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Analysis · November 20, 2026 · Sudan

Sudan Situation Report: SAF Advances in West Kordofan, Civilian Risks Persist

—High
BOTTOM LINE

SAF and allied forces are likely to retain the initiative in parts of West Kordofan, although the RSF reportedly still controls most of the state. Reports of RSF-SPLM-N gains in Blue Nile remain unverified; drone strikes and displacement continue to expose civilians to acute risk.

KEY JUDGMENTS
  • SAF and allied forces are likely to retain the initiative in northeastern West Kordofan over the next 1 to 3 months, but are unlikely to dislodge the RSF from most of the state in the near term. Reports describe advances at Al-Khuwai, Al-Morkib, Khamasat, Umm Oweisha and Al-Sa’atat, while a 17 November territorial assessment says the RSF still held most of West Kordofan. The reported date and administrative location of Al-Khuwai are inconsistent, limiting confidence in the precise front line. (medium)
  • It is unlikely that current reporting establishes a sustained RSF-SPLM-N advance to Ad-Damazin's outskirts or durable control of Sali. A local-media report says the alliance captured Sali, but a separate account describes the new Blue Nile offensive as unverified; SAF reportedly deployed five equipped combat units to its 4th Infantry Division headquarters in Ed Damazin. The offensive claims rely on limited reporting, so confidence in the operational picture is low. (low)
  • Drone strikes are very likely to remain a leading civilian threat in Sudan over the next month. The UN Human Rights Office reported more than 1,630 civilian deaths from drone strikes between January and October 2026. Amnesty International reported nine strikes in North Kordofan between June and August and attributed attacks in and around El Obeid that killed 37 civilians and wounded 10 to the RSF; the RSF denied responsibility. Amnesty also said it is examining SAF drone strikes, so attribution for individual incidents remains contested. (medium)
  • Acute humanitarian pressure is very likely to persist over the next 1 to 3 months. UNICEF reporting estimates that around 4.2 million children will suffer acute malnutrition this year and at least 8 million lack access to formal education. IOM reported that more than 7,000 people fled inter-communal clashes in Al Sunta locality, South Darfur, and 1,380 people fled insecurity in Um Baru, North Darfur, into Chad. In Khartoum, Usratuna has stopped most support services, leaving more than 100 registered children without the listed rehabilitation services. (medium)
  • It is unlikely that the available evidence establishes that cargo on the SU-SKG flights reached the RSF in Sudan. Malawi's Anti-Corruption Bureau arrested retired General Paul Valentino Phiri in Lilongwe, and prosecutors allege an arms-smuggling operation involving movement through Malawi to Chad. Flight records document routes between Mombasa, Lilongwe and N'Djamena, but those records do not establish the cargo or its final recipient. The arrest and prosecution are reported, while the alleged supply chain remains unproven. (low)

TLP:CLEAR · Disclosure is not limited.

Sudan Situation Report: SAF Advances in West Kordofan, Civilian Risks Persist

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-11-20 22:07Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

SAF and allied forces are likely to retain the initiative in parts of West Kordofan, although the RSF reportedly still controls most of the state. Reports of RSF-SPLM-N gains in Blue Nile remain unverified; drone strikes and displacement continue to expose civilians to acute risk.

Executive summary

Reporting from 13 to 20 November describes SAF and allied advances across named areas of West Kordofan, alongside an RSF-SPLM-N offensive claim in Blue Nile that is not independently confirmed. Amnesty International reported civilian deaths in RSF-attributed drone strikes on El Obeid, while the RSF denied responsibility and Amnesty said it is also examining SAF drone strikes. UNICEF and IOM reporting highlights severe child welfare needs and displacement from South and North Darfur. Malawi's case against retired General Paul Valentino Phiri has drawn attention to an alleged arms route, but the reporting does not establish that tracked flights carried weapons to the RSF in Sudan.

Change from previous assessment

Since the 19 November brief, reporting has added named SAF gains in West Kordofan, including Al-Morkib, Khamasat and Al-Sa’atat, and a report of five combat units deployed to Ed Damazin. New reporting details the El Obeid drone strike allegations and gives specific IOM displacement figures for Al Sunta and Um Baru. The Blue Nile picture remains unresolved: current reporting does not verify a sustained advance to Ad-Damazin or resolve the earlier Bau uncertainty. No new claim in this run resolves Ahmad Haroun's custody status, formal famine status or the El Fasher allegations. Initial confidence in the broad military and humanitarian picture is unchanged; confidence remains low on Blue Nile operational claims.

Key judgments

  1. SAF and allied forces are likely to retain the initiative in northeastern West Kordofan over the next 1 to 3 months, but are unlikely to dislodge the RSF from most of the state in the near term. Reports describe advances at Al-Khuwai, Al-Morkib, Khamasat, Umm Oweisha and Al-Sa’atat, while a 17 November territorial assessment says the RSF still held most of West Kordofan. The reported date and administrative location of Al-Khuwai are inconsistent, limiting confidence in the precise front line. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
    • I&W: Independent geolocated reporting confirms SAF control at Al-Khuwai and Al-Morkib, with SAF units advancing towards Abu Zabad. (0-30 days)
    • I&W: RSF forces retake Al-Khuwai or Al-Morkib, or prevent SAF from maintaining positions at those named locations. (0-30 days)
  2. It is unlikely that current reporting establishes a sustained RSF-SPLM-N advance to Ad-Damazin's outskirts or durable control of Sali. A local-media report says the alliance captured Sali, but a separate account describes the new Blue Nile offensive as unverified; SAF reportedly deployed five equipped combat units to its 4th Infantry Division headquarters in Ed Damazin. The offensive claims rely on limited reporting, so confidence in the operational picture is low. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)
    • I&W: Independent imagery or at least two field reports place RSF-SPLM-N forces in settlements south of Ad-Damazin or confirm sustained control of Sali. (0-14 days)
    • I&W: Geolocated reporting confirms SAF control of the approaches to Ad-Damazin and no loss of positions around Sali. (0-14 days)
  3. Drone strikes are very likely to remain a leading civilian threat in Sudan over the next month. The UN Human Rights Office reported more than 1,630 civilian deaths from drone strikes between January and October 2026. Amnesty International reported nine strikes in North Kordofan between June and August and attributed attacks in and around El Obeid that killed 37 civilians and wounded 10 to the RSF; the RSF denied responsibility. Amnesty also said it is examining SAF drone strikes, so attribution for individual incidents remains contested. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
    • I&W: OHCHR or Amnesty documents another drone strike causing civilian deaths at a named civilian site in Sudan. (0-30 days)
    • I&W: A subsequent OHCHR reporting period records a sustained fall in civilian deaths attributed to drone strikes across Sudan. (1-3 months)
  4. Acute humanitarian pressure is very likely to persist over the next 1 to 3 months. UNICEF reporting estimates that around 4.2 million children will suffer acute malnutrition this year and at least 8 million lack access to formal education. IOM reported that more than 7,000 people fled inter-communal clashes in Al Sunta locality, South Darfur, and 1,380 people fled insecurity in Um Baru, North Darfur, into Chad. In Khartoum, Usratuna has stopped most support services, leaving more than 100 registered children without the listed rehabilitation services. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
    • I&W: An IOM update reports additional displacement from Al Sunta or Um Baru, or further arrivals from Um Baru into Chad. (0-30 days)
    • I&W: UNICEF reports a material reduction in its acute malnutrition estimate and IOM records stabilising displacement from the named Darfur localities. (1-3 months)
  5. It is unlikely that the available evidence establishes that cargo on the SU-SKG flights reached the RSF in Sudan. Malawi's Anti-Corruption Bureau arrested retired General Paul Valentino Phiri in Lilongwe, and prosecutors allege an arms-smuggling operation involving movement through Malawi to Chad. Flight records document routes between Mombasa, Lilongwe and N'Djamena, but those records do not establish the cargo or its final recipient. The arrest and prosecution are reported, while the alleged supply chain remains unproven. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)
    • I&W: Court filings, cargo records or independently verified evidence identify weapons aboard SU-SKG and confirm delivery to a Sudanese recipient. (0-3 months)
    • I&W: Court filings or cargo records establish that the tracked flights carried no military cargo or had a different documented end user. (0-3 months)

Outlook & scenarios

SAF consolidates local gains while the RSF retains most of West Kordofan (55%)

This is the most likely course over the next 1 to 3 months. SAF and allied forces consolidate at the reported West Kordofan locations, but the RSF continues to hold most of the state. Fighting and displacement continue without a confirmed decisive change in control.

The RSF stabilises the West Kordofan front (28%)

The RSF maintains control across most of West Kordofan and slows further SAF gains. This would leave the reported SAF captures as local advances rather than a confirmed opening of a sustained route towards Darfur.

The Blue Nile offensive is independently confirmed (12%)

Independent confirmation of RSF-SPLM-N positions beyond Sali or near Ad-Damazin would indicate a wider front than current reporting establishes. Such a development would increase pressure on SAF forces around Ed Damazin and raise the risk of additional civilian displacement.

High-impact wildcard: a rapid shift near Ed Damazin (5%)

A sudden RSF-SPLM-N advance towards Ed Damazin would sharply change the Blue Nile picture and could force SAF to redirect forces from other fronts. Current reporting does not establish that such an advance is under way.

Recommendations

  1. Keep West Kordofan control assessments provisional. Verify SAF presence at Al-Khuwai, Al-Morkib, Khamasat and Al-Sa’atat, and reconcile the reported date and administrative location of Al-Khuwai before updating maps.
  2. Do not assess Sali or the approaches to Ad-Damazin as changed hands without independent confirmation. Track reporting on the five SAF combat units deployed to Ed Damazin and seek geolocated evidence of positions on both sides.
  3. Separate confirmation of drone strikes from attribution. Record the RSF denial alongside Amnesty International's findings, and track the organisation's examination of SAF strikes and subsequent OHCHR reporting.
  4. Prioritise the next IOM displacement update for Al Sunta and Um Baru, alongside UNICEF updates on child malnutrition and access to education. Track whether Usratuna resumes services for registered children in Khartoum.
  5. For the Malawi case, distinguish flight tracking from evidence about cargo and end recipients. Base any assessment of a Sudan or RSF supply link on court filings, cargo documentation or independent confirmation.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is high for the broad situation picture: OHCHR, UNICEF, IOM and Amnesty International reporting supports the civilian and humanitarian assessment, while local reporting and a think-tank assessment describe SAF advances in West Kordofan. Confidence is lower for precise territorial control at Al-Khuwai, the unverified Blue Nile offensive and attribution of individual drone strikes. Malawi prosecution reporting establishes the arrest and allegations, not the alleged cargo's final destination.

Intelligence gaps

  • [EEI 1.2 · PARTIAL] Changes in employment of heavy weapons and systems: documented use or emplacement of artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, tanks, combat helicopters, and airstrikes at specific coordinates and times. Recommended collection: open-source/media
  • [EEI 1.4 · UNCOVERED] Status of critical infrastructure and lines of communication: control or denial of named bridges, main highways (identify route numbers), airfields, fuel depots and telecommunication hubs and any reported sabotage/blockage incidents. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
  • [EEI 2.1 · PARTIAL] Counts and locations of newly displaced persons arriving at formal sites, informal camps, border crossings or collective centers (daily/weekly arrivals, site coordinates), including demographics (women, children, elderly) where available. Recommended collection: humanitarian/UN OCHA reports
  • [EEI 2.2 · UNCOVERED] Access impediments to humanitarian assistance: reported attacks on, blockages of, or denial of passage for named humanitarian convoys (dates, GPS locations, responsible actor if known) and closure status of specific routes. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
  • [EEI 2.3 · PARTIAL] Functional status of medical infrastructure in named locations: number of operational hospitals/clinics, reported shortages of key medicines/blood, and hospital casualty/occupancy figures for the last 72 hours. Recommended collection: medical/health cluster reporting
  • [EEI 3.1 · UNCOVERED] Detection of flights, ships or overland convoys delivering military materiel or foreign personnel to named airfields, ports or border crossings (flight/IMO numbers, manifests if available, timestamps, route origin/destination). Recommended collection: air-traffic / maritime / border customs
  • [EEI 3.2 · UNCOVERED] Imagery or on-the-ground confirmation of foreign military personnel or private military contractor bases/forward operating elements at specified coordinates or compounds, including vehicle/weapon types observed. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
  • [EEI 3.3 · UNCOVERED] Financial and sanctions-relevant indicators: atypical large transfers, use of designated front companies, or shipments routed through third states linked to procurement of weapons or fuel for RSF or SAF (transaction dates, parties, amounts where obtainable). Recommended collection: financial intelligence

Red cell review: CONCUR WITH COMMENT

TLP:CLEAR

Cited sources

10 sources cited · drawn from 80 assessed open sources · graded on the NATO Admiralty reliability scale (A best → F).

  1. [1]DSudans PostTerritorial Control Map – Sudan Conflict (as of November 17, 2026) - Sudans Post17 November 2026 · sha256:5f98c336c127sudanspost.com ↗
  2. [2]CEEPA (Europe External Programme with Africa) situation report, republished by In-Depth News (IDN)EEPA reports on EU deportations of rejected asylum seekers to Rwanda to start in 202719 November 2026 · sha256:066d552a5dabindepthnews.net ↗
  3. [3]CMENAFN (reporting on Amnesty International)Amnesty Demands War Crimes Probe After RSF Drone Strikes Kill 3719 November 2026 · sha256:560ffde581c1menafn.com ↗
  4. [4]CPlatform for Investigative Journalism (PIJ)Malawi’s arms trafficking case: The weapons order and the aircraft.17 November 2026 · sha256:138b1a9034a2makanday.org ↗
  5. [5]AAl JazeeraSudan’s war leaves disabled children missing out on education20 November 2026 · sha256:a0890b83ac39aljazeera.com ↗
  6. [6]Ebsky.app⚔️ Amnesty (Nov 18) urges a war-crimes probe into RSF drone strikes on El Obeid: nine strikes, June–Aug 2026, 37 civilians killed. RSF deniesha256:2dc94c3db219bsky.app ↗
  7. [7]Edailyzonereport (Bluesky account)🇸🇩 Ground combat · Sudan A Telegram channel, @geopwatch, reports that RSF and SPLM-N forces launched a new offensive in Blue Nile State, sha256:c5e58dd33c48bsky.app ↗
  8. [8]DThe Eastleigh VoiceKenya silent as Malawi general's arrest exposes alleged arms route to Sudan's RSF | The Eastleigh Voice14 November 2026 · sha256:1741f47ad4d0eastleighvoice.co.ke ↗
  9. [9]ECritical Threats ProjectThe military captured al Khawai—a midpoint town 70 miles west of the SAF’s central Sudan headquarters in the North Kordofan state capital, esha256:336ec3316685bsky.app ↗
  10. [10]BXinhua (via The Star)Feature: Back to school on an empty stomach in Omdurman19 November 2026 · sha256:9d4ed5d57c46thestar.com.my ↗

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UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT-DERIVED // FOUO