Bottom Line
Very likely (80-90%), confidence: high, the Rapid Support Forces will launch a ground assault on El Obeid within the next 72 hours. Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz will continue a managed recovery under an IMO/Oman corridor, while Houthi attacks and a reported monetised "safety-fee" scheme will keep commercial shipping risk elevated.
What changed since the prior briefing (2026-06-24)
Judgement continuity: Our prior assessment judged an RSF assault on El Obeid as very likely and the US-Iran mediated maritime pause as likely to hold short-term. New reporting over the last 24 hours strengthens the RSF threat picture: RSF drone strikes on El Obeid escalated, cutting water and power for over 500,000 people; reporting indicates RSF air-defence deployments at Abu Zabad and fresh reinforcements around El Obeid, raising our confidence in an imminent assault to high. On maritime risk, the IMO/Oman corridor and phased seafarer evacuation advanced over the last 24 hours and at least 172 vessel transits have occurred since reopening, which confirms managed recovery momentum but not a return to pre-crisis throughput.
Key Developments
- Sudan, El Obeid
Reporting: UN, UK statements, SAF and RSF social reporting, and local open sources indicate intensified RSF drone strikes on civilian infrastructure in El Obeid in the past 24 hours that have degraded power and water services for over 500,000 residents, including an estimated 200,000 internally displaced persons. Open reporting places RSF air-defence assets at Abu Zabad and notes RSF reinforcements around El Obeid.
Assessment: Very likely (80-90%), confidence: high, RSF will attempt a ground assault on El Obeid within 72 hours. If RSF seizes or heavily fights for the city, mass atrocities are very likely given RSF historical behaviour in Darfur and current UN/UK atrocity warnings.
- Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea
Reporting: The IMO has organised phased convoys and an evacuation of more than 11,000 seafarers via an Omani corridor. AIS and industry tracking show at least 172 transits since reopening and 21 central-corridor crossings on 23 June. Iran and Oman have opened talks on navigation administration. Houthi media and industry notes point to an 8 June ban on Israeli-linked navigation and emerging reports of a Houthi "safety-fee" scheme routed through temporary digital wallets.
Assessment: Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, Hormuz will remain open under managed controls over 24-72 hours but throughput will stay below pre-conflict norms and insurance premiums will remain elevated. Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, Houthi attacks and monetised non-targeting will keep the Red Sea a high-cost, high-delay route for affected owners and insurers.
- Israel, Lebanon
Reporting: Washington hosted a fifth round of Israel-Lebanon talks; mediators announced a deconfliction mechanism. Despite diplomacy, the IDF engaged Hezbollah near the Ali Taher Ridge on 23 June and Israeli fire killed two civilians in southern Lebanon according to Hezbollah and local reports.
Assessment: Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, low-level exchanges between the IDF and Hezbollah will persist in the near term. The mediator-announced mechanism is likely to face Israeli resistance because operational constraints reported in public accounts could endanger troops and exclude Israel from oversight, increasing miscalculation risk.
- Ukraine and the Black Sea
Reporting: Ukrainian forces reported striking 60 Russian targets overnight on 23 June, including a destroyed rail bridge over the North Crimean Canal near Rozdolne and hits near the Crimean Bridge. Sevastopol suffered a citywide power outage after attacks. Russia attempted a multi-USV attack on Odesa on 23 June that Ukraine destroyed.
Assessment: Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, Kyiv will sustain an interdiction campaign to isolate Crimea and degrade Russian logistics and energy nodes. Russia will continue to press Ukrainian coastal infrastructure and merchant shipping using drones and USVs.
- Taiwan Strait and South China Sea
Reporting: China transited its carrier Fujian through the Taiwan Strait on 22 June. Taiwan ran five days of immediate-readiness drills from 22 June, designed around a scenario in which a routine PLA exercise flips to an attack. A single uncorroborated social post alleges a China Coast Guard run-in with the Philippine Coast Guard in the South China Sea.
Assessment: Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, Beijing will sustain conspicuous naval signalling. The unverified South China Sea claim remains low credibility and requires independent confirmation.
- Sahel and munitions
Reporting: Open-source geolocation has identified unexploded Russian-made ShOAB-0.5 submunitions at Tadjmart after Malian strikes; Mali continues to receive support from Russia-linked units. NASA VIIRS thermal alerts over Mali require corroboration.
Assessment: Very likely, confidence: high, Mali and Burkina Faso remain extreme-risk environments for personnel and humanitarian operations; the presence of Russian ordnance raises legal and reputational exposure for Bamako.
Analysis
Judgements
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Sudan is the highest immediate humanitarian and atrocity risk. RSF offensive posture, combined with deliberate attacks on civilian infrastructure and reported forward air-defence deployments, almost certainly increases the probability of mass civilian harm and large displacement from El Obeid. This threatens to create a rapid humanitarian surge into neighbouring states and collapse of essential services in North Kordofan.
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Maritime trade faces a bifurcated path: managed, lower-throughput movement through Hormuz under IMO/Oman control, and sustained disruption in the Red Sea owing to Houthi attacks and reported extortion. The result is continued Suez underutilisation, persistent Cape of Good Hope diversions, and sustained upward pressure on shipping costs and insurance premiums. Owners will continue to reroute higher-value or time-sensitive cargoes away from the Red Sea.
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Ukraine’s intensified interdiction campaign is likely to worsen fuel and logistics scarcity in occupied Crimea and increase Russian defensive asset use, prolonging Black Sea risk to merchant shipping.
Stakeholder-specific implications
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Governments: Sudanese civilians and host-state humanitarian agencies face acute risk; UK and UN diplomatic steps are unlikely to halt an RSF assault absent enforcement. Israel and Lebanon mediators should expect low-level breaches; a high-casualty incident would force rapid policy choices for Israel, the US and regional states.
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Navies and maritime industry: Coalition navies and mine-countermeasures assets will be in demand. Owners and insurers will continue to prefer the Cape route for tankers and container ships that can accept the extra time and cost. Oil markets are likely to remain sensitive to episodic shocks, though current Brent levels are below early-June peaks.
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Energy markets: Hormuz corridor recovery is supporting increased Iranian hydrocarbon liftings, but prices remain vulnerable to a renewed closure or major mine incident. Continued tanker movements from Iran increase near-term supply availability but do not remove medium-term political risk.
Indicators & Warnings
(See the indicators array above for observable tripwires. Key near-term warnings are: a rapid RSF armoured convoy approach to El Obeid, a sustained spike in drone strikes on the city, a mine incident or major Houthi attack against a merchant vessel in the Red Sea, and a major escalation in Lebanon exceeding 50 rockets or large IDF offensive movements north of the Blue Line.)
Alternatives
(See the alternatives array above. Briefly: the most likely outcome is an RSF assault on El Obeid within 72 hours; alternative outcomes include a siege strategy by the RSF or a limited international deterrent that delays but does not eliminate the threat. For maritime risk the most likely outcome is continued managed recovery in Hormuz and persistent Red Sea disruption.)
Outlook (24-72 hours)
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Sudan: Very likely (80-90%), confidence: high, an RSF assault will be attempted on El Obeid. Expect immediate large-scale displacement and high civilian casualty risk if the assault proceeds.
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Maritime: Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, Hormuz will remain open under controlled convoys; very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, Houthi attacks and monetised non-targeting will continue to disrupt Red Sea trade and keep insurance and rerouting costs high.
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Israel-Lebanon: Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, low-level exchanges will continue; a single high-casualty incident could escalate rapidly.
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Ukraine: Likely (65-75%), confidence: moderate, Kyiv will continue strikes on Crimea logistics and energy nodes, causing further local outages and Russian defensive activity.
Sourcing and confidence
This brief synthesises reporting from UN and UK public statements, Ukrainian military reporting, Russian occupation authorities, AIS and commercial ship-tracking data, NASA thermal detection products, IMO and CENTCOM statements, industry advisories, and open-source geolocated imagery. The underlying source mix is weighted toward higher-quality A/B reporting across the briefs, with Admiralty-graded source counts provided to analysts as A:61, B:64, C:6, E:2, F:1. Where single-source or low-credibility social reporting informs a claim (for example, the Houthi "safety-fee" mechanics or a claimed China Coast Guard run-in with the Philippine Coast Guard), we have flagged limited corroboration and applied lower confidence. Overall analytic confidence for the daily product is moderate due to strong corroboration on the RSF build-up and Hormuz corridor, balanced against uncorroborated social posts and state-media variance in some theatres.
Analytic continuity
Compared with the prior briefing, the RSF assault probability and confidence have increased based on reported escalation of drone strikes and corroborated RSF reinforcements around El Obeid. The assessment that Hormuz can remain open under managed controls is consistent with prior reporting; new evidence of IMO/Oman phased evacuations and 172 transits since reopening reinforces that judgement but does not change our assessment that maritime risk remains elevated in the Red Sea.