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Sudan Situation Report, 12 November 2026

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-11-12 22:11Z · Overall confidence: MEDIUM

BLUF

Drone attacks, civilian harm and fresh displacement remain the immediate risks. Sudan’s allegations that RSF operations use Ethiopian territory remain contested, while reporting does not establish durable SAF gains in Kordofan or a ceasefire agreement.

Executive summary

SAF announced that it had downed 29 drones in Kordofan and Darfur, while the G7 warned of drone strikes on civilian infrastructure and health facilities. A drone strike at Bani Shako killed nine people, but the operator has not been confirmed. IOM reported 2,510 people displaced from five villages in North Darfur’s Umbro locality, with most reportedly crossing into Chad. Sudan’s complaint against Ethiopia has raised the profile of cross-border allegations, which Ethiopia denies. G7 and Egyptian statements support truce efforts, but reporting does not show that SAF and RSF have accepted a ceasefire.

Change from previous assessment

Since the 11 November brief, this assessment adds the G7’s ceasefire declaration, Egypt’s planned truce proposals, IOM reporting of 2,510 people displaced from five North Darfur villages, Sudan’s complaint against Ethiopia and SAF’s announcement that it downed 29 drones. The judgement on SAF pressure in Kordofan remains, but the new reporting does not establish durable territorial gains. The Bani Shako attribution remains unresolved, and El Fasher’s population and citywide control remain uncertain despite more specific reporting. This brief adds judgements on the Ethiopia allegations and the current diplomatic initiatives; no prior judgement is retired.

Key judgments

1. Drone attacks are likely to continue threatening civilian infrastructure over the next 14 days. SAF announced that it had downed 29 drones it described as hostile in Kordofan and Darfur. Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council reported 70 attacks involving 187 suicide drones between 15 February and 27 October, and the G7 warned of drone strikes on health facilities, displacement camps and civilian infrastructure. These reports establish continuing concern, but do not independently verify each attack or its operator. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
   • I&W: A new, independently corroborated drone strike on a named power station, health facility or displacement site would confirm continued attacks on civilian infrastructure. (0-14 days)
   • I&W: Independent reporting that no new strikes occurred at named sites, alongside verified evidence that reported damage was misattributed, would weaken this judgement. (0-14 days)
2. At least nine people were killed in a drone strike at Bani Shako in Kurmuk locality, Blue Nile State, but RSF responsibility remains unconfirmed. A local official blamed the RSF; another report described the attackers as unidentified, and the RSF had not commented in the available reporting. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)
   • I&W: An independent investigation that confirms the nine deaths and identifies the launch site or operating unit would resolve the attribution question. (0-14 days)
   • I&W: Verified evidence identifying an operator other than the RSF would rule out the local official’s allegation. (0-14 days)
3. Further displacement from North Darfur is likely over the next 30 days. IOM reported that 2,510 people left five villages in Umbro locality; field reporting also recorded departures from Mazbad, Awiriri, Lail, Turba and Um Haraz, and said most displaced people crossed into Chad. IOM’s reporting of earlier displacement waves points to repeated movement, although the available claims do not establish how many people remain displaced. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
   • I&W: A new IOM displacement update recording departures from Umbro villages or additional crossings into Chad would confirm continued movement. (0-30 days)
   • I&W: An IOM update recording no new departures and verified returns to the five villages would weaken this judgement. (0-30 days)
4. Sudan’s allegations that RSF forces used Ethiopian territory for drone operations remain unverified and contested. Sudan filed a complaint against Ethiopia, and Sudanese authorities named Bahir Dar and Asosa as alleged sites. Other reporting states that the RSF launched attacks from those locations, but Sudanese allegations are not independent confirmation; Ethiopia has rejected claims of involvement. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)
   • I&W: An independently verified investigation or released UN or AU evidence identifying an RSF drone operation launched from Bahir Dar or Asosa would break the current assessment that the allegation is unverified. (0-30 days)
   • I&W: Time-matched records or imagery independently showing that the named sites were not used for the alleged operations would further weaken the allegation. (0-30 days)
5. El Fasher is likely severely depopulated, but current reporting does not establish the city’s population or who controls it citywide. Amnesty International reported that fewer than 70,000 people remained, compared with more than one million before the war. A separate account described the city as empty, while Yale University’s Humanitarian Research Lab placed RSF forces in First Daraja. The accounts support a major population decline and an RSF presence in one neighbourhood, not a verified citywide control picture. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)
   • I&W: A new population estimate or independently reviewed imagery showing substantial civilian activity in El Fasher’s eight markets would weaken the assessment of severe depopulation. (0-30 days)
   • I&W: Independent reporting that locates SAF and RSF positions across multiple neighbourhoods would clarify whether either side controls the city as a whole. (0-30 days)
6. External ceasefire diplomacy is likely to remain active over the next 30 days, but reporting does not establish that SAF or RSF has accepted a truce. The G7 called for negotiations and an end to external support, while Egypt said it was developing proposals for a humanitarian truce. Reports differ on whether the G7 named the Quad or the Quintet as the negotiating format. Reuters, citing Sudanese and Western sources, reported that SAF tied acceptance of a US 90-day ceasefire plan to RSF withdrawal from captured cities. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
   • I&W: A public SAF and RSF commitment to attend the same named mediation process, or an announced truce, would confirm progress beyond diplomatic statements. (0-30 days)
   • I&W: A public rejection by either SAF or RSF of the proposed truce or negotiating format would weaken the prospect of near-term diplomatic progress. (0-30 days)

Outlook & scenarios

Continued attrition and drone attacks (60%)

Continued fighting is likely. SAF pressure in Kordofan, reported drone activity and displacement in North Darfur persist, while G7 and Egyptian truce efforts produce no reported agreement. Civilian infrastructure and routes used by displaced people remain exposed to attack.

Limited humanitarian truce (25%)

A limited pause is less likely than continued fighting. Egypt’s truce proposals and the G7’s call for negotiations provide a diplomatic opening, but this scenario requires SAF and RSF to accept terms and engage in the same process. Current reporting does not show that acceptance.

Cross-border escalation (10%)

An escalation between Sudan and Ethiopia is unlikely but would have high impact. The wildcard is independently verified evidence that RSF drone operations used Bahir Dar or Asosa, followed by a formal or military response from Sudan. Current reporting contains allegations and denials, not confirmation of such operations.

Recommendations

1. Track SAF and RSF statements alongside independent reporting on drone strikes. Record the named site, date, reported damage and attribution separately, and do not treat a party’s claim of an interception as evidence of territorial control.
2. Seek corroboration for the Bani Shako death toll and attribution from independent local reporting, medical accounts or verified imagery before assigning responsibility.
3. Use new IOM updates to distinguish people newly displaced from cumulative displacement, and track separately departures from Umbro villages and crossings into Chad.
4. Keep Sudan’s allegations about Ethiopian launch sites separate from confirmed military activity. Update the assessment only when independent evidence identifies a site, operation and responsible unit.
5. For El Fasher, preserve the distinction between citywide control, RSF presence in First Daraja and estimates of the remaining population. Flag the conflicting descriptions of the city as empty and as having fewer than 70,000 residents.
6. Monitor whether SAF and RSF publicly accept the same ceasefire process, and verify whether diplomatic statements refer to the Quad or the Quintet before assessing progress.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is medium because reporting from major media and wire services, alongside claims attributed to IOM, the G7, UNICEF and Amnesty International, supports the broad picture of drone activity, displacement and severe depopulation in El Fasher. Confidence is lower on responsibility for specific strikes, cross-border operations from Ethiopia and control of El Fasher. Several claims rely on officials or parties to the conflict, and the reporting on El Fasher’s population and the G7’s negotiating format is inconsistent.

Intelligence gaps

• [EEI 1.1 · PARTIAL] Observed concentrations and movement of armed units (size estimates, unit identifiers if visible) within X km of named towns/roads/airfields (e.g., El Fasher, Geneina, Nyala, Khartoum neighborhoods) including timestamps and direction of movement. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 1.4 · PARTIAL] Status of critical infrastructure and lines of communication: control or denial of named bridges, main highways (identify route numbers), airfields, fuel depots and telecommunication hubs and any reported sabotage/blockage incidents. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.2 · PARTIAL] Access impediments to humanitarian assistance: reported attacks on, blockages of, or denial of passage for named humanitarian convoys (dates, GPS locations, responsible actor if known) and closure status of specific routes. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.3 · PARTIAL] Functional status of medical infrastructure in named locations: number of operational hospitals/clinics, reported shortages of key medicines/blood, and hospital casualty/occupancy figures for the last 72 hours. Recommended collection: medical/health cluster reporting
• [EEI 3.1 · PARTIAL] Detection of flights, ships or overland convoys delivering military materiel or foreign personnel to named airfields, ports or border crossings (flight/IMO numbers, manifests if available, timestamps, route origin/destination). Recommended collection: air-traffic / maritime / border customs
• [EEI 3.2 · PARTIAL] Imagery or on-the-ground confirmation of foreign military personnel or private military contractor bases/forward operating elements at specified coordinates or compounds, including vehicle/weapon types observed. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 3.3 · PARTIAL] Financial and sanctions-relevant indicators: atypical large transfers, use of designated front companies, or shipments routed through third states linked to procurement of weapons or fuel for RSF or SAF (transaction dates, parties, amounts where obtainable). Recommended collection: financial intelligence

Red cell review: CONCUR

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