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Sudan: RSF entrenched in Darfur, Khartoum contested, civilian harm intensifies

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-06-15 11:26Z · Overall confidence: MEDIUM

BLUF

The Rapid Support Forces very likely remain entrenched across most of Darfur and parts of Kordofan, while control of Khartoum is likely contested and the Sudanese Armed Forces appear to run core governance from Port Sudan. Civilian harm is severe, driven by strikes on civilian sites, aid restrictions and drone use, with mass displacement and hunger persisting.

Executive summary

Reporting indicates RSF control across key Darfur population centres, including Nyala, Geneina, Ed Daein, Central Darfur and El Fasher since late October 2025, alongside influence in sections of Kordofan. In and around Khartoum, RSF seized the presidential palace and reportedly held most of the capital by late 2023, while SAF has relocated much of its governing apparatus to Port Sudan. The conflict has produced vast humanitarian need: attacks on schools, markets and hospitals, restrictions on aid, and drone strikes have contributed to mass displacement and widespread food insecurity. Aid delivery in West Darfur is hampered by funding and communications failures. External involvement is contested, with Western sanctions on entities linked to both factions and public dispute over alleged UAE support to RSF.

Change from previous assessment

Revised the Khartoum control assessment to contested, reflecting reporting that RSF held most of the capital by late 2023 and that SAF shifted core governance to Port Sudan. Incorporated fresh UK statements on strikes against civilian infrastructure and on drone‑linked civilian deaths, and new reporting on humanitarian access obstacles in West Darfur. Noted recent NASA FIRMS detections over Sudan, with appropriate caveats. Retained the judgment that RSF remains entrenched across much of Darfur and that mass‑atrocity risk persists. Confidence reduced on external‑support assertions given public denials and contested claims.

Key judgments

1. RSF very likely retains de facto control across most of Darfur and parts of Kordofan, including Nyala, Geneina, Central Darfur, Ed Daein and El Fasher since late October 2025. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)

• I&W: Continued RSF checkpoints and administrative announcements reported from Nyala, Geneina, Ed Daein and El Fasher (1-3 months)
• I&W: SAF units publicly enter and hold fixed positions inside El Fasher or Nyala for two consecutive weeks (1-3 months)

2. Control of Khartoum is likely contested: RSF seized key sites including the presidential palace and reportedly held most of the capital by late 2023, while SAF very likely shifted much of its governing apparatus to Port Sudan. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Official SAF cabinet meetings and foreign envoy engagements continue to be hosted in Port Sudan rather than Khartoum (1-3 months)
• I&W: Verified resumption of core SAF governance functions in central Khartoum with regular public engagements (1-3 months)

3. Sudan almost certainly faces a nationwide humanitarian catastrophe, with at least 12 million people displaced as of February 2025 and up to 25 million facing severe food insecurity, compounded by strikes on civilian sites and restrictions on aid access. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)

• I&W: OCHA or major NGO updates keep reported displacement near or above 12 million and severe food insecurity near 25 million (1-3 months)
• I&W: Public reporting of sustained humanitarian access corridors into West Darfur with restored communications and new funding (1-3 months)

4. RSF and allied militias likely committed atrocity crimes in Darfur, including organised massacres and ethnic cleansing, with international actors alleging genocide and crimes against humanity. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)

• I&W: New sanctions or legal filings cite RSF command responsibility for massacres in Geneina or around El Fasher (1-3 months)
• I&W: Independent UN Fact-Finding Mission reporting explicitly rejects RSF responsibility for alleged massacres (1-3 months)

5. Drone and air-delivered strikes by SAF and RSF very likely continue to inflict substantial civilian casualties. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)

• I&W: Official or UN reports cite additional drone strikes with large civilian death tolls in Sudan (0-14 days)
• I&W: Month-on-month drop in reported drone incidents by either side in Sudan (1-3 months)

6. Active combat is likely ongoing in parts of Sudan, but satellite thermal detections alone cannot attribute incidents. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)

• I&W: Sustained clusters of NASA FIRMS anomalies near El Fasher, Nyala or Ed Daein over multiple weeks (1-3 months)
• I&W: Two consecutive weeks with near-zero FIRMS anomalies in major Darfur population centres (0-14 days)

7. The war’s external dimension remains contested: Western governments have sanctioned entities linked to both factions and call for outside actors to stop arming them, while the UAE denies aiding RSF and Sudanese officials accuse Abu Dhabi. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)

• I&W: New US, UK, EU or Canadian sanctions explicitly target alleged UAE-linked Sudan supply networks (1-3 months)
• I&W: UN or AU Fact-Finding reporting explicitly finds no external arming by the UAE (1-3 months)

8. Aid delivery in West Darfur is likely to remain impeded by funding shortfalls and communications failures in the near term. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)

• I&W: Humanitarian cluster updates cite ongoing funding gaps and telecom outages limiting operations in West Darfur (1-3 months)
• I&W: Announcements of restored networks and new funding sufficient to scale operations in West Darfur (1-3 months)

Outlook & scenarios

Entrenched lines and worsening humanitarian crisis (60%)

RSF remains entrenched across Darfur and parts of Kordofan while SAF administers from Port Sudan, with Khartoum contested. Strikes on civilian sites and aid restrictions persist, displacement remains near the reported 12 million and severe food insecurity approaches 25 million.

RSF consolidation and elevated atrocity risk (40%)

RSF consolidates control in Darfur’s key cities and surrounding areas, with continued allegations of massacres, ethnic cleansing and systematic sexual violence. Drone use continues to drive high civilian casualties.

Incremental accountability pressure and limited access gains (30%)

Expanded Western sanctions and active UN, AU fact-finding cooperation increase pressure on belligerents. Localised and temporary improvements in humanitarian access in West Darfur emerge, but no sustained ceasefire takes hold.

Regional spillover strains neighbours (20%)

Sudan’s fragmentation deepens, increasing displacement flows into Chad and heightening the risk of a broader regional crisis with far‑reaching consequences.

Recommendations

1. Update internal control maps to reflect RSF’s reported hold on Nyala, Geneina, Central Darfur, Ed Daein and El Fasher, and treat Khartoum as contested while tracking SAF governance activity centred on Port Sudan.
2. Maintain a standing watch on NASA FIRMS heat detections over Darfur population centres and transport corridors, using them as prompts for multi‑source corroboration rather than attribution.
3. Build an event‑based dataset on reported drone use and civilian harm in Sudan by fusing UK official statements with multilateral human rights and humanitarian reporting.
4. Prioritise collection on humanitarian access constraints in West Darfur, including telecom outages and funding gaps, and track displacement flows into Chad.
5. Monitor sanctions designations and legal actions related to RSF and SAF networks to map potential external enablers and associated evasion patterns.
6. Track UN Human Rights Council and UN, AU Fact‑Finding Mission outputs on Sudan for indicators of shifting international accountability pressure.
7. Flag casualty figures as highly uncertain in all reporting, distinguishing single‑source or uncorroborated tallies from multi‑source estimates.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is medium. Several core points rest on multi‑source reporting and official statements, including RSF control across much of Darfur, widespread civilian harm and severe food insecurity. Control of Khartoum is judged contested based on reported RSF gains and SAF’s relocation to Port Sudan, but contemporary control details are not uniformly corroborated. Claims regarding external support are explicitly disputed, lowering confidence. Casualty figures vary widely and include single‑source and secondary references, so fatality estimates carry substantial uncertainty. Satellite heat detections support activity assessments but do not attribute actors.

Intelligence gaps

• [EEI 1.2 · PARTIAL] Changes in employment of heavy weapons and systems: documented use or emplacement of artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, tanks, combat helicopters, and airstrikes at specific coordinates and times. Recommended collection: open-source/media
• [EEI 1.3 · UNCOVERED] Reports or intercepts of orders, operational directives or public statements from RSF/SAF commanders indicating planned offensives, ceasefire acceptance/rejection, defensive postures or orders to withdraw from named locations. Recommended collection: signals/communications intercepts
• [EEI 1.4 · PARTIAL] Status of critical infrastructure and lines of communication: control or denial of named bridges, main highways (identify route numbers), airfields, fuel depots and telecommunication hubs and any reported sabotage/blockage incidents. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.1 · PARTIAL] Counts and locations of newly displaced persons arriving at formal sites, informal camps, border crossings or collective centers (daily/weekly arrivals, site coordinates), including demographics (women, children, elderly) where available. Recommended collection: humanitarian/UN OCHA reports
• [EEI 2.2 · PARTIAL] Access impediments to humanitarian assistance: reported attacks on, blockages of, or denial of passage for named humanitarian convoys (dates, GPS locations, responsible actor if known) and closure status of specific routes. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.3 · PARTIAL] Functional status of medical infrastructure in named locations: number of operational hospitals/clinics, reported shortages of key medicines/blood, and hospital casualty/occupancy figures for the last 72 hours. Recommended collection: medical/health cluster reporting
• [EEI 3.1 · PARTIAL] Detection of flights, ships or overland convoys delivering military materiel or foreign personnel to named airfields, ports or border crossings (flight/IMO numbers, manifests if available, timestamps, route origin/destination). Recommended collection: air-traffic / maritime / border customs
• [EEI 3.2 · PARTIAL] Imagery or on-the-ground confirmation of foreign military personnel or private military contractor bases/forward operating elements at specified coordinates or compounds, including vehicle/weapon types observed. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 3.3 · PARTIAL] Financial and sanctions-relevant indicators: atypical large transfers, use of designated front companies, or shipments routed through third states linked to procurement of weapons or fuel for RSF or SAF (transaction dates, parties, amounts where obtainable). Recommended collection: financial intelligence

Cited sources

[1] weeklyblitz.net · Sudan’s geography of wealth makes partition an illusion - BLiTZ (B) · sha256:14ea997b32aa [2] Wikipedia · Darfur campaign (2023–present) (B) · sha256:7bc207eb01e4 [3] Wikipedia · Sudanese civil war (2023–present) (B) · sha256:f0da09ea4299 [4] Wikipedia · Rapid Support Forces (B) · sha256:7c4390c5010b [5] UK Government · UN Human Rights Council 62: UK Statement for the Enhanced Interactive Dialogue with the UN Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan (A) · sha256:eb055e3fe539 [6] UK Government · UN Human Rights Council 62: Joint Statement for the Enhanced Interactive Dialogue with the UN Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan (A) · sha256:eb0c5d646793 [7] Al Jazeera · El-Geneina’s struggle: Life amid Sudan war and humanitarian challenges (A) · sha256:411c21986eb5 [8] Knewdex News · El-Geneina Faces Humanitarian Crisis Amid Sudan War (B) · sha256:376f77e9aa4a [9] Wikipedia · Darfur genocide (2023–present) (B) · sha256:da25d31cd28f [10] NASA · NASA FIRMS thermal detections — Sudan (2d) (A) · sha256:00677be0bef6 [11] Wikipedia · Sudanese Armed Forces (C) · sha256:a5f3545892c5 [12] The Proxy Protocol · UAE's Secret War? Sudan's Hidden Mercenaries EXPOSED (B) · sha256:db31364d862e [13] The Contrapuntal · Dark Shadows of Private War in Sudan  - The Contrapuntal (D) · sha256:514005d970f2

Source content hashes were computed at collection time; the cited text is preserved unmodified for the life of this product.

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