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Sudan Situation Report: Drone Strikes Reach Northern Power and Oil Sites

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-11-01 22:10Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

RSF drone attacks on power and energy sites have expanded from reported strikes in Hayya on 31 October to outages at Dabba and Abu Hamad on 1 November. Further attacks on infrastructure are likely over the next 14 days; civilian protection risks remain acute, and the death toll and responsibility for the Nyala market strike remain disputed.

Executive summary

Reporting from 25 October to 1 November describes RSF drone attacks on power and energy infrastructure in several parts of Sudan. In Hayya, strikes on 31 October hit an oil pumping station and a transformer substation; on 1 November, reports said attacks put power stations in Dabba and Abu Hamad out of service. A UN fact-finding mission reported that civilians in El Obeid face RSF drone attacks and SAF arrests and torture, and that only about 30 per cent of the city's hospitals remained operational after attacks. Reports on the 26 October Nyala market strike range from 36 deaths recorded by a hospital to substantially higher figures, with the date and attribution also contested. Sudanese authorities accused Ethiopia of aiding rebels, but the supplied reporting does not establish Ethiopian involvement.

Change from previous assessment

Since the prior brief on 1 November, the infrastructure assessment has broadened: new reports describe outages at Dabba and Abu Hamad, alongside the 31 October Hayya strikes. The judgement that further infrastructure attacks are likely is strengthened, but confidence remains medium because the newest outages rely on local reporting and cumulative strike totals vary. This brief adds the UN Mission's specific warning on El Obeid and assesses the reported Siddiq Ander defection; it retains the contested Nyala casualty assessment and low confidence in the Ethiopia allegation. No new supplied reporting establishes a change in control of Darfur.

Key judgments

1. RSF drone attacks on electricity and energy infrastructure are likely to continue over the next 0-14 days. Reports place strikes on an oil pumping station and a transformer substation in Hayya on 31 October, followed by outages at power stations in Dabba and Abu Hamad on 1 November. Reported campaign totals vary, from six power stations hit on 26 October to more than 13 substations in seven states and 14 stations in nine states over two weeks. The latest Dabba and Abu Hamad accounts rely on local reporting, and the different totals may cover different periods or sites. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
   • I&W: A separately reported drone strike or outage at a named power or energy site in Hayya, Dabba, Abu Hamad or Wad al-Mahi would confirm the assessment. (0-14 days)
   • I&W: No new reported strikes, alongside reports that power service has returned to Dabba and Abu Hamad, would weaken the assessment. (0-14 days)
2. Drone strikes are very likely to remain a leading cause of civilian deaths in Sudan over the next 0-30 days. The UN has identified drone strikes as the leading cause of civilian deaths, and a UN mission chair said October saw the highest number of attacks on civilians since the conflict began. The UN Human Rights Office reported at least 1,120 civilian deaths from drone strikes in the first half of 2026. Confidence is medium because these assessments and casualty figures do not resolve responsibility for every strike or reconcile all reported totals. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
   • I&W: A new UN casualty update that records civilian deaths from drone strikes and continues to identify them as a leading cause would confirm the assessment. (0-30 days)
   • I&W: A UN update identifying another cause as the leading cause of civilian deaths, with no newly reported drone deaths, would break the assessment. (0-30 days)
3. Civilians in El Obeid are likely to face continued acute protection and essential-service risks over the next 1-3 months. The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan reported RSF drone strikes killing and injuring civilians and damaging homes, schools, displacement sites, electricity and water systems. It also reported arbitrary arrests and torture by SAF security cells, and said only around 30 per cent of El Obeid's hospitals remained operational after attacks. The detail comes from the Mission's reporting, without independent corroboration in the supplied claims. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
   • I&W: A Mission update or hospital report documenting a new drone casualty incident, further hospital closures, or additional detention and torture cases in El Obeid would confirm the assessment. (0-30 days)
   • I&W: A documented increase in operational hospitals above the reported 30 per cent, alongside no new reported drone or detention incidents, would weaken the assessment. (1-3 months)
4. The best-supported reported minimum for the Nyala market strike is 36 deaths, but the final toll, date and responsibility remain unresolved. The MSF-supported Nyala Teaching Hospital reported receiving 36 bodies, and its director separately reported 36 deaths. Other accounts gave 21 deaths, more than 100, or 188; a hospital report places the strike on 27 October, while other reporting identifies 26 October. MSF attributed the market strike to SAF, while other reporting leaves the attacker unknown. The substantial discrepancies lower confidence in any final toll or attribution. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)
   • I&W: A reconciled Nyala Teaching Hospital register recording 36 or more deaths from the same market strike would confirm the reported minimum. (0-14 days)
   • I&W: A hospital correction placing fewer than 36 deaths at the market strike, or evidence that the 36 bodies came from a different incident, would break the reported minimum. (0-14 days)
5. There is a roughly even chance that further senior RSF defections will be reported over the next 1-3 months, but the current reporting does not establish an imminent force-wide fracture. Senior commander Siddiq Ander announced his departure and accused Hemedti's relatives of controlling RSF finances, weapons and promotions. Earlier reporting described departures by Mohammed Azraq al-Fanjari with 300 officers and soldiers and 30 vehicles, and Al-Tayeb al-Wahidu with 50 fighters. The announcements do not independently verify the number of personnel who moved or their continuing allegiance, so confidence is low. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)
   • I&W: A named senior RSF commander publicly announcing departure alongside an identifiable unit or vehicles joining SAF would confirm continued defections. (1-3 months)
   • I&W: No additional named commander or unit departure, and evidence that Ander’s announcement did not involve personnel movement, would weaken the assessment. (1-3 months)
6. Sudanese authorities are likely to maintain public accusations that Ethiopia is aiding rebels over the next 0-14 days, but the supplied reporting does not establish Ethiopian involvement. The accusation is reported in one wire-service account and is not independently corroborated; confidence in the forecast is low. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)
   • I&W: A further Sudanese government statement or formal diplomatic action repeating the accusation would confirm continued public pressure. (0-14 days)
   • I&W: A Sudanese government retraction, or an independently verified finding that rules out Ethiopian involvement, would break the assessment. (0-14 days)

Outlook & scenarios

Infrastructure strikes continue (65%)

RSF drone attacks are likely to continue against power and energy sites, with further local outages in northern and eastern Sudan. Damage at Hayya, Dabba or Abu Hamad would add pressure to services already disrupted by reported strikes elsewhere. The reported South Sudan oil pipeline runs through Hayya, but the supplied reporting does not say that oil transit has stopped.

Attacks ease or shift away from infrastructure (25%)

A pause in attacks on power and energy sites is unlikely, but the campaign could shift to other targets or produce fewer outages after recent damage. In that case, the immediate pressure on electricity services would ease without resolving civilian exposure to drone attacks or the humanitarian risks reported in El Obeid.

Cross-border accusation escalates (10%)

A very unlikely, high-impact wildcard is a formal diplomatic or military escalation after Sudan repeats its accusation that Ethiopia is aiding rebels. The supplied reporting does not verify Ethiopian involvement. A new allegation tied to independently verified launch-site or flight-path evidence would raise the risk of a wider interstate crisis.

Recommendations

1. Maintain a strike-by-strike incident log for Hayya, Dabba, Abu Hamad, Wad al-Mahi and other reported sites. Record the site, date, outage, casualty count, attribution and source separately so cumulative station totals are not conflated.
2. Prioritise verification of damage and service status at the Hayya oil pumping station and transformer substation, and at the Dabba and Abu Hamad power stations. Treat NASA FIRMS thermal detections as corroboration of heat events, not proof of a strike or its perpetrator.
3. For the Nyala market strike, report the hospital-based figure of 36 deaths as the best-supported minimum. Attribute higher casualty figures to their sources and keep the 26 and 27 October dates separate pending reconciliation.
4. Track UN Mission and hospital reporting from El Obeid for new drone casualties, changes in the number of operational hospitals, and further reports of SAF arrests or torture.
5. Do not present the Ethiopia allegation as established fact. Seek independent evidence of a launch site or flight path before using it to assess Ethiopian involvement.
6. Verify future RSF defection announcements against evidence of personnel, vehicles or units changing allegiance before assessing their effect on RSF cohesion.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is high for the broad pattern of expanding drone attacks, civilian exposure and disruption to power infrastructure. The assessment draws on reporting from the UN fact-finding mission and Human Rights Office, hospital accounts, a wire service, major media and official statements. Confidence is lower on the Nyala death toll and attribution, the total number of power sites hit, the operational effect of announced RSF defections and the allegation of Ethiopian support. Those issues remain contested or rest on limited reporting.

Alternative analysis (red cell)

The supplied evidence more securely establishes recent attacks, humanitarian harm and several reported defections than it establishes the forecasted trajectories. In particular, the Nyala casualty figure may not be a minimum for one incident, and the RSF defection reporting is concentrated in a single origin, so both judgments should be treated as indeterminate rather than assigned a directional probability. The drone-strike and El Obeid judgments likewise rely on historical or current-status reporting that does not directly demonstrate persistence through the forecast windows.

Intelligence gaps

• [EEI 1.1 · PARTIAL] Observed concentrations and movement of armed units (size estimates, unit identifiers if visible) within X km of named towns/roads/airfields (e.g., El Fasher, Geneina, Nyala, Khartoum neighborhoods) including timestamps and direction of movement. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 1.3 · PARTIAL] Reports or intercepts of orders, operational directives or public statements from RSF/SAF commanders indicating planned offensives, ceasefire acceptance/rejection, defensive postures or orders to withdraw from named locations. Recommended collection: signals/communications intercepts
• [EEI 2.1 · PARTIAL] Counts and locations of newly displaced persons arriving at formal sites, informal camps, border crossings or collective centers (daily/weekly arrivals, site coordinates), including demographics (women, children, elderly) where available. Recommended collection: humanitarian/UN OCHA reports
• [EEI 2.2 · PARTIAL] Access impediments to humanitarian assistance: reported attacks on, blockages of, or denial of passage for named humanitarian convoys (dates, GPS locations, responsible actor if known) and closure status of specific routes. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 3.1 · UNCOVERED] Detection of flights, ships or overland convoys delivering military materiel or foreign personnel to named airfields, ports or border crossings (flight/IMO numbers, manifests if available, timestamps, route origin/destination). Recommended collection: air-traffic / maritime / border customs
• [EEI 3.2 · UNCOVERED] Imagery or on-the-ground confirmation of foreign military personnel or private military contractor bases/forward operating elements at specified coordinates or compounds, including vehicle/weapon types observed. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
• [EEI 3.3 · PARTIAL] Financial and sanctions-relevant indicators: atypical large transfers, use of designated front companies, or shipments routed through third states linked to procurement of weapons or fuel for RSF or SAF (transaction dates, parties, amounts where obtainable). Recommended collection: financial intelligence

Red cell review: PARTIAL DISSENT

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