Open-source intelligence

Intelligence briefings

Daily, weekly, and monthly briefings synthesizing the period’s key developments — patterns, trends, and full analysis. Updated continuously.

Daily · July 1, 2026

Stand-down Fragile After US-Iran Strikes; Up to 80 Mines and Ship Attacks Keep Strait of Hormuz Operationally Hazardous

Very likely (70-90%), the 29 June 2026 US-Iran stand-down will be fragile and limited to mediated, technical contacts rather than a durable political settlement: CENTCOM strikes on Iranian drone and radar sites on 26-27 June, IRGC drone/ballistic missile strikes on 28 June against Kuwaiti and Bahraini bases, public Iranian denials of bilateral Doha talks, and multilateral advisories (IMO/JMIC) assessing as many as 80 naval mines leave the Strait of Hormuz operationally hazardous and sustain elevated shipping disruption. Confidence: moderate.

Daily · June 30, 2026

US strikes and Iran’s 30‑day Hormuz claim keep maritime risk elevated; Kuwait and Bahrain report IRGC missile and drone launches

Very likely that the Strait of Hormuz will remain operationally volatile over the next 24-72 hours after US strikes on at least ten Iranian military targets on 27-28 June and reported Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps missile and drone launches against US‑linked sites in Kuwait and Bahrain; Iran’s declaration of 30 days of sole management for Hormuz and IRGC threats to halt talks make the current stand‑down fragile. Confidence: moderate.

Weekly · June 29, 2026

US‑Iran strikes (25-28 June), Iran’s 30‑day Hormuz claim and mine hazards raise shipping risk; RSF reinforces El Obeid; China normalises east‑of‑Taiwan patrols

Very likely the 17-18 June Islamabad Memorandum between Washington and Tehran has effectively fractured after Iran‑linked one‑way drone strikes on merchant shipping (including the Singapore‑flagged M/V Ever Lovely on 25 June and the Panama‑flagged VLCC Kiku) and U.S. strikes on Iranian military sites on 26-28 June; the Strait of Hormuz will remain a contested, high‑risk corridor for the next 1-4 weeks, constraining throughput and keeping war‑risk premiums elevated (very likely, moderate confidence). The Rapid Support Forces are very likely to mount a ground assault on El Obeid within 1-3 weeks, creating a high risk of mass civilian casualties and a major humanitarian collapse if the city falls (very likely, high confidence).

Daily · June 29, 2026

US CENTCOM Strikes 10 Iranian Targets After M/T Kiku Hit; Iran Strikes Kuwait and Bahrain and Declares 30‑Day Control of the Strait of Hormuz (28 Jun 2026)

Fact: US Central Command reported strikes on 10 Iranian missile, drone and coastal‑radar sites on 28 June 2026 in response to a drone strike on the Panama‑flagged VLCC M/T Kiku (US Central Command press release, 28 Jun 2026, Admiralty A). Judgment: We assess a 70% probability (very likely, 70-90%) that the Islamabad Memorandum is functionally collapsed given reciprocal US‑Iran strikes, Iran’s 30‑day transit claim (Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi statement, 28 Jun 2026, Iranian state media, Admiralty C) and the Joint Maritime Information Center raising threat level to 'substantial' (JMIC advisory, 28 Jun 2026, Admiralty A). Operational implication: Very likely (80%, 70-90%) Strait of Hormuz transits will remain volatile over the next 24-72 hours, sustaining elevated insurance premiums and rerouting pressure for tankers and VLCCs, confidence: moderate.

Daily · June 28, 2026

US strikes and Iranian reprisals raise Hormuz shipping risk; Ukraine deep strikes hit Volgograd; RSF tightens siege on El Obeid

U.S. airstrikes on Iranian missile, drone and coastal‑radar sites on 26-27 June, launched after the 25 June strike on the Singapore‑flagged containership Ever Lovely, and Iranian retaliatory actions including reported drone landings in Bahrain, have very likely degraded the Islamabad memorandum and pushed the Joint Maritime Information Center threat level to 'substantial', leaving Strait of Hormuz transits volatile and partially constrained, confidence: moderate. Ukraine conducted heavy deep strikes on 26-27 June, including a Flamingo FP-5 hit on the Titan‑Barrikady defence plant in Volgograd, while the Rapid Support Forces have reinforced and tightened siege conditions around El Obeid with intensified drone strikes, raising near‑term civilian risk, confidence: moderate.

Daily · June 27, 2026

Ever Lovely strike pauses IMO evacuations; RSF assault on El Obeid very likely; Ukraine deep strikes continue

The International Maritime Organization paused evacuation of more than 11,000 seafarers after a drone struck the Singapore‑flagged containership Ever Lovely off Dahit, Oman on 25 June; US military officials attribute the strike to IRGC naval one‑way drones, an assessment we judge as Likely (55-70%), confidence: moderate. Very likely (70-85%), confidence: high, the Rapid Support Forces will launch a ground assault on El Obeid within 72 hours absent a verifiable halt; Ukraine will very likely sustain deep strikes against Russian energy and Crimea infrastructure over the next 72 hours (70-85%, confidence: high).

Daily · June 26, 2026

RSF Assault on El Obeid Very Likely; Strait of Hormuz Reopening Fragile as Niamey Airport Attack and Red Sea Threats Raise Global Risk

Very likely, confidence: high, the Rapid Support Forces will launch a ground assault on El Obeid (North Kordofan) within 72 hours, driven by sustained RSF drone strikes that have cut power and water for at least 500,000 residents and observed RSF force posture including air-defence deployments near Abu Zabad. Roughly even chance, confidence: moderate, that the reported US‑Iran memorandum will enable a managed, partial reopening of the Strait of Hormuz over the next week; IRGC Navy rejection of the Oman southern corridor, reported mines in the TSS and an IMO evacuation of more than 11,000 seafarers keep full normalisation unlikely in the near term.

Daily · June 25, 2026

Rapid Support Forces Poised to Assault El Obeid; Hormuz Recovers Under Managed Corridors as Houthi 'Safety Fee' Monetises Red Sea Risk; Ukraine Intensifies Crimea Strikes

Very likely (80-90%), confidence: high, the Rapid Support Forces will launch a ground assault on El Obeid within the next 72 hours, driven by reported RSF reinforcements, escalated RSF drone strikes that have cut power and water for over 500,000 residents, and RSF air-defence deployments at Abu Zabad. Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz will continue a managed recovery under an IMO/Oman corridor and international facilitation, but Houthi (Ansar Allah) attacks in the Red Sea and a reported monetised "safety fee" scheme will keep commercial shipping risk elevated and sustain Suez diversions and insurance-premium pressure.

Daily · June 24, 2026

US-Iran pause holds for now; RSF poised to assault El Obeid; Hormuz reopens under Iranian-directed dual regime, 24-hour update

Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, the US-Iran mediated pause and nascent deconfliction will hold over the next 24-72 hours, sustaining a cautious reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under a dual-transit regime. Very likely (80-90%), confidence: high, the Rapid Support Forces will attempt a ground assault on El Obeid within days, creating a very likely risk of mass atrocities and large displacement among roughly 480,000-520,000 residents.

Daily · June 23, 2026

Ceasefire brittle: IRGC Hormuz closure claim, Israel‑Hezbollah exchanges persist; RSF encircles El Obeid, assault very likely

Very likely (80-85%) Israel and Hezbollah will exchange additional strikes in the next 24-72 hours. Very likely (80-90%) the Rapid Support Forces will mount a ground assault on El Obeid within days, creating a very likely (80-90%) risk of mass atrocities and large displacement among the roughly 480,000-520,000 civilians there; Iran’s 22 June IRGC closure claim has produced partial disruption to Hormuz transits and Tehran is very likely (75-85%) to sustain a permissions/managed‑flow posture rather than enforce a prolonged physical blockade.

Weekly · June 22, 2026

US‑Iran interim memorandum begins contested reopening of the Strait of Hormuz; Houthi Red Sea threats persist as Niamey airport attack and RSF build‑up raise risks

An interim US‑Iran memorandum announced 18 June 2026 has likely (65%) begun a contested, partial reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority permit and insurance rules; mine clearance and IRGC gatekeeping mean throughput will remain constrained and war‑risk premiums elevated in the near term (likely, moderate confidence). Separately, the 18 June 2026 assault on Niamey’s Diori Hamani International Airport, claimed by Jama'at Nusrat al‑Islam wal‑Muslimin (JNIM), and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) concentrations around El Obeid very likely (85%) increase the near‑term probability of follow‑on urban attacks in Niamey and an imminent RSF assault on El Obeid with a high risk of mass atrocities if the city is taken (very likely, high confidence).

Daily · June 22, 2026

Israel‑Hezbollah pause very likely failed; Iran’s 20 June Hormuz 'closure' claim contested as commercial transits continued; Switzerland talks fragile

The US‑brokered Israel‑Hezbollah pause very likely failed on 20 June 2026, with Israeli air and drone strikes in southern Lebanon followed by Hezbollah rocket and anti‑tank fire, making additional cross‑border exchanges very likely in the next 24-72 hours (Very likely, 80%; Confidence: moderate). Iran’s 20 June declaration that it had closed the Strait of Hormuz is being used as coercive leverage; U.S. Central Command public statements and MarineTraffic AIS logs show commercial transits continued on 20 June, so it is very likely Tehran will sustain a permissions and fee regime rather than enforce a prolonged physical blockade (Very likely, 80%; Confidence: moderate). The US‑Iran technical talks in Switzerland remain fragile and at roughly even chance to stall or see limited progress in the next 72 hours (Roughly even chance, 50%; Confidence: moderate).

Daily · June 21, 2026

20-21 June 2026: Lebanon ceasefire frays; Iran enforces PGSA transit rules in the Strait of Hormuz; Russia retaliates after Ukraine's 18 June Moscow-region drone strike; JNIM assaults Niamey airport

The US-announced Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire very likely failed on 20 June 2026 (80-90% probability; Confidence: moderate), after Israeli airstrikes killed at least 16 people in southern Lebanon and Hezbollah resumed attacks. Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) publishment and public closure claims make constrained, supervised transits through the Strait of Hormuz very likely over the next 24-72 hours (80-90% probability; Confidence: moderate) and place the scheduled US-Iran technical talks in Switzerland at roughly even risk of stall or limited progress (45-55% probability; Confidence: moderate).

Daily · June 20, 2026

20 June 2026 Daily Brief: Hormuz Reopens Under US‑Iran MoU; Moscow Refinery Hit; Niamey Airport Assault; Lebanon Ceasefire Fragile

The US‑Iran interim memorandum published 18 June is very likely being implemented: tankers transited the Strait of Hormuz on 18-19 June under new Iranian permit and insurance rules, but mines, insurer caution and a brittle Israel‑Hezbollah ceasefire make the arrangement fragile. Concurrent shocks raise short‑term risk across theatres: Ukraine very likely executed a large 18 June drone barrage that damaged the Gazprom Neft Moscow Oil Refinery and wounded at least 17; Niger suffered a complex assault on Niamey’s Diori Hamani International Airport on 18 June; and RSF forces have massed around El Obeid, making an imminent ground assault and mass atrocities very likely.

Daily · June 19, 2026

US, Iran release interim memorandum; Strait of Hormuz partially reopens under US oversight while mines, Lebanon front and Houthi threats keep maritime and energy risk elevated

Reporting: The U.S. Department of State Office of the Spokesperson (readout, 18 June 2026; Admiralty Grade A) and the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (spokesperson Nasser Kanaani, statement, 18 June 2026; Admiralty Grade B) published the text of an interim memorandum that frames a 60‑day cessation and a phased reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under U.S. naval oversight. Assessment: It is almost certain (95-99% probability; Confidence: high) that the memorandum exists in operational form as of 18-19 June 2026, and it is very likely (75-90% probability; Confidence: moderate) that constrained transits via an Omani southern corridor will continue over the next 24-72 hours; however it is likely (60-75% probability; Confidence: high) that the central Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) will remain blocked pending mine‑clearance, insurer and carrier returns, and near‑term spoilers including Israel‑Hezbollah exchanges and Houthi threats.

Daily · June 18, 2026

U.S., Iran Likely to Sign Interim Accord 19 June; Hormuz Reopening Probable but Slow as IDF‑Hezbollah Strikes, Tanker Attacks and Suspected Mines Keep Maritime Risk High

U.S. and Iran are likely (65-75% probability; Confidence: moderate) to sign an interim memorandum in Bürgenstock, Switzerland on 19 June 2026. If signed, phased reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is probable (60-75% probability; Confidence: moderate) but very likely to be slow and conditional because suspected mines, insurer and carrier restrictions, and ongoing Israeli Defence Forces strikes in Lebanon plus recent attacks on merchant tankers keep maritime and energy risk elevated.

Daily · June 17, 2026

Israel strikes in southern Lebanon; Strait of Hormuz remains high‑risk; JNIM posts €2.0m bounty on Assimi Goïta

Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon on 16 June and Iran’s retaliatory warnings keep the northern front active and sustain very high maritime and energy risk in the Strait of Hormuz, with insurers and carriers maintaining restrictions and mine clearance likely to take weeks to months. JNIM’s €2,000,000 bounty on Malian junta leader Assimi Goïta very likely increases the probability of kidnapping or assassination attempts in Bamako over the next 1-3 months; Confidence: moderate.

Daily · June 16, 2026

Mali: JNIM €2.0M bounty for Assimi Goïta raises near‑term risk of leadership‑targeted attacks in Bamako

Fact: JNIM posted a communique on 2026-06-15T13:42:00Z on a JNIM‑affiliated Telegram channel (handle @JNIM_Media; post ID JNIM-COMM-20260615-01; admiralty grade B) offering €2,000,000 for information on Colonel‑putsch leader Assimi Goïta and €1,000,000 rewards that name Colonel Lassina Diallo and General Malick Diakité and explicitly offer payment for information or for actions to ‘neutralise’ them. Assessment: This communique very likely (75-85%) increases the probability of attempts to kidnap, assassinate or plot against the named officials in or near Bamako over the next 1-3 months; Confidence: moderate (based on the communique plus corroborating Malian government security orders and independent commercial imagery; caveat: JNIM messaging is intended to mobilise opportunistic actors and does not by itself prove centralised operational planning).

Weekly · June 15, 2026

Houthi Red Sea ban and US‑Iran strikes keep Bab el‑Mandeb and Hormuz at crisis risk; Taiwan HIMARS, Scarborough platform raise Indo‑Pacific friction

The Houthis are very likely to enforce their 8-10 June ban on Israeli‑linked shipping in the Red Sea and Bab el‑Mandeb, sustaining operator avoidance, Suez re‑routing and higher freight and insurance costs (very likely, moderate confidence). Renewed U.S.‑Iran exchanges, including a U.S. disabling strike on the tanker M/T Settebello, have made the Strait of Hormuz a contested, high‑hazard corridor, elevating the risk of maritime miscalculation (likely, moderate confidence). Taiwan and South China Sea grey‑zone pressure intensified this week, Taiwan fired U.S. HIMARS into the Strait on 10 June and China installed a floating platform at Scarborough Shoal, increasing the near‑term chance of short, dangerous encounters at sea (likely, moderate confidence).

Daily · June 15, 2026

14 June 2026, Houthis enforce Israeli‑ship ban; US‑Iran diplomacy raises chance of a short Hormuz lull; IDF strike keeps Israel‑Hezbollah northern front active

Ansar Allah’s 8 June declaration to treat Israeli‑linked vessels as military targets, reinforced by observed interdictions and industry AIS reroutes, makes enforcement of an Israeli‑ship ban very likely (75-85%); Confidence: moderate. Combined with ongoing reciprocal U.S.‑Iran missile and drone exchanges, this very likely (75-85%) keeps the Bab el‑Mandeb and Strait of Hormuz hazardous to merchant shipping for the next 24-72 hours, sustaining Cape/Suez diversions and elevated war‑risk premiums. The IDF strike on Beirut’s Dahiyeh on 14 June after Hezbollah fired three projectiles into northern Israel makes the Israel‑Lebanon northern front very likely (75-85%) to remain active and to drive additional civilian harm and displacement; Confidence: moderate.