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War Economy Sustains Sudan Conflict as RSF Encircles El Obeid

Time window: Last 7 days · Audience: General analyst · Type: Situation report · DTG: 2026-07-16 22:15Z · Overall confidence: HIGH

BLUF

Rapid Support Forces have encircled and intensified drone strikes against El Obeid, creating imminent risk of atrocities mirroring the El Fasher massacre. Both warring parties continue exploiting gum arabic and gold trade routes to finance operations despite coordinated international sanctions. Nearly 20 million people face acute food insecurity, with disrupted supply chains worsening conditions as humanitarian access deteriorates.

Executive summary

Recent UN reporting confirms Sudan's war economy is sustaining the conflict through systematic exploitation of gum arabic and gold trade routes by both Rapid Support Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces. The RSF has encircled El Obeid and intensified drone strikes while international actors implement sanctions targeting illicit gold networks and conflict financing mechanisms. The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, with 19.5 million people facing acute food insecurity across the country and over 100,000 remaining in famine conditions despite limited aid efforts. The city of El Obeid, housing approximately 500,000 people including 100,000 internally displaced, now faces imminent threat as RSF advances.

Change from previous assessment

El Obeid security situation has significantly deteriorated since prior assessment. Previously described as experiencing 'temporary respite', the city is now completely encircled by RSF forces with intensifying drone strikes and imminent risk of mass atrocities. The UK has escalated sanctions against conflict financing networks beyond those mentioned in previous brief including specific designations against Abu Dharr's operations. The UN's updated war economy report provides more detailed evidence of RSF's systematic redirection of gum arabic through Darfur and West Kordofan than what was documented in the prior assessment period.

Key judgments

1. Very likely both the Rapid Support Forces and Sudanese Armed Forces continue exploiting Sudan's gum arabic trade routes, with RSF having looted significant quantities from El-Nuhud warehouses in May 2025 and redirected substantial volumes toward Darfur and Souq al-Na'am. (Confidence: high · REPORTED)

• I&W: Documentation of gum arabic shipments transiting through Souq al-Na'am from RSF-controlled West Kordofan to Darfur (0-14 days)
• I&W: Public reporting of increased checkpoint fees imposed by RSF on gum arabic traders in Darfur (1-3 months)

2. Very likely the Rapid Support Forces have completely encircled El Obeid and are intensifying drone strikes against the city, creating an imminent risk of mass atrocities comparable to those witnessed at El Fasher. (Confidence: high · REPORTED)

• I&W: Satellite imagery showing RSF consolidation in all cardinal directions surrounding El Obeid (0-14 days)
• I&W: Documented increase in drone attack frequency against civilian infrastructure in El Obeid (0-14 days)

3. Very likely the humanitarian situation is worsening across Sudan, with approximately 19.5 million people facing acute food insecurity as disrupted supply chains prevent agricultural inputs from reaching farmers before planting season. (Confidence: high · REPORTED)

• I&W: Documented increases in basic food commodity prices exceeding 50% year-over-year in Port Sudan (0-30 days)
• I&W: Reporting of suspended agricultural shipments due to fuel shortages in North Kordofan (0-14 days)

4. Very likely international sanctions targeting conflict gold and gum arabic networks will disrupt established RSF and SAF financing channels, with the UK added 11 new designations on 16 July 2026 and the European Union banning Sudanese gold imports on 10 July 2026. (Confidence: high · REPORTED)

• I&W: Documented seizure of RSF-linked gold shipments at Port Sudan following the EU ban (0-60 days)
• I&W: Decreased availability of gum arabic stocks at the El-Nuhud trading center (1-3 months)

5. Very likely the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces have maintained separate governance structures in their controlled territories since the war began in April 2023, with the RSF signing a charter in Kenya in May 2026 to establish a rival parallel government. (Confidence: high · REPORTED)

• I&W: Publication of RSF administrative decrees governing West Darfur state (1-3 months)
• I&W: Documentation of SAF tax collection mechanisms in Port Sudan ports (0-30 days)

Outlook & scenarios

El Obeid Falls with Mass Atrocities (70%)

RSF successfully captures El Obeid within eight weeks, repeating El Fasher-type atrocities against civilians with over 60,000 additional deaths documented. The humanitarian situation deteriorates significantly as major aid corridors through North Kordofan are severed, reducing WFP assistance from 3.5 million to 2 million beneficiaries. International actors respond with stricter sanctions targeting secondary gold markets that process Sudanese gold through third countries.

Stalemate With Continued Resource Exploitation (65%)

Military operations reach a stalemate with neither SAF nor RSF able to capture major population centres by year end. Both parties continue expanding control over trade routes, with RSF redirecting gum arabic through Chad and Sudanese Armed Forces maintaining taxation at Port Sudan. UK sanctions targeting Abu Dharr's procurement networks partially disrupt RSF financing but fail to stop looting of key commodities entirely. Humanitarian access improves incrementally in certain corridors but remains obstructed in Darfur and Kordofan.

International Intervention Through Expanded Mandate (35%)

Following atrocities in El Obeid, the UN Security Council expands the Darfur arms embargo to cover all Sudan, authorising regional forces to interdict smuggling routes. African Union forces increase border monitoring in Chad and South Sudan, disrupting key RSF supply lines. The EU extends restrictions on companies handling gold from third countries processing Sudanese gold. The United States temporarily lifts tariffs on humanitarian goods entering Sudan through Port Sudan, enabling 30 percent increase in aid deliveries.

Collapse of RSF Control in Western Sudan (25%)

SAF successfully counterattacks into West Darfur in August, reclaiming Geneina and breaking RSF control over key gum arabic collection points. RSF financial networks collapse following EU gold ban and UK sanctions on Abu Dharr's operations, triggering defections among RSF leadership. The gum arabic trade partially recovers, enabling seasonal farmers to plant crops during the rainy season. The World Food Programme significantly expands operations, reaching 4.5 million beneficiaries as humanitarian access improves in SAF-controlled territories.

Recommendations

1. Monitor gum arabic shipments through Souq al-Na'am as critical tripwire indicator for RSF financial activity
2. Develop targeted sanctions packages against companies involved in re-exporting looted Sudanese commodities through third countries
3. Prioritise deployment of aid monitors to North Kordofan to document obstruction of humanitarian access near El Obeid
4. Coordinate with regional governments to increase monitoring of cross-border trade routes in Chad and South Sudan
5. Prepare contingency plans for mass displacement from El Obeid should RSF successfully capture the city

Confidence & uncertainty

Overall confidence is assessed as high due to multiple corroborated reports from UN agencies, international governments, and major media outlets consistently documenting war economy mechanisms and combat activities. UN Human Rights Office reporting provides direct evidence of trade route exploitation, while UK and EU government actions demonstrate recognition of these finance networks. Contradictions in casualty figures between sources are resolved through consistent documentation of humanitarian conditions from reputable aid organisations. Key uncertainties include the precise scale of gum arabic redirection to third countries and the effectiveness of new sanctions on war financing.

Intelligence gaps

• [EEI 1.2 · UNCOVERED] Changes in employment of heavy weapons and systems: documented use or emplacement of artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, tanks, combat helicopters, and airstrikes at specific coordinates and times. Recommended collection: open-source/media
• [EEI 1.3 · UNCOVERED] Reports or intercepts of orders, operational directives or public statements from RSF/SAF commanders indicating planned offensives, ceasefire acceptance/rejection, defensive postures or orders to withdraw from named locations. Recommended collection: signals/communications intercepts
• [EEI 1.4 · PARTIAL] Status of critical infrastructure and lines of communication: control or denial of named bridges, main highways (identify route numbers), airfields, fuel depots and telecommunication hubs and any reported sabotage/blockage incidents. Recommended collection: human intelligence/field reporting
• [EEI 2.1 · PARTIAL] Counts and locations of newly displaced persons arriving at formal sites, informal camps, border crossings or collective centers (daily/weekly arrivals, site coordinates), including demographics (women, children, elderly) where available. Recommended collection: humanitarian/UN OCHA reports
• [EEI 2.3 · PARTIAL] Functional status of medical infrastructure in named locations: number of operational hospitals/clinics, reported shortages of key medicines/blood, and hospital casualty/occupancy figures for the last 72 hours. Recommended collection: medical/health cluster reporting
• [EEI 3.1 · UNCOVERED] Detection of flights, ships or overland convoys delivering military materiel or foreign personnel to named airfields, ports or border crossings (flight/IMO numbers, manifests if available, timestamps, route origin/destination). Recommended collection: air-traffic / maritime / border customs
• [EEI 3.2 · UNCOVERED] Imagery or on-the-ground confirmation of foreign military personnel or private military contractor bases/forward operating elements at specified coordinates or compounds, including vehicle/weapon types observed. Recommended collection: imagery/satellite

Cited sources

[1] United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) · Sudan: “War economy” sustains conflict, United Nations (UN) report warns - Social News XYZ (A) · sha256:37fca61f84da [2] United Nations: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) · Sudan: “War economy” sustains conflict, United Nations (UN) report warns (A) · sha256:65824b55e5a6 [3] converseer.com · Sudan: “War economy” sustains conflict, United Nations (UN) report warns (A) · sha256:3824bdd5acdd [4] riotimesonline.com · UN Warns Sudan’s Gum Arabic Trade Is Directly Financing the War (B) · sha256:633d78c22d1f [5] allafrica.com · Sudan: Looted Gold and Gum Arabic Are Bankrolling Sudan's War, UN Warns (A) · sha256:d901c6bc9f13 [6] United Nations · Looted gold and gum arabic are bankrolling Sudan's war, UN warns (A) · sha256:f354ed7f313f [7] foreignpolicy.com · Sudan Faces New Sanctions as Evidence of Atrocities Mounts (A) · sha256:1a6423d26cfe [8] Al Jazeera English · Sudanese doctor keeps North Kordofan hospital running amid war (A) · sha256:94e9f89546d6 [9] UK Government · UK sanctions illicit gold networks fuelling Sudan’s war amid crisis around El Obeid (A) · sha256:6e187a8a03db [10] The Epoch Times · G7 Urges End to Attacks in Sudan’s El-Obeid, Seeks Nationwide Arms Embargo (B) · sha256:6d61b48cda0b [11] africa.businessinsider.com · Sudan’s fragile fight against famine faces new threat as Gulf conflict drives up farming costs (B) · sha256:8acea1cf52e7 [12] thefridaytimes.com · When Paperwork Costs Lives – The Silent Weapon In Sudan's Humanitarian Crisis (B) · sha256:767fc4c8511a [13] Wikipedia · Darfur genocide (2023–present) (B) · sha256:3107b6dc93e9 [14] euronews.com · Sudan's 'war economy' fuelling conflict, United Nations says (A) · sha256:657be95a0bc2 [15] gov.uk · Sudan: list of designations and sanctions notices (A) · sha256:f1a76c8dd3d9 [16] Wikipedia · Sudanese Armed Forces (F) · sha256:09e869388756

Source content hashes were computed at collection time; the cited text is preserved unmodified for the life of this product.

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