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Analysis · November 18, 2026 · Sudan

Sudan situation report: SAF gains in Kordofan, civilian risks persist

—High
BOTTOM LINE

SAF and allied Joint Force reports describe recapturing El Khoi and eight surrounding areas on 13 and 14 November, with SAF forces reaching En Nahud; reporting does not establish durable control of En Nahud. Drone attacks, displacement and interrupted aid remain immediate risks, while the Sudanese government’s peace initiative is a new diplomatic step, not evidence of a ceasefire.

KEY JUDGMENTS
  • SAF and the Joint Force likely recaptured El Khoi, also reported as al-Khuwai, and eight surrounding areas on 13 and 14 November. SAF forces are reported to have reached En Nahud, but control remains unresolved: another report says the RSF still holds al-Nuhud. These accounts support recent SAF movement, not durable control. (medium)
  • Drone strikes are very likely to remain a leading direct threat to civilians in Sudan over the next month. The UN Human Rights Office reported more than 2,230 civilian deaths from January to October, with more than 1,630 attributed to drones. Amnesty International investigated nine RSF drone strikes in El Obeid and its surroundings between June and August, reporting 37 civilian deaths and 10 injuries. UN reporting also documents attacks on civilian infrastructure and essential services. The figures establish a broad threat, but attribution for individual strikes remains uneven. (high)
  • Humanitarian conditions in Kordofan are likely to remain acute over the next one to three months. Reporting says most aid operations in Kordofan have halted, and the IOM reported that about 750 people fled Abu Zabad on 14 November. UN agencies have also warned that 15.4 million people in Sudan urgently need shelter amid supply and funding shortages. The scale of need is clear, but current access and delivery data are limited. (medium)
  • Hemedti’s reported appointment of six governors is likely an effort to formalise an RSF-aligned administration across Darfur and West Kordofan, but the reporting does not establish that the appointees exercise authority. The appointments named Al-Tijani Al-Tahir Karshoum in West Darfur, Musa Dodein Al-Hurr in East Darfur, Dr Al-Fadil Mohamed Karama Yahya in Central Darfur, Yousif Awadallah Alayan in West Kordofan, Eissa Babiker Hussein Abdallah in South Darfur, and Al-Fadil Al-Nour Mohamed Ahmed Tirab in North Darfur. This rests on local-media reporting and confidence is low. (low)
  • The Sudanese government, through Prime Minister Dr Kamil Idris, presented a peace initiative to the UN Security Council. Its stated terms include a monitored ceasefire, RSF withdrawal and disarmament, unhindered humanitarian access, justice for victims, and an inclusive Sudanese-led political process leading to elections. The presentation is directly reported by the Sudanese government; the available reporting does not establish RSF acceptance or implementation. (medium)
  • The RSF reportedly transferred 120 detainees from El Nahud prison in West Kordofan to Dagris prison in Nyala, South Darfur. An El Nahud emergency room representative said most were civilians arrested on allegations of collaboration with the army; a Joint Force spokesman linked the transfer to the SAF advance. The transfer is reported by major media, but detainee status and numbers at Dagris remain uncertain. (medium)
  • The allegation that the RSF is using Ethiopian territory to attack SAF forces in Blue Nile remains unverified. It rests on a wire-service report and a low-reliability social-media claim; broader allegations of Ethiopian support for the RSF are reported as denied by Ethiopia. Confidence in the allegation is low. (low)

TLP:CLEAR · Disclosure is not limited.

Sudan situation report: SAF gains in Kordofan, civilian risks persist

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-11-18 13:29Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

SAF and allied Joint Force reports describe recapturing El Khoi and eight surrounding areas on 13 and 14 November, with SAF forces reaching En Nahud; reporting does not establish durable control of En Nahud. Drone attacks, displacement and interrupted aid remain immediate risks, while the Sudanese government’s peace initiative is a new diplomatic step, not evidence of a ceasefire.

Executive summary

Reports describe recent SAF and Joint Force gains in West Kordofan, alongside the displacement of about 750 people from Abu Zabad in one day. The RSF reportedly transferred 120 detainees from El Nahud to Dagris prison in Nyala; a local emergency room representative said most were civilians arrested for alleged collaboration with the army. The Sudanese government presented a peace initiative to the UN Security Council, while RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo issued decrees appointing six governors in Darfur and Kordofan. We assess that control of key Kordofan towns remains unsettled and that civilian exposure to drone attacks and aid disruption remains high.

Change from previous assessment

Since the 17 November brief, reporting has specified that SAF and the Joint Force retook El Khoi and eight surrounding areas on 13 and 14 November, while the status of En Nahud remains disputed. New developments include the reported flight of about 750 people from Abu Zabad in one day, the transfer of 120 detainees from El Nahud to Dagris, Hemedti’s reported appointment of six governors, and the Sudanese government’s presentation of a peace initiative to the UN Security Council. The assessment of drone danger and acute humanitarian pressure carries forward; no new reporting establishes durable SAF control of West Kordofan.

Key judgments

  1. SAF and the Joint Force likely recaptured El Khoi, also reported as al-Khuwai, and eight surrounding areas on 13 and 14 November. SAF forces are reported to have reached En Nahud, but control remains unresolved: another report says the RSF still holds al-Nuhud. These accounts support recent SAF movement, not durable control. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
    • I&W: Independent reporting or geolocated footage shows SAF and Joint Force units operating inside En Nahud and maintaining checkpoints there. (0-14 days)
    • I&W: Multiple reports identify RSF checkpoints or administration in En Nahud while SAF units remain outside the town. (0-14 days)
  2. Drone strikes are very likely to remain a leading direct threat to civilians in Sudan over the next month. The UN Human Rights Office reported more than 2,230 civilian deaths from January to October, with more than 1,630 attributed to drones. Amnesty International investigated nine RSF drone strikes in El Obeid and its surroundings between June and August, reporting 37 civilian deaths and 10 injuries. UN reporting also documents attacks on civilian infrastructure and essential services. The figures establish a broad threat, but attribution for individual strikes remains uneven. (Confidence: high · ASSESSED)
    • I&W: OHCHR or OCHA reports additional civilian deaths from drone strikes or new strikes on named civilian services in Sudan. (0-1 month)
    • I&W: The next OHCHR reporting period records no drone-related civilian deaths and OCHA reports no drone threats to essential services. (0-1 month)
  3. Humanitarian conditions in Kordofan are likely to remain acute over the next one to three months. Reporting says most aid operations in Kordofan have halted, and the IOM reported that about 750 people fled Abu Zabad on 14 November. UN agencies have also warned that 15.4 million people in Sudan urgently need shelter amid supply and funding shortages. The scale of need is clear, but current access and delivery data are limited. (Confidence: medium · ASSESSED)
    • I&W: OCHA or IOM reports aid operations remain halted in Kordofan or records further displacement from Abu Zabad. (0-1 month)
    • I&W: OCHA confirms aid operations have resumed in Kordofan and IOM reports no new displacement from Abu Zabad. (0-1 month)
  4. Hemedti’s reported appointment of six governors is likely an effort to formalise an RSF-aligned administration across Darfur and West Kordofan, but the reporting does not establish that the appointees exercise authority. The appointments named Al-Tijani Al-Tahir Karshoum in West Darfur, Musa Dodein Al-Hurr in East Darfur, Dr Al-Fadil Mohamed Karama Yahya in Central Darfur, Yousif Awadallah Alayan in West Kordofan, Eissa Babiker Hussein Abdallah in South Darfur, and Al-Fadil Al-Nour Mohamed Ahmed Tirab in North Darfur. This rests on local-media reporting and confidence is low. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)
    • I&W: The named appointees appear in state-level orders, convene state security committees or take up offices in their assigned states. (0-1 month)
    • I&W: Local authorities reject the appointments or the RSF rescinds the decree before any appointee assumes a state role. (0-1 month)
  5. The Sudanese government, through Prime Minister Dr Kamil Idris, presented a peace initiative to the UN Security Council. Its stated terms include a monitored ceasefire, RSF withdrawal and disarmament, unhindered humanitarian access, justice for victims, and an inclusive Sudanese-led political process leading to elections. The presentation is directly reported by the Sudanese government; the available reporting does not establish RSF acceptance or implementation. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)
    • I&W: A UN Security Council record confirms circulation of the initiative and the RSF publicly responds to its terms. (0-14 days)
    • I&W: No UN record of a submitted initiative emerges and the Sudanese government clarifies that the statement was not a formal proposal to the Council. (0-14 days)
  6. The RSF reportedly transferred 120 detainees from El Nahud prison in West Kordofan to Dagris prison in Nyala, South Darfur. An El Nahud emergency room representative said most were civilians arrested on allegations of collaboration with the army; a Joint Force spokesman linked the transfer to the SAF advance. The transfer is reported by major media, but detainee status and numbers at Dagris remain uncertain. (Confidence: medium · REPORTED)
    • I&W: A humanitarian organisation gains access to Dagris and verifies the transferred detainees’ locations and civilian status. (0-1 month)
    • I&W: The RSF publishes a release or transfer list that conflicts with the reported total or destination. (0-1 month)
  7. The allegation that the RSF is using Ethiopian territory to attack SAF forces in Blue Nile remains unverified. It rests on a wire-service report and a low-reliability social-media claim; broader allegations of Ethiopian support for the RSF are reported as denied by Ethiopia. Confidence in the allegation is low. (Confidence: low · ASSESSED)
    • I&W: Independent reporting, UN findings or geolocated imagery verifies RSF launch points inside Ethiopian territory. (0-1 month)
    • I&W: Independent reporting locates the relevant RSF operations inside Sudan and provides no evidence of cross-border launch activity. (0-1 month)

Outlook & scenarios

Contested Kordofan pressure continues (50%)

The most likely path is continued SAF pressure around El Khoi and En Nahud without a rapid, verified shift in control of al-Nuhud. RSF and SAF drone activity, civilian displacement and disrupted aid continue to shape conditions around Kordofan.

SAF consolidates its recent gains (25%)

SAF and allied Joint Force units consolidate their reported gains and establish a sustained presence in En Nahud. A further RSF withdrawal from contested Kordofan localities would increase displacement and place additional pressure on already interrupted aid operations.

The peace initiative remains declaratory (20%)

The Sudanese government’s initiative remains a statement of terms rather than the basis for a ceasefire. Without reported RSF acceptance or implementation, fighting and humanitarian access constraints continue.

Cross-border escalation in Blue Nile (5%)

As a low-probability, high-impact wildcard, independent verification that RSF forces are launching attacks from Ethiopian territory would increase the risk of a cross-border dimension to fighting in Blue Nile. Current reporting does not verify the allegation.

Recommendations

  1. Track control of El Khoi, En Nahud and al-Nuhud separately. Require independent reporting or geolocated evidence before describing any of these locations as durably held.
  2. Prioritise daily review of OCHA and IOM reporting on aid access and displacement in Kordofan, with particular attention to Abu Zabad and routes towards El Fula.
  3. Separate verified drone incidents from claims about responsibility. Preserve the OHCHR civilian-death figures and Amnesty’s El Obeid findings as distinct evidence streams.
  4. Treat the six RSF-aligned governor appointments as an indicator of attempted administrative consolidation, not proof that the appointees govern the named states.
  5. Track whether the UN Security Council records the Sudanese government’s initiative and whether the RSF responds to its terms. Do not describe the proposal as an agreed ceasefire.
  6. Keep the Ethiopia and Blue Nile allegation at low confidence unless independent reporting or verifiable imagery confirms activity across the border.

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is high in the broad assessment because UN human-rights and humanitarian reporting, Amnesty International findings, IOM reporting and major-media accounts provide multiple credible lines of evidence on civilian harm, displacement and recent fighting. Confidence is lower on exact control of En Nahud, detainee totals and the allegation of RSF operations from Ethiopian territory. The civilian-death figures are well supported for the stated January to October period, while some reporting gives conflicting figures for narrower periods.

Alternative analysis (red cell)

The governor appointments may be primarily symbolic claims by an RSF-linked authority rather than an effort that meaningfully formalises administration across Darfur and West Kordofan. The available D3 reporting confirms reported appointments but does not demonstrate local recognition, institutional capacity, or territorial control. Accordingly, the evidence supports the appointments as a political signaling exercise at least as well as it supports the stated administrative interpretation.

Intelligence gaps

  • [EEI 1.1 · PARTIAL] Observed concentrations and movement of armed units (size estimates, unit identifiers if visible) within X km of named towns/roads/airfields (e.g., El Fasher, Geneina, Nyala, Khartoum neighborhoods) including timestamps and direction of movement. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
  • [EEI 1.3 · UNCOVERED] Reports or intercepts of orders, operational directives or public statements from RSF/SAF commanders indicating planned offensives, ceasefire acceptance/rejection, defensive postures or orders to withdraw from named locations. Recommended collection: signals/communications intercepts
  • [EEI 1.4 · PARTIAL] Status of critical infrastructure and lines of communication: control or denial of named bridges, main highways (identify route numbers), airfields, fuel depots and telecommunication hubs and any reported sabotage/blockage incidents. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
  • [EEI 2.1 · PARTIAL] Counts and locations of newly displaced persons arriving at formal sites, informal camps, border crossings or collective centers (daily/weekly arrivals, site coordinates), including demographics (women, children, elderly) where available. Recommended collection: humanitarian/UN OCHA reports
  • [EEI 2.2 · PARTIAL] Access impediments to humanitarian assistance: reported attacks on, blockages of, or denial of passage for named humanitarian convoys (dates, GPS locations, responsible actor if known) and closure status of specific routes. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
  • [EEI 2.3 · PARTIAL] Functional status of medical infrastructure in named locations: number of operational hospitals/clinics, reported shortages of key medicines/blood, and hospital casualty/occupancy figures for the last 72 hours. Recommended collection: medical/health cluster reporting
  • [EEI 3.1 · UNCOVERED] Detection of flights, ships or overland convoys delivering military materiel or foreign personnel to named airfields, ports or border crossings (flight/IMO numbers, manifests if available, timestamps, route origin/destination). Recommended collection: air-traffic / maritime / border customs
  • [EEI 3.2 · PARTIAL] Imagery or on-the-ground confirmation of foreign military personnel or private military contractor bases/forward operating elements at specified coordinates or compounds, including vehicle/weapon types observed. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite
  • [EEI 3.3 · PARTIAL] Financial and sanctions-relevant indicators: atypical large transfers, use of designated front companies, or shipments routed through third states linked to procurement of weapons or fuel for RSF or SAF (transaction dates, parties, amounts where obtainable). Recommended collection: financial intelligence

Red cell review: PARTIAL DISSENT

TLP:CLEAR

Cited sources

11 sources cited · drawn from 80 assessed open sources · graded on the NATO Admiralty reliability scale (A best → F).

  1. [1]DRadio TamazujRSF leader appoints 6 governors in Darfur, Kordofan18 November 2026 · sha256:fd78866b36f6radiotamazuj.org ↗
  2. [2]AAl Jazeera (Al Jazeera Net)مصيرهم مجهول.. الدعم السريع ينقل 120 معتقلا من سجن النهود إلى "دقريس"18 November 2026 · sha256:fcffa7a0aecbaljazeera.net ↗
  3. [3]AAl JazeeraHow SAF successes in Sudan’s Kordofan could turn tide against the RSF14 November 2026 · sha256:1cbd489b0827aljazeera.com ↗
  4. [4]BCGTNDrones account for nearly three-quarters of Sudan war deaths this year, UN says17 November 2026 · sha256:3db116893219newsaf.cgtn.com ↗
  5. [5]AAgenzia FidesAFRICA/SUDAN - Guerra su più fronti, i Vescovi invocano una pace negoziatasha256:051c32a0e6cffides.org ↗
  6. [6]BAmnesty International (Amnesty International UK)Sudan: ‘Deadly’ RSF drone strikes in El Obeid need war crimes investigation, says Amnesty18 November 2026 · sha256:01625c10ac8camnesty.org.uk ↗
  7. [7]BRT (Russia Today)Drones cause nearly three-quarters of verified civilian deaths in Sudan – UNsha256:83f8d9bcf0aart-english.com ↗
  8. [8]BSudan News Agency (SUNA), republished by allAfrica.comSudanese Ambassador to India Publishes Article On El Fasher Massacre in World Affairs Magazine18 November 2026 · sha256:a7f76fb43ebcallafrica.com ↗
  9. [9]EBalkan MapperSudanese Army Closes In On En Nahud While RSF Expands Across Blue Nile From Ethiopia [17 Nov 2026]sha256:8f800dcae979youtube.com ↗
  10. [10]ADeutsche Welle (DW)Fresh clashes at the Eritrean border — is Ethiopia sliding into a regional war?17 November 2026 · sha256:ae6a812ba07fdw.com ↗
  11. [11]BRT (Russia Today)RSF commander defects to Sudanese armysha256:656b0e78abd2rt-english.com ↗

Source content hashes were computed at collection time; the cited text is preserved unmodified for the life of this product.

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UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT-DERIVED // FOUO