Open-source intelligence

Intelligence briefings

Daily, weekly, and monthly briefings synthesizing the period’s key developments — patterns, trends, and full analysis. Updated continuously.

Monthly · October 1, 2026

Hormuz Restriction and Multi-Theatre Coercion: 1 October to 31 December 2026

From 1 October through 31 December 2026, the US-Iran confrontation is very likely to remain active, with moderate confidence, and the Strait of Hormuz is likely to remain operationally restricted, defined as fewer than 14 visible commodity-vessel transits on a seven-day average or continued avoidance by major carriers. Russia is very likely to continue long-range attacks on Ukrainian energy and transport infrastructure, JNIM is likely to sustain attacks on Mali's Kayes-Bamako fuel corridor and military positions, and Houthi attacks are likely to keep Bab el-Mandab and Saudi-linked shipping exposed. A verified seven-day improvement in Hormuz traffic has a roughly even chance, but a normal return of crude and LNG movements and a substantive Russia-Ukraine energy ceasefire are very unlikely before 31 October.

Weekly · September 28, 2026

Hormuz traffic remains severely restricted as US-Iran confrontation, reciprocal strikes and maritime coercion persist

US Central Command and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy are very likely to remain in an active maritime confrontation through 5 October 2026, defined by tanker incidents, vessel redirections, Iranian transit penalties and continuing military repositioning. Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely restricted, with Kpler recording 17 commodity vessels over one recent weekend against a pre-war reference of roughly 125 comparable vessels per day, although broader US shipping data recorded more than 30 vessels per day and therefore indicate that the waterway is not demonstrably closed.

Daily · September 24, 2026

No New Current-Window Escalation Reported, but Russia-Ukraine Strike Cycle Persists

The supplied reporting contains no materially new Russia-Ukraine event dated 23 or 24 September. Russia remains assessed at an 85 per cent probability, moderate confidence, of conducting at least one attack involving 100 or more launched drones or missiles against Ukrainian infrastructure by 8 October, while Ukraine has a 75 per cent probability, moderate confidence, of another deep strike against a Russian refinery, military facility or logistics node by 24 October. The principal consequence is continued pressure on Ukrainian electricity and heating resilience, without verified evidence of a wider battlefield breakthrough.

Daily · September 23, 2026

Hormuz traffic remains severely constrained as US-Iran contact fails to change military risk

The US-Iran confrontation is very likely to remain active through 6 October, while commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely constrained through 25 September. Reported contact between Abbas Araghchi and Steve Witkoff, and Iran's conditional seven-day reopening offer, have not produced verified traffic normalisation; Houthi pressure on Saudi Arabia continues to expose Saudi energy infrastructure, Red Sea shipping and CENTCOM forces.

Daily · September 22, 2026

Hormuz tanker incidents deepen US-Iran crisis; partial transit persists, closure unconfirmed

As of 22 September 2026 at 0127Z, the US-Iran confrontation is very likely to remain active through 6 October, while the Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely constrained through 25 September after UKMTO reported an inbound tanker struck by an unknown projectile and an outbound LPG tanker hit by debris on 21 September. Iran has not been shown to have ordered a complete closure or caused either incident, but the combination of reduced traffic, IRGC harassment and US force-protection measures will keep CENTCOM installations, Saudi Aramco-linked shipping and commercial insurers exposed over the next 72 hours.

Weekly · September 21, 2026

Hormuz remains selectively open as Ansar Allah widens Saudi pressure and Russia-Ukraine strikes reciprocate

US Central Command and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy are very likely to remain in an active maritime confrontation through 5 October 2026, while Strait of Hormuz traffic stays severely reduced but not demonstrably halted. Ansar Allah, also known as the Houthis, is likely to retain the ability to threaten Saudi targets and shipping from positions at or near Mokha port and Mayyun Island, also known as Perim, while Russia and Ukraine are very likely to sustain reciprocal deep strikes without independently corroborated evidence of a physical attack on NATO territory. Confidence is moderate because activity is corroborated by maritime monitors, UN agencies, commercial tracking and major media, whereas attribution, damage and territorial-control claims often rely on belligerent or single-source reporting.

Daily · September 21, 2026

Hormuz Traffic Remains Severely Constrained as Houthi Pressure and Russia-Ukraine Strikes Sustain High Crisis Levels

The US-Iran confrontation is very likely to remain active over the next 14 days, at 80 per cent probability and moderate confidence, while commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely constrained over the next 72 hours, at 82 per cent and moderate confidence. Houthi forces are likely to launch another attack against a Saudi target, and Russia and Ukraine are likely to sustain reciprocal long-range strikes, but the collection does not establish full Hormuz closure, successful Houthi penetration of Saudi defences or a durable Russia-Ukraine ceasefire.

Daily · September 20, 2026

Hormuz remains severely constrained as Houthi pressure and repeated maritime incidents raise escalation risk

Commercial commodity traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely constrained but not fully denied over the next 72 hours, with an estimated 82 per cent probability and moderate confidence. Houthi attacks and Saudi defensive and strike activity are likely to keep Bab el-Mandeb traffic below its recent baseline, while Russia is very likely to launch another defined strike package against Ukraine by 21 September 2359Z.

Daily · September 19, 2026

Hormuz remains severely constrained as Houthi pressure and South China Sea collision raise spillover risk

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely constrained over the next 72 hours, while a complete 48-hour closure remains unlikely. Houthi pressure on Saudi-linked shipping, a reported China Coast Guard collision with a Philippine vessel, and sustained Russia-Ukraine strikes increase the risk of wider maritime, energy and military escalation.

Daily · September 18, 2026

Hormuz Remains Severely Constrained as Ansar Allah Threatens Saudi Shipping

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely constrained through 20 September 2026 at 01:20 UTC, with an estimated 82 per cent probability and moderate confidence. Severe constraint means commodity-vessel throughput below 50 per cent of the pre-conflict baseline for three consecutive days. A complete 48-hour closure remains unlikely at 15 per cent because some commercial movement continues, although the available vessel and oil-flow measures are not directly comparable. The CrisisBrief Index is 78 out of 100, labelled SEVERE, driven chiefly by US-Iran hostilities, Ansar Allah pressure on Saudi-linked shipping, the East-West Pipeline outage and Russia's high-volume attacks on Ukraine.

Daily · September 17, 2026

Hormuz Traffic Stays Severely Constrained as US-Iran Contacts and Saudi Pipeline Outage Sustain Energy Risk

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely constrained through 20 September 2026 at 01:20 UTC, with an estimated 82 per cent probability and moderate confidence. A complete 48-hour closure is unlikely at 15 per cent because vessels continued to transit on 15 September and no collection source has verified zero commercial movement for 48 consecutive hours. Direct US-Iran maritime encounters, the Saudi East-West Pipeline outage and Ansar Allah pressure near Bab al-Mandab will keep energy and shipping risks elevated.

Daily · September 16, 2026

Hormuz Traffic Remains Severely Constrained as Russian Strikes and NATO-Adjacent Incidents Persist

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely constrained through 21 September, at 82 per cent, with moderate confidence, although no complete 48-hour closure appears in the supplied reporting. Russia almost certainly conducted a 200-drone raid against Ukraine, an Italian aircraft operating on a NATO mission shot down a drone in Lithuania, and China has scheduled military activity near the Philippines, but a direct Russia-NATO clash and a sustained China-Philippines armed exchange remain unlikely.

Daily · September 15, 2026

Hormuz Traffic Remains Severely Constrained as Houthi Pressure and Saudi Pipeline Outage Persist

Commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely constrained through 21 September, with high confidence, although no complete 48-hour closure has been verified. This is the most consequential issue covered in this brief for commercial shipping and energy flows because JMIC and UKMTO report recent vessel attacks, Kpler records sharply reduced commodity-vessel activity, tanker hire exceeds US$1 million per day and Saudi Arabia's East-West pipeline remains offline.

Weekly · September 14, 2026

Hormuz Stays Severely Constrained as Houthi Partial Control and Western Ukraine Strikes Raise Spillover Risk

US-Iran maritime confrontation is very likely to continue from 14 through 28 September 2026, with moderate confidence, while commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains very likely to stay severely constrained but not fully closed. Ansar Allah likely has a military presence and partial tactical control at Mokha, Dhubab and Mayyun, also known as Perim, but the evidence does not establish uncontested control of the Bab al-Mandab. Russia's 13 September strikes on western Ukrainian transport infrastructure, including a train locomotive roughly 2 kilometres from the Polish border, raise the risk of miscalculation without establishing an attack on Poland or NATO territory.

Daily · September 14, 2026

Hormuz traffic remains severely constrained as Russia strikes Ukraine’s western transport network

Commercial movement through the Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely constrained through 21 September, at 82 per cent, with high confidence that traffic is reduced and moderate confidence in the duration. Russia almost certainly launched a mass air assault on Ukraine on 13 September, while Houthi positions near Perim and Dhubab and Saudi Arabia’s reported temporary East-West pipeline shutdown sustain separate maritime and energy exposures. The 13 September vessel incident does not qualify as a direct US-Iran kinetic episode unless direct participation by both states in the same reciprocal exchange is established.

Daily · September 13, 2026

Hormuz remains severely constrained as Houthi gains pressure Bab el-Mandeb and Russia sustains Ukraine strikes

The Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain in a severe non-zero constraint state through 00:00Z on 21 September, with an 82 per cent probability, while complete closure is unlikely at 20 per cent. Multiple reports place Ansar Allah in or controlling access to Mocha and Dhubab and at or near Perim, but continued Bab el-Mandeb traffic does not establish closure. There is a 60 per cent probability, likely with moderate confidence, of a qualifying direct US-Iran kinetic episode by 00:17Z on 16 September, defined as a separate reciprocal episode involving US and Iranian forces and excluding unverified partner attacks or the previously reported 8-10 September incidents unless direct participation is confirmed.

Daily · September 12, 2026

Houthi Presence Near Perim Raises Bab el-Mandeb Risk as Hormuz Traffic Remains Severely Constrained

The probability of a distinct reciprocal US-Iran kinetic episode by 01:18Z on 12 September is 65 per cent, likely, down from 80 per cent because the supplied record does not independently verify a qualifying episode before the cutoff. The Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain severely constrained through 21 September, while Houthi forces very likely retain Mocha and Dhubab and likely maintain at least a temporary presence on Perim, increasing selective risk to Saudi-linked shipping without establishing control of the island.

Daily · September 11, 2026

US-Iran Exchange Forecast Holds at 80 Per Cent as Hormuz Traffic Falls 50 Per Cent

We assess an 80 per cent probability, very likely, of a distinct reciprocal US-Iran kinetic episode by 12 September 2026 at 01:18Z, separate from the reported maritime and Al-Azraq incidents of 8 to 10 September, with moderate confidence. Hormuz traffic will very likely remain severely constrained through 21 September, while the reported Houthi seizure of Mokha and positions near the Hanish Islands will likely sustain selective risk to Saudi-linked shipping and energy infrastructure rather than close the Red Sea.

Daily · September 10, 2026

US-Iran Retaliation Reaches Jordan as Hormuz Commodity Transits Fall to Six on 8 September

We assess an 80 per cent probability, very likely, of another direct US-Iran maritime exchange by 12 September 2026 at 01:18:29Z, with moderate confidence. Hormuz traffic will very likely remain severely constrained through 21 September, with high confidence, but the latest supplied Kpler observation is a daily count of six commodity vessels on 8 September, not a current 10 September count and not a measure of all vessel traffic.

Daily · September 9, 2026

US-Iran Maritime Exchange Keeps Hormuz Constrained as Ukraine and Red Sea Fighting Intensify

The US-Iran confrontation remains the principal near-term global security risk because reported tanker strikes, Iranian threats to shipping and sharply reduced Strait of Hormuz traffic directly affect US forces, Gulf exporters and Asian energy importers. CENTCOM claims US forces destroyed five named Iranian tankers after Iranian missile attempts against a US warship; Iranian state television confirms attacks on at least three tankers but disputes the outcome. We assess a 78 per cent probability of another US-Iran maritime exchange by 12 September 0121Z, with moderate confidence, while severe but incomplete Hormuz disruption has an 82 per cent probability through 21 September.