The Gulf's Detours Shift Risk, Rather Than Remove It

The prevailing view is that alternative routes make disruption in the Strait of Hormuz manageable: some vessels still pass, and Saudi Arabia can send crude west by pipeline. That view captures real adaptation, but mistakes a detour for resilience. The previous fortnight's conclusion still holds: Hormuz is severely constrained, not demonstrably closed. What has moved is the question of where the pressure goes when traffic shifts. The East-West Pipeline and Yanbu provide an alternative route, but its onward movement depends on shipping through the Red Sea, where Houthi pressure has risen. I would hold that this fortnight has exposed a more consequential weakness than the risk to any one passage: the substitutes for Hormuz are themselves exposed, and the record does not show that they can replace its lost capacity.

Resilience here means the ability to sustain a material share of energy exports when a principal route is disrupted, without transferring equivalent risk or delay to another narrow point. The mechanism is displacement. If Gulf exporters shift crude away from Hormuz, the pipeline, Red Sea terminals and ships taking cargo onward must carry more of the burden; if threat or congestion impairs those links, the alternative absorbs less of the shock than its existence on a map suggests. This does not mean that the routes have failed, or that a second chokepoint is closed. It means that observed movement is evidence of adaptation, not yet proof of adequate substitution.

Hormuz remains the first constraint. Kpler recorded 17 commodity vessels over one recent weekend, against a pre-war reference of roughly 125 comparable vessels per day, while the US Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping reported more than 30 vessels per day across a broader category and period. Those counts cannot be reconciled as a single measure of flow. The International Maritime Organization, meanwhile, reported 80 attacks on international shipping and at least 22 seafarer deaths since 28 February; UK Maritime Trade Operations reported two tanker incidents on 21 September, one involving an unknown projectile and another debris. The mechanism linking these incidents to reduced movement is straightforward: uncertainty over attack, detention and safe passage raises the cost of operating, so some owners wait, divert or accept exceptional protection. Traffic continues, but continuity is not normality.

Saudi Arabia's route substitution is real, though its present scale is harder to establish. Saudi reporting described the East-West Pipeline as shut after damage to pumping stations; by 23 September, major-media and wire reporting said operations had restarted, and Saudi Aramco was reported to have loaded about 14 million barrels onto seven supertankers inside the Gulf. The pipeline is reported to have capacity of approximately 3.6 to 4 million barrels per day, but no supplied account establishes its current throughput or the volumes reaching Yanbu. Nor does a reported loading total establish a sustained export rate. The change from reported shutdown to reported restart matters: Saudi Arabia has recovered some routing capacity, but the evidence does not establish that the system has returned to full flow or can compensate for continuing Hormuz constraint.

The Red Sea makes the distinction consequential. Kpler recorded 21 vessels through Bab al-Mandeb on 18 September, against a mid-July average of 47 on comparable reporting days. Saudi authorities reported intercepting Houthi attacks or attempted attacks towards targets including Riyadh and Yanbu, while Houthi statements claimed strikes and a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia. Reports place Houthi forces at or near Mokha and Mayyun Island, also known as Perim, but do not establish uncontested control of the strait or an ability to stop all shipping. The two passages therefore converge in their effect on commercial confidence, but diverge in what is known: Hormuz has a clearer record of sharply reduced traffic and repeated vessel incidents; at Bab al-Mandeb, the territorial picture and the cause of lower movement remain less certain. Houthi pressure adds exposure to the alternative route without proving that it has become unusable.

The strongest opposing case is that this is resilience working as intended. Commercial vessels continue to transit Hormuz; broader US shipping data recorded more than 30 vessels per day; Saudi pipeline operations reportedly resumed; and Saudi Aramco used supertankers to preserve some Gulf exports. Iran also offered to reopen Hormuz within seven days if Washington eased military pressure and lifted its blockade of Iranian ports. These are not trivial facts. They show that neither a total halt nor the collapse of Gulf export options is established, and they leave room for a controlled increase in traffic. Nevertheless, a conditional offer is not an operating arrangement, and a resumed pipeline without measured throughput is not a demonstrated replacement for lost movement. The case for resilience is strongest at the level of individual cargoes; it is weaker at the level of reliable, sustained capacity.

The evidence has limits, and they are material. Kpler, UK shipping monitors and US navigational reporting count different vessel classes and time periods; the supplied figures cannot establish a single current throughput or a like-for-like percentage of normal trade. The 21 September tanker incidents were reported by UKMTO without attribution, while Iranian and US statements about other maritime encounters conflict. Saudi pipeline status changed across reports, but no current flow rate or independently reconciled Yanbu loading series is supplied. Houthi presence around Perim and Mokha is reported, yet independent imagery, a sustained logistics chain and the ability to deny passage are not established. I would revise the judgement towards genuine route resilience if comparable daily transit counts rose and remained higher, Saudi authorities or Aramco reported measured pipeline throughput, and Yanbu loadings were shown to continue at scale without renewed disruption. A further isolated transit would not be enough.

For Gulf governments, the implication is that a second route should be assessed by delivered volume and continuity, not nominal capacity; a pipeline restart and a port loading answer different questions from reliable access to destination markets. For shipowners and insurers, residual passage is no assurance that a voyage can be scheduled on ordinary terms, particularly when incidents, Iranian transit penalties and Houthi threats affect different legs of a journey. Energy buyers and investors should resist reading high freight costs or oil prices as a direct measure of physical shortage: the supplied reporting establishes market stress, but does not isolate its causes or provide a defensible price threshold. Ultimately, the Gulf has not run out of routes. It has yet to show that its routes can carry the risk.