Open-source intelligence

Intelligence briefings

Daily, weekly, and monthly briefings synthesizing the period’s key developments — patterns, trends, and full analysis. Updated continuously.

Weekly · July 6, 2026

Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea contested; RSF poised to assault El Obeid; JNIM and Russia sustain high‑tempo operations, weekly 29 Jun to 6 Jul 2026

Very likely (70-90%) the Strait of Hormuz and the southern Red Sea will remain contested and hazardous to commercial shipping over the next 1 to 4 weeks, sustaining route diversions, naval escorts and elevated war‑risk premiums, moderate confidence. Very likely (75-90%) the Rapid Support Forces will launch a ground assault on El Obeid within 72 hours; if the RSF capture the city, mass civilian killings and a major humanitarian collapse are almost certain (95-99%), high confidence.

Daily · July 6, 2026

US‑Iran reciprocal strikes continue despite 5 July deconfliction, leaving Hormuz and the Red Sea hazardous; Russia sustains mass strikes on Ukraine while Ukraine deep‑strikes Russian oil; JNIM and RSF intensify multi‑site offensives

Very likely reciprocal strikes between the United States and Iran persisted through 5 July despite a narrow US‑Iran deconfliction understanding announced on 5 July, keeping the Strait of Hormuz hazardous for commercial shipping; confidence: moderate. Very likely Russia continued high‑tempo missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities while Ukraine intensified deep strikes against Russian oil infrastructure, sustaining civilian harm and fuel restrictions in Russia; confidence: high.

Daily · July 5, 2026

05 Jul 2026 - Russia strikes Sumy; Khamenei funeral raises Hormuz and Red Sea risk; China Coast Guard patrol east of Taiwan; RSF readies El Obeid offensive

Russia and Ukraine have returned to a high‑tempo exchange of long‑range missiles, glide munitions and UAS; Russia struck Sumy on 4 July, killing four civilians and wounding 27, and Ukraine continues deep strikes into Russian energy and logistics nodes, making further urban civilian harm and infrastructure disruption very likely over the next 72 hours. Iran’s 4-9 July funeral period for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei materially raises near‑term escalation risk among Iran, Israel and the United States and sustains acute maritime danger in the Strait of Hormuz and southern Red Sea; additional attacks on merchant shipping, mining incidents or coercive routing are very likely.

Daily · July 4, 2026

2 July: Ballistic-heavy barrage on Kyiv kills civilians; US-Iran strikes in Strait of Hormuz and Houthi boarding attempt raise shipping and energy risk

Russia’s ballistic-heavy missile and UAS barrage on Kyiv on 2 July caused at least 20 civilian deaths and widespread damage, and Ukraine has launched deep strikes into Russian territory; very likely both sides will sustain high-tempo missile and UAS exchanges over the next 72 hours, keeping civilian risk in Ukrainian cities high. Concurrent US strikes on Iranian military facilities and Iranian-linked attacks on commercial vessels on 2 July, plus a Houthi attempted boarding off Yemen, make transits through the Strait of Hormuz and the southern Red Sea fragile and very likely to see further disruptive incidents in the coming week.

Daily · July 3, 2026

Russia fires mass missile-and-drone salvo at Kyiv on 01-02 Jul 2026; Iran presses 'authorised' Hormuz routing as armed boarding off Balhaf sustains Red Sea risk

Very likely (70-90%) Russia executed a major combined missile and unmanned aerial vehicle salvo against Kyiv overnight 01-02 July 2026 that caused civilian deaths and prompted Ukrainian deep strikes inside Russia; analytic confidence: moderate. Likely (55-69%) Iran will continue pressing for recognised routing and fee mechanisms in the Strait of Hormuz over the next 7-14 days while maritime harassment off Yemen maintains elevated shipping risk; analytic confidence: moderate.

Daily · July 2, 2026

US-Iran maritime strikes keep Strait of Hormuz hazardous; Ukraine 30 June deep strikes, likely Dubna hit, raise Russian reprisal risk, 2 July 2026

Very likely (70-90%) that continued US-Iran limited kinetic exchanges and Iran's push to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz will keep maritime and energy disruption elevated for 7-14 days; confidence: moderate. Likely (55-69%) that Ukrainian forces struck the Dubna Space Communications Center on or about 30 June 2026; if confirmed, it is very likely (70-90%) Moscow will respond with increased missile and drone salvos against Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure within 72 hours; confidence: moderate.

Monthly · July 1, 2026

June 2026 Strategic Estimate: Hormuz coercion sustains maritime hazard; Ukraine escalates deep strikes; Sudan RSF readies assault on El Obeid

Very likely (65-80%; moderate confidence) that reciprocal US-CENTCOM strikes (26-28 June) and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maritime coercion, including routing orders and announced plans for post-window 'service fees', will keep the Strait of Hormuz hazardous to commercial shipping through the next 30-90 days, sustaining paused LNG sailings, diverted crude cargoes and elevated war-risk premiums. Very likely (65-80%; moderate confidence) that Ukraine intensified long-range drone and missile strikes on 26-30 June, reported hits at Slavyansk-on-Kuban, Yaroslavl, Titan-Barrikady and the Dubna Space Communications Centre, materially degrade Russian fuel logistics and prompt sustained Russian missile and drone reprisals against Ukrainian cities; analytic confidence: moderate.

Daily · July 1, 2026

Stand-down Fragile After US-Iran Strikes; Up to 80 Mines and Ship Attacks Keep Strait of Hormuz Operationally Hazardous

Very likely (70-90%), the 29 June 2026 US-Iran stand-down will be fragile and limited to mediated, technical contacts rather than a durable political settlement: CENTCOM strikes on Iranian drone and radar sites on 26-27 June, IRGC drone/ballistic missile strikes on 28 June against Kuwaiti and Bahraini bases, public Iranian denials of bilateral Doha talks, and multilateral advisories (IMO/JMIC) assessing as many as 80 naval mines leave the Strait of Hormuz operationally hazardous and sustain elevated shipping disruption. Confidence: moderate.

Daily · June 30, 2026

US strikes and Iran’s 30‑day Hormuz claim keep maritime risk elevated; Kuwait and Bahrain report IRGC missile and drone launches

Very likely that the Strait of Hormuz will remain operationally volatile over the next 24-72 hours after US strikes on at least ten Iranian military targets on 27-28 June and reported Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps missile and drone launches against US‑linked sites in Kuwait and Bahrain; Iran’s declaration of 30 days of sole management for Hormuz and IRGC threats to halt talks make the current stand‑down fragile. Confidence: moderate.

Weekly · June 29, 2026

US‑Iran strikes (25-28 June), Iran’s 30‑day Hormuz claim and mine hazards raise shipping risk; RSF reinforces El Obeid; China normalises east‑of‑Taiwan patrols

Very likely the 17-18 June Islamabad Memorandum between Washington and Tehran has effectively fractured after Iran‑linked one‑way drone strikes on merchant shipping (including the Singapore‑flagged M/V Ever Lovely on 25 June and the Panama‑flagged VLCC Kiku) and U.S. strikes on Iranian military sites on 26-28 June; the Strait of Hormuz will remain a contested, high‑risk corridor for the next 1-4 weeks, constraining throughput and keeping war‑risk premiums elevated (very likely, moderate confidence). The Rapid Support Forces are very likely to mount a ground assault on El Obeid within 1-3 weeks, creating a high risk of mass civilian casualties and a major humanitarian collapse if the city falls (very likely, high confidence).

Daily · June 29, 2026

US CENTCOM Strikes 10 Iranian Targets After M/T Kiku Hit; Iran Strikes Kuwait and Bahrain and Declares 30‑Day Control of the Strait of Hormuz (28 Jun 2026)

Fact: US Central Command reported strikes on 10 Iranian missile, drone and coastal‑radar sites on 28 June 2026 in response to a drone strike on the Panama‑flagged VLCC M/T Kiku (US Central Command press release, 28 Jun 2026, Admiralty A). Judgment: We assess a 70% probability (very likely, 70-90%) that the Islamabad Memorandum is functionally collapsed given reciprocal US‑Iran strikes, Iran’s 30‑day transit claim (Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi statement, 28 Jun 2026, Iranian state media, Admiralty C) and the Joint Maritime Information Center raising threat level to 'substantial' (JMIC advisory, 28 Jun 2026, Admiralty A). Operational implication: Very likely (80%, 70-90%) Strait of Hormuz transits will remain volatile over the next 24-72 hours, sustaining elevated insurance premiums and rerouting pressure for tankers and VLCCs, confidence: moderate.

Daily · June 28, 2026

US strikes and Iranian reprisals raise Hormuz shipping risk; Ukraine deep strikes hit Volgograd; RSF tightens siege on El Obeid

U.S. airstrikes on Iranian missile, drone and coastal‑radar sites on 26-27 June, launched after the 25 June strike on the Singapore‑flagged containership Ever Lovely, and Iranian retaliatory actions including reported drone landings in Bahrain, have very likely degraded the Islamabad memorandum and pushed the Joint Maritime Information Center threat level to 'substantial', leaving Strait of Hormuz transits volatile and partially constrained, confidence: moderate. Ukraine conducted heavy deep strikes on 26-27 June, including a Flamingo FP-5 hit on the Titan‑Barrikady defence plant in Volgograd, while the Rapid Support Forces have reinforced and tightened siege conditions around El Obeid with intensified drone strikes, raising near‑term civilian risk, confidence: moderate.

Daily · June 27, 2026

Ever Lovely strike pauses IMO evacuations; RSF assault on El Obeid very likely; Ukraine deep strikes continue

The International Maritime Organization paused evacuation of more than 11,000 seafarers after a drone struck the Singapore‑flagged containership Ever Lovely off Dahit, Oman on 25 June; US military officials attribute the strike to IRGC naval one‑way drones, an assessment we judge as Likely (55-70%), confidence: moderate. Very likely (70-85%), confidence: high, the Rapid Support Forces will launch a ground assault on El Obeid within 72 hours absent a verifiable halt; Ukraine will very likely sustain deep strikes against Russian energy and Crimea infrastructure over the next 72 hours (70-85%, confidence: high).

Daily · June 26, 2026

RSF Assault on El Obeid Very Likely; Strait of Hormuz Reopening Fragile as Niamey Airport Attack and Red Sea Threats Raise Global Risk

Very likely, confidence: high, the Rapid Support Forces will launch a ground assault on El Obeid (North Kordofan) within 72 hours, driven by sustained RSF drone strikes that have cut power and water for at least 500,000 residents and observed RSF force posture including air-defence deployments near Abu Zabad. Roughly even chance, confidence: moderate, that the reported US‑Iran memorandum will enable a managed, partial reopening of the Strait of Hormuz over the next week; IRGC Navy rejection of the Oman southern corridor, reported mines in the TSS and an IMO evacuation of more than 11,000 seafarers keep full normalisation unlikely in the near term.

Daily · June 25, 2026

Rapid Support Forces Poised to Assault El Obeid; Hormuz Recovers Under Managed Corridors as Houthi 'Safety Fee' Monetises Red Sea Risk; Ukraine Intensifies Crimea Strikes

Very likely (80-90%), confidence: high, the Rapid Support Forces will launch a ground assault on El Obeid within the next 72 hours, driven by reported RSF reinforcements, escalated RSF drone strikes that have cut power and water for over 500,000 residents, and RSF air-defence deployments at Abu Zabad. Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz will continue a managed recovery under an IMO/Oman corridor and international facilitation, but Houthi (Ansar Allah) attacks in the Red Sea and a reported monetised "safety fee" scheme will keep commercial shipping risk elevated and sustain Suez diversions and insurance-premium pressure.

Daily · June 24, 2026

US-Iran pause holds for now; RSF poised to assault El Obeid; Hormuz reopens under Iranian-directed dual regime, 24-hour update

Very likely (75-85%), confidence: moderate, the US-Iran mediated pause and nascent deconfliction will hold over the next 24-72 hours, sustaining a cautious reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under a dual-transit regime. Very likely (80-90%), confidence: high, the Rapid Support Forces will attempt a ground assault on El Obeid within days, creating a very likely risk of mass atrocities and large displacement among roughly 480,000-520,000 residents.

Daily · June 23, 2026

Ceasefire brittle: IRGC Hormuz closure claim, Israel‑Hezbollah exchanges persist; RSF encircles El Obeid, assault very likely

Very likely (80-85%) Israel and Hezbollah will exchange additional strikes in the next 24-72 hours. Very likely (80-90%) the Rapid Support Forces will mount a ground assault on El Obeid within days, creating a very likely (80-90%) risk of mass atrocities and large displacement among the roughly 480,000-520,000 civilians there; Iran’s 22 June IRGC closure claim has produced partial disruption to Hormuz transits and Tehran is very likely (75-85%) to sustain a permissions/managed‑flow posture rather than enforce a prolonged physical blockade.

Weekly · June 22, 2026

US‑Iran interim memorandum begins contested reopening of the Strait of Hormuz; Houthi Red Sea threats persist as Niamey airport attack and RSF build‑up raise risks

An interim US‑Iran memorandum announced 18 June 2026 has likely (65%) begun a contested, partial reopening of the Strait of Hormuz under Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority permit and insurance rules; mine clearance and IRGC gatekeeping mean throughput will remain constrained and war‑risk premiums elevated in the near term (likely, moderate confidence). Separately, the 18 June 2026 assault on Niamey’s Diori Hamani International Airport, claimed by Jama'at Nusrat al‑Islam wal‑Muslimin (JNIM), and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) concentrations around El Obeid very likely (85%) increase the near‑term probability of follow‑on urban attacks in Niamey and an imminent RSF assault on El Obeid with a high risk of mass atrocities if the city is taken (very likely, high confidence).

Daily · June 22, 2026

Israel‑Hezbollah pause very likely failed; Iran’s 20 June Hormuz 'closure' claim contested as commercial transits continued; Switzerland talks fragile

The US‑brokered Israel‑Hezbollah pause very likely failed on 20 June 2026, with Israeli air and drone strikes in southern Lebanon followed by Hezbollah rocket and anti‑tank fire, making additional cross‑border exchanges very likely in the next 24-72 hours (Very likely, 80%; Confidence: moderate). Iran’s 20 June declaration that it had closed the Strait of Hormuz is being used as coercive leverage; U.S. Central Command public statements and MarineTraffic AIS logs show commercial transits continued on 20 June, so it is very likely Tehran will sustain a permissions and fee regime rather than enforce a prolonged physical blockade (Very likely, 80%; Confidence: moderate). The US‑Iran technical talks in Switzerland remain fragile and at roughly even chance to stall or see limited progress in the next 72 hours (Roughly even chance, 50%; Confidence: moderate).

Daily · June 21, 2026

20-21 June 2026: Lebanon ceasefire frays; Iran enforces PGSA transit rules in the Strait of Hormuz; Russia retaliates after Ukraine's 18 June Moscow-region drone strike; JNIM assaults Niamey airport

The US-announced Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire very likely failed on 20 June 2026 (80-90% probability; Confidence: moderate), after Israeli airstrikes killed at least 16 people in southern Lebanon and Hezbollah resumed attacks. Iran's Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) publishment and public closure claims make constrained, supervised transits through the Strait of Hormuz very likely over the next 24-72 hours (80-90% probability; Confidence: moderate) and place the scheduled US-Iran technical talks in Switzerland at roughly even risk of stall or limited progress (45-55% probability; Confidence: moderate).