaps

• [EEI 1.1 · PARTIAL] Observed concentrations and movement of armed units (size estimates, unit identifiers if visible) within X km of named towns/roads/airfields (e.g., El Fasher, Geneina, Nyala, Khartoum neighborhoods) including timestamps and direction of movement. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 1.3 · PARTIAL] Reports or intercepts of orders, operational directives or public statements from RSF/SAF commanders indicating planned offensives, ceasefire acceptance/rejection, defensive postures or orders to withdraw from named locations. Recommended collection: signals/communications intercepts
• [EEI 1.4 · PARTIAL] Status of critical infrastructure and lines of communication: control or denial of named bridges, main highways (identify route numbers), airfields, fuel depots and telecommunication hubs and any reported sabotage/blockage incidents. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.2 · PARTIAL] Access impediments to humanitarian assistance: reported attacks on, blockages of, or denial of passage for named humanitarian convoys (dates, GPS locations, responsible actor if known) and closure status of specific routes. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.3 · PARTIAL] Functional status of medical infrastructure in named locations: number of operational hospitals/clinics, reported shortages of key medicines/blood, and hospital casualty/occupancy figures for the last 72 hours. Recommended collection: medical/health cluster reporting
• [EEI 3.1 · UNCOVERED] Detection of flights, ships or overland convoys delivering military materiel or foreign personnel to named airfields, ports or border crossings (flight/IMO numbers, manifests if available, timestamps, route origin/destination). Recommended collection: air-traffic / maritime / border customs
• [EEI 3.2 · PARTIAL] Imagery or on-the-ground confirmation of foreign military personnel or private military contractor bases/forward operating elements at specified coordinates or compounds, including vehicle/weapon types observed. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 3.3 · PARTIAL] Financial and sanctions-relevant indicators: atypical large transfers, use of designated front companies, or shipments routed through third states linked to procurement of weapons or fuel for RSF or SAF (transaction dates, parties, amounts where obtainable). Recommended collection: financial intelligence

Cited sources

[1] Al Jazeera (aljazeera.net) · تقدم للجيش في كردفان ومنظمات تحذر من اتساع رقعة المعاناة (A) · Sat Sep 19 2026 15:45:08 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:ce660cd6077a [2] Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI) · External Support Networks Sustain Sudan’s Multi-Faceted Conflict — Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute (BISI) (C) · Mon Sep 21 2026 05:01:56 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:8dcfc4c77b51 [3] International Business Times UK · 'I Will Not Be Going': Zara Larsson Pulls Out of Abu Dhabi GP Amid Sudan War, Inside UAE-RSF Allegations (B) · Mon Sep 21 2026 09:09:30 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:4ebdb020d9c5 [4] Global Issues (republishing IPS/inter Press Service commentary, likely CIVICUS) · Sudan: Blood on Foreign Powers’ Hands (C) · Mon Sep 21 2026 00:00:00 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:a0db91f80bcd [5] Modern Tokyo Times · Sudan Crisis and War – Darfur to Kordofan – Modern Tokyo Times (B) · sha256:55bcb866a248 [6] Inter Press Service (republished on NewsBreak) · Sudan: Blood on Foreign Powers’ Hands - NewsBreak (B) · Mon Sep 21 2026 04:49:26 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:6e9d91e50154 [7] Inter Press Service (IPS) · Sudan: Blood on Foreign Powers’ Hands (C) · Mon Sep 21 2026 04:49:26 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:7dc7ae47ec7e [8] The Eastleigh Voice · Sudan says it does not want war with Ethiopia amid rising tensions | The Eastleigh Voice (D) · Fri Sep 18 2026 08:18:31 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:02bd35c2498b [9] UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (GOV.UK) · Sudan Stability Programme (SSP): call for expressions of interest (A) · Mon Sep 21 2026 07:23:05 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time) · sha256:d013d2eae13f

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