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Weekly intelligence briefing · November 16, 2026 · TLP:CLEAR

Hormuz disruption deepens as Bab el-Mandeb positions shift, while Ukraine and Sudan remain attritional

BOTTOM LINE

The 9 to 16 November trajectory was a measurable increase in maritime disruption and local battlefield pressure, not a verified transition to sustained regional war. Strait of Hormuz traffic remained about 65 per cent below the pre-conflict baseline, while the Southern Armed Forces' announced withdrawal from Dhubab Airfield and nearby Bab el-Mandeb positions likely increased Houthi leverage, with moderate confidence; a complete closure of either chokepoint remains unlikely, with high confidence, and further limited US-Iran military action is a roughly even chance through 23 November, with moderate confidence.

// TEARLINE // TLP:CLEAR // RELEASABLE SUMMARY

From 9 to 16 November, Strait of Hormuz traffic remained about 65 per cent below the pre-conflict baseline, while the Southern Armed Forces' announced withdrawal from Dhubab Airfield and nearby Bab el-Mandeb positions likely increased Houthi leverage. A complete closure of either chokepoint remains unlikely with high confidence, while further limited US-Iran military action is a roughly even chance through 23 November with moderate confidence. Russian strikes on Ukraine, SAF-RSF fighting in Sudan and Israeli military activity in Gaza continued without a verified strategic breakthrough.

Bottom Line

The 9 to 16 November trajectory was a measurable increase in maritime disruption and local battlefield pressure, not a verified transition to sustained regional war. For this assessment, sustained regional war means recurring direct US-Iran exchanges for at least seven days, attacks on multiple state territories and continued kinetic involvement by at least three state militaries. That threshold has not been met in the supplied reporting.

Strait of Hormuz traffic remained about 65 per cent below the pre-conflict baseline. The Southern Armed Forces announced a withdrawal from Dhubab Airfield and nearby Bab el-Mandeb positions towards Aden. Commercial passage through either chokepoint is very likely to remain hazardous and below normal through 23 November, with high confidence that Hormuz remains disrupted and moderate confidence that Houthi leverage will increase near Bab el-Mandeb. A complete closure of either chokepoint remains unlikely, with high confidence. Further limited US-Iran military action is a roughly even chance through 23 November, with moderate confidence.

Key Developments

Strait of Hormuz

UKMTO's latest weekly tally recorded 139 outbound and 169 inbound transits through the Strait of Hormuz, a total of 308 reported movements. UKMTO assessed traffic at about 65 per cent below the pre-conflict baseline. JMIC estimated approximately 211 commercial vessels stationary at anchorages east of the strait on 12 November. These are contemporaneous operational indicators, but they measure different phenomena: UKMTO counts reported movements and JMIC estimates stationary vessels.

The International Energy Agency reported October Gulf oil exports, excluding Oman, at 18.4 million barrels per day, about 26 per cent below the pre-conflict level. The IEA figure is a monthly export measure and does not establish the transit rate during 9 to 16 November. Qatar also sent two loaded LNG carriers through during a lull under US naval escort. Those selected voyages demonstrate continued passage, not normal traffic.

Assessment: Commercial passage through Hormuz is very likely to remain hazardous and materially below the pre-conflict baseline through 23 November, with high confidence. The confidence is based on converging evidence from UKMTO, JMIC, the IEA and reported Qatar-linked sailings, while recognising that the sources cover different dates and populations. A complete closure remains unlikely because commercial vessels continued to move.

Iran and Bahrain

On 15 November, the IRGC claimed that six drones targeted a US air-defence radar at Al-Riffa in Bahrain. The Bahrain Defence Force said it intercepted the drones. US reporting did not confirm casualties or damage, and one report placed the target at a US naval facility in Manama rather than Al-Riffa.

Assessment: A further limited US-Iran military exchange through 23 November is a roughly even chance, with moderate confidence. The Qeshm Island strike publicly confirmed by President Donald Trump, Iranian retaliation warnings, the Bahrain claim and reported US force activity support continuation. Trump's public preference for restraint, Qatari mediation and the absence of a confirmed order for a larger campaign support containment. Confidence is high that the IRGC made the claim, but low to moderate that the claimed operation damaged the radar.

Bab el-Mandeb and Red Sea shipping

The Southern Armed Forces announced on 15 November that they had withdrawn from Dhubab Airfield and nearby positions near Bab el-Mandeb to reinforce Aden as Houthi forces advanced in Lahj Governorate. Reports placed Houthi forces near Kharaz and Tur al-Baha, approximately 60 to 80 kilometres from Aden. The announcement is corroborated by multiple outlets, but post-withdrawal control of Perim Island, Ras Menhali and the wider strait approaches is not independently verified.

Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd have selectively restored their ME1 service through the Suez Canal. The first westbound departure from Salalah was scheduled for 4 November and the first eastbound departure from Tangier for 12 to 13 November. The companies stated that further routing decisions depend on security conditions. This is evidence of selective route testing, not a broad return to routine Red Sea traffic.

Assessment: Houthi leverage over the southern Red Sea approach is likely to increase through 15 December, with moderate confidence. A general Houthi closure of Bab el-Mandeb remains unlikely through 23 November, with moderate confidence. No supplied report verifies a new Houthi attack on a Red Sea merchant vessel during the week.

Russia-Ukraine

Ukrainian authorities reported that Russian attacks on 13 November caused power outages in about half of Ukraine's regions. Russia's Defence Ministry said Russian forces struck a ferry terminal, port administration building and power substation at Chernomorsk on 15 November. The specific damage and military purpose of those targets are not independently established in the supplied material.

The Associated Press reported a Ukrainian operation involving nearly 1,200 drones. Russia's Defence Ministry separately claimed to have downed 1,198 Ukrainian drones. The launch total, interception figure and damage are not independently verified and should not be combined into a confirmed Ukrainian launch count.

Reporting on Operation Vivaldi described a Ukrainian advance of 10 to 20 kilometres near the Siverskyi Donets, with Russian fire halting the advance at the Chornyi Zherebets. ISW reported no confirmed Russian advances in the Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Lyman or Kostiantynivka directions and assessed only a limited Russian advance southeast of Dobropillia.

Assessment: Russian missile, drone and glide-bomb attacks on Ukrainian energy, urban and transport targets are very likely through 23 November, with high confidence. A front-wide Russian breakthrough remains unlikely, with moderate confidence. A ceasefire agreement during the same period is unlikely, with moderate confidence, because Abu Dhabi talks did not resolve Russian territorial demands, the proposed role of NATO or European participation.

Sudan

SAF and allied forces claimed control of al-Khuwai, the Khamas area and other positions in West Kordofan. The RSF remained reported in al-Nuhud and parts of South Kordofan and was reported to retain broad control across Darfur. The supplied material does not establish durable SAF control of the newly claimed localities.

UNICEF and other reporting described recurring attacks on Sudanese electricity infrastructure. Reported generation capacity was about 1,100 megawatts, compared with roughly 4,400 megawatts before the war. Humanitarian reporting put urgent shelter needs above 15 million people and acute food insecurity at about 20 million, although these figures differ in scope and are not independently reconciled.

Assessment: Further localised fighting and contested control in West Kordofan are likely through 23 November, with moderate confidence. A durable SAF operational gain remains unlikely through 23 November. Humanitarian conditions in Kordofan, Darfur and around El Obeid are very likely to remain severe through January 2027, with moderate confidence. The evidence supports persistent deprivation more strongly than a quantified week-on-week deterioration.

Gaza and Lebanon

Israel and Hamas confirmed the death of Samir Abu Younis, commander of Hamas's Rafah Brigade, in an Israeli strike in the Mawasi area of Khan Younis between 14 and 15 November. Gaza's Health Ministry reported 1,643 Palestinians killed and 5,964 wounded since the ceasefire as of 14 November. Humanitarian reporting described flooding that affected thousands of tents and continuing restrictions on shelter supplies.

In southern Lebanon, reporting described Israeli air and artillery activity, while Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah should retain its weapons. The supplied material does not establish a sustained Hezbollah-Israel exchange or identify a verified implementation mechanism for disarmament.

Assessment: Israeli military activity in Gaza is very likely to continue through 14 December, with high confidence. Humanitarian pressure is also very likely to remain acute, with moderate confidence on the scale of deterioration. Hezbollah's dispute with Lebanese authorities over weapons is likely to remain unresolved through 14 December, with low to moderate confidence.

Taiwan and the South China Sea

Taiwanese officials and major-media accounts described Chinese naval and coast guard activity involving the PLA Eastern, Northern and Southern Theater Commands and the Liaoning carrier group. Estimates ranged from more than 100 vessels across the Western Pacific to about 70 inside the first island chain. The American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War assessed that the activity might rehearse isolation of Taiwan, while China Daily described it as routine and lawful.

Assessment: There is a roughly even chance that the deployment rehearsed isolating Taiwan rather than comprising routine or separate activity, with low confidence. A PLA attack on Taiwan in the next one to three months is unlikely, with low confidence. The supplied reporting contains no attack order, amphibious mobilisation or missile-unit dispersal.

The 49th ASEAN Summit opened in Manila on 15 November. Philippine officials said about 80 per cent of the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct document was complete, but final signing during the summit was unlikely. The supplied record does not establish a new China Coast Guard encounter with Philippine vessels during 8 to 15 November. Another unsafe China Coast Guard, PLA or Philippine encounter near Scarborough Shoal or Second Thomas Shoal through 23 November remains likely, with low confidence, based on the prior pattern rather than a verified event this week.

Europe and Ethiopia-Eritrea

Estonia detained eight people after an attempted arson attack at Threod Systems in Viimsi on 14 November. Estonia's Internal Security Service attributed the operation to Russia's GRU and announced closure of the Narva, Koidula and Luhamaa road crossings with Russia from 1 December. The attempted arson and arrests are very likely to have occurred, with high confidence. The GRU attribution is likely, with moderate confidence, because it rests on Estonian intelligence claims whose underlying evidence has not been publicly described.

False bomb threats disrupted European aviation, schools and media organisations during early November. It is unlikely, with moderate confidence, that current public reporting establishes Russian direction of that wave. The threats and the Threod case should not be treated as one operation without forensic or prosecutorial linkage.

Ethiopian military chief Field Marshal Birhanu Jula accused Eritrea of coordinating attacks on Ethiopian federal positions and alleged Egyptian logistical support. Eritrea rejected Ethiopia's incursion allegation. Open Ethiopia-Eritrea war in the next one to three months is unlikely, with low confidence. The evidence supports elevated tension and fighting involving Ethiopian federal and Tigrayan forces, but not verified sustained direct combat between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Analysis

Change from the prior briefing

Hormuz: unchanged in direction, stronger in evidence. The 9 November briefing assessed that passage would very likely remain hazardous and below the pre-conflict baseline and that complete closure was unlikely. This remains the current estimate. Confidence in the occurrence of disruption has increased from moderate to high because the current week adds UKMTO movement counts, JMIC anchorage estimates, IEA export data and reported escorted Qatar-linked sailings. Those measures are complementary rather than interchangeable.

US-Iran confrontation: broadly unchanged. The prior briefing assessed further US military action as a roughly even chance through 23 November, with moderate confidence. The current estimate is the same. The IRGC's Al-Riffa claim raises the evidence of attempted escalation, but conflicting Bahrain and US accounts leave damage and intent unresolved. Trump's preference for restraint, Qatari mediation and the lack of a confirmed order for a wider campaign continue to support the same estimate.

Bab el-Mandeb: the leverage estimate has increased, but the closure estimate has not. The prior briefing judged a general closure unlikely and the Houthi passage-request mechanism uncertain. The Southern Armed Forces' announced withdrawal from Dhubab Airfield and nearby positions now supports a likely increase in Houthi leverage, with moderate confidence. It does not establish Houthi control of the strait, a merchant-vessel attack or a general closure.

Ukraine: unchanged. The prior briefing assessed continued Russian strikes as very likely, a front-wide breakthrough as unlikely and a near-term ceasefire as unlikely. The current assessment retains all three judgements. The new reporting shows continued energy and transport strikes and contested local movement, but no verified front-wide shift. Confidence in continued strikes remains high because the pattern is recurrent and supported by official and major-media reporting; confidence in battlefield direction remains moderate because locality-level claims conflict.

Sudan: unchanged in forecast, narrower in wording. The prior briefing assessed likely SAF tactical gains but no decisive shift, likely continued drone attacks and worsening humanitarian pressure. The current assessment retains likely localised fighting, unlikely durable SAF operational gain and very likely severe humanitarian conditions. It does not claim that conditions worsened by a measured amount during this week because the supplied statistics are not temporally comparable.

Gaza: unchanged. The prior briefing assessed very likely continued Israeli strikes and severe humanitarian pressure through late November. The current assessment extends the same trajectory through 14 December. Confirmation of Samir Abu Younis's death and additional reports of fire and flooding support continuity. The casualty figures remain authority-reported and the responsibility for individual ceasefire breaches remains disputed.

Taiwan and the South China Sea: unchanged in core estimate. The prior briefing assessed a roughly even chance that the Chinese deployment rehearsed Taiwan isolation, an unlikely PLA attack in the next one to three months and a likely but low-confidence risk of another unsafe encounter near Scarborough Shoal or Second Thomas Shoal. The current estimates remain the same. The supplied South China Sea record still does not confirm a new encounter during the week, while the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct talks add diplomatic activity without a final agreement.

Ethiopia-Eritrea: unchanged below the threshold of open interstate war. The prior briefing assessed open war as unlikely with low confidence and direct combat as unverified. The current reporting adds competing official accusations but no independent confirmation of sustained Ethiopia-Eritrea combat. The estimate therefore remains unlikely, with low confidence.

Source quality and corroboration

The 414 source items contain 141 in the highest reliability category and 109 in the next reliability category, alongside 37 fair-quality items, 55 questionable items, 70 poor-quality items and two items that cannot be assessed. The most reliable judgements in this product concern reported UKMTO movements, IEA exports, recurring Russian strikes, official legal actions and company route announcements. Reliability is lower for attribution, damage, casualty totals, battlefield control and intent where reporting rests on belligerent claims, state media, social media or single-source local reporting.

Hormuz disruption is supported by UKMTO movement counts, JMIC anchorage estimates, IEA monthly export data and reported Qatar-linked sailings. These sources independently measure different aspects of the same problem, but none alone establishes a complete closure. Bahrain radar damage rests on directly conflicting IRGC and Bahraini-US claims, without independent damage imagery. Houthi claims concerning Saudi infrastructure are also unverified. ISW and major wire reporting support the broad Ukraine assessment, while the AP drone figure and the Russian interception claim remain separate belligerent or media-reported figures. UNICEF and UN-linked reporting support the severity of Sudan's humanitarian conditions, but the reported needs totals have different scopes and dates.

Stakeholder implications

Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline, Yanbu export route and air-defence network face continued exposure over the next 7 to 14 days. QatarEnergy's LNG sailings face escort and scheduling risk in Hormuz. UAE anchorages at Fujairah and Khor Fakkan face additional dwell-time pressure if more tankers wait east of the strait. India, Japan and South Korea face longer or less predictable Gulf-to-Asia energy voyages. Egypt's Suez Canal revenue remains exposed if Maersk, Hapag-Lloyd or other carriers reverse their selective return to Suez.

Ukraine's grid operators and port authorities face continued Russian strike risk through 23 November. The reported outages across about half of Ukraine's regions indicate pressure on electricity distribution, while the Chernomorsk reporting identifies continued exposure of port and power infrastructure. The launch and damage figures for the Ukrainian drone operation do not establish the scale of disruption inside Russia.

UN agencies and aid organisations operating in El Obeid, North Kordofan, Darfur, Gaza and Taiz face continued access and shelter constraints over the next 30 to 90 days. In Gaza, winter weather and flooding affect tented populations. In Sudan, electricity damage and contested roads constrain services. In Taiz, supplied reporting supports severe access pressure but does not substantiate an aid cutoff affecting 800,000 people.

Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan and the United States face a higher maritime surveillance burden if Chinese multi-theatre activity persists. The current evidence does not support an imminent PLA attack forecast. European defence firms, airports, schools and transport operators face continued disruption from unattributed threats and alleged Russian-linked sabotage, but public evidence does not yet connect the events into one campaign.

Indicators & Warnings

  • UKMTO or JMIC reporting of fewer than 20 commercial Hormuz transits in a 24-hour period for two consecutive days, or zero verified transits for 48 hours, would raise the temporary-closure scenario from unlikely to roughly even chance. Weekly movements within 25 per cent of the current 308-transit tally would support the baseline. Monitor UKMTO incident reports, JMIC updates, AIS data and port calls at Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar and Musandam over the next 7 days.
  • A Lloyd's Joint War Committee notice, a major insurer's new Hormuz exclusion, a reported war-risk premium increase, AIS silence from more than 10 tankers in the eastern Gulf or median tanker anchorage dwell time above 72 hours would indicate further disruption. Stable cover, normal AIS transmission and dwell times below 48 hours would support partial normalisation. Monitor over the next 7 to 14 days.
  • A formal Iranian passage-clearance mechanism through Qatar or Oman, a US Navy notice confirming an agreed transit procedure or a Qatar- or Pakistan-facilitated pause in attacks would lower the further US-Iran action estimate from roughly even chance to unlikely. Monitor official statements over the next 14 days.
  • A CENTCOM, Bahrain Defence Force or commercial satellite report confirming casualties, crater damage or radar-service interruption at Al-Riffa would raise further US-Iran action from roughly even chance to likely. No further Iranian salvo for seven days combined with a damage assessment showing no impact would lower it to unlikely. Monitor over the next 14 days.
  • Commercial satellite imagery, AIS-linked coastal reporting or Yemeni military statements confirming Houthi deployment of anti-ship missiles, coastal radar or fire-control systems near Dhubab, Ras Menhali or Perim Island would raise the Houthi maritime-shock scenario from unlikely to roughly even chance. A Southern Armed Forces counterattack restoring Dhubab positions would lower the estimate of increased Houthi leverage. Monitor over the next 14 to 30 days.
  • ISW, geolocated imagery or locality-level Ukrainian and Russian reporting confirming Russian control of Dobropillia for seven days or a sustained advance west of the Chornyi Zherebets would raise the localised Russian-breakthrough scenario from unlikely to roughly even chance. A Ukrainian restoration of positions west of the river or a signed Abu Dhabi ceasefire text would support the competing assessment. Monitor over the next 14 days.
  • UN OCHA, satellite imagery or repeated geolocated reporting confirming SAF control of al-Khuwai and adjacent routes for seven days would raise the SAF-consolidation scenario to roughly even chance. An RSF counterattack towards al-Khuwai or al-Obeid, three additional power-station strikes or an OCHA-confirmed suspension of aid convoys would raise the RSF-counterattack and humanitarian-deterioration estimates. Monitor over the next 30 days.
  • Five or more independently reported Israeli strikes or incidents in Gaza over seven days would support continued ceasefire erosion. A seven-day period without reported Israeli strikes, an agreed mechanism for Hamas weapons and a verified increase in shelter deliveries would lower that estimate. Monitor UN OCHA, WHO, Israeli military releases and Gaza health reporting over the next 30 days.
  • A PLA Eastern Theater Command exercise announcement, navigation warnings covering approaches to Taiwan, coordinated Liaoning and Fujian carrier activity, missile-unit dispersal visible in commercial satellite imagery, reserve activation or amphibious loading would raise the Taiwan isolation-exercise estimate from roughly even chance to likely. Routine training notices without exclusion zones and without logistics mobilisation would favour routine activity or signalling. Monitor over the next 30 days.
  • Estonian prosecutors releasing evidence linking the Threod suspects to GRU tasking, a forensic link between the bomb-threat emails and Russian infrastructure or comparable arrests in Poland, Romania or Lithuania would raise the Russian-direction estimate from unlikely to roughly even chance. Continued attribution to compromised accounts without Russian infrastructure or tasking evidence would support the current assessment. Monitor over the next 30 to 90 days.
  • Commercial satellite imagery or independent reporting showing Eritrean heavy equipment crossing into Tigray, direct Ethiopian-Eritrean exchanges near Badme or Assab, border closure or mobilisation beyond forces engaged against Tigrayan units would raise the open-war estimate from unlikely to roughly even chance. Continued fighting confined to Ethiopian federal and Tigrayan forces would support the current estimate. Monitor over the next 30 to 90 days.

Alternatives

The alternatives below are concurrent scenario tests rather than mutually exclusive global outcomes. Each probability applies to the named issue and forecast period, not to the whole weekly assessment.

Concurrent Gulf escalation with selective maritime passage

Probability: likely.

Iran maintains passage restrictions, conducts or attempts limited attacks, the United States responds selectively and Houthi pressure increases near Bab el-Mandeb while selected vessels continue to transit. The 308 reported weekly Hormuz movements, two escorted Qatar-linked LNG sailings, the IRGC Al-Riffa claim and the Southern Armed Forces withdrawal support this scenario. The absence of independently confirmed radar damage, mine strikes or a new Houthi merchant-vessel attack argues against a more severe outcome. A verified seven-day pause and formal passage arrangements would lower this scenario to roughly even chance.

Temporary Hormuz closure after a verified attack

Probability: unlikely.

A confirmed mine strike, boarding, US or Bahraini casualty or damage to a US-linked facility prompts insurers, shipowners or escorts to suspend passage. A sudden AIS blackout, zero or near-zero UKMTO transits, tanker queues above 72 hours and a Lloyd's Joint War Committee exclusion would favour this alternative. Continued escorted passage and no independent confirmation of damage argue against it. Two or more of those indicators occurring together would raise the scenario to roughly even chance.

Ukraine remains under sustained but non-decisive pressure

Probability: likely.

Russian strikes continue against energy and transport infrastructure, Ukraine continues long-range attacks on Russian targets and local ground movement continues without a front-wide breakthrough. ISW's lack of confirmed Russian advances in several key directions, contested control around Dobropillia and the halt of Operation Vivaldi at the Chornyi Zherebets favour this scenario. Sustained Russian control of Dobropillia, an advance west of the river or a collapse in Ukrainian defensive lines would raise the localised-breakthrough alternative to roughly even chance.

SAF consolidates West Kordofan

Probability: unlikely.

SAF and allied forces retain al-Khuwai, secure adjacent routes and prevent an RSF counterattack for at least seven days. Repeated satellite or geolocated confirmation, functioning SAF logistics and resumed aid access through El Obeid would favour this scenario. The current lack of durable control evidence and continued RSF presence in al-Nuhud and South Kordofan argue against it. Confirmed SAF control of al-Khuwai and adjacent routes for seven days would raise the probability to roughly even chance.

RSF counterattack reverses SAF gains in Kordofan

Probability: unlikely.

RSF forces retake al-Khuwai or sever SAF supply routes around El Obeid. Evidence favouring it would be RSF movement from al-Nuhud, repeated attacks on SAF positions and verified displacement from newly claimed SAF areas. The reported SAF and allied advance and the absence of a confirmed counterattack argue against it. Retaking a named locality would raise the scenario to roughly even chance.

Gaza enters a temporary restraint period

Probability: unlikely.

Israeli strikes pause, Hamas exercises restraint and shelter and medical access measurably improve for at least seven days. A jointly monitored ceasefire mechanism, no reported Israeli strikes and sustained aid deliveries would favour this alternative. The confirmed death of Samir Abu Younis, continuing reported fire and unresolved disputes over Hamas disarmament argue against it. A signed implementation mechanism for the next phase of the settlement process would raise the scenario to roughly even chance.

PLA activity is routine training or coercive signalling, not an isolation rehearsal

Probability: roughly even chance.

The reported multi-theatre activity consists of separate exercises, routine deployments or political signalling without a unified blockade plan. China Daily's routine-activity description, the lack of a Chinese exercise announcement and the absence of mobilisation indicators favour this alternative. Participation by three theatre commands, the Liaoning carrier group and the unusual geographic spread argue against it. Temporary exercise zones without logistics mobilisation would favour routine activity; missile-unit dispersal, reserve activation and amphibious preparation would favour an isolation rehearsal.

European bomb threats are criminal or opportunistic activity rather than Russian-directed action

Probability: likely.

The threats were generated by independent actors, compromised accounts or copycat perpetrators. Unresolved sender identities, reported use of hijacked legitimate accounts and the absence of a forensic Russian link favour this scenario. The broader record of Russian-linked sabotage allegations in Europe provides context but does not connect the events. A confirmed Russian infrastructure, tasking or payment link would lower this probability to roughly even chance.

UNCLASSIFIED // OSINT-DERIVED // FOUO