Open-source intelligence

Intelligence briefings

Daily, weekly, and monthly briefings synthesizing the period’s key developments — patterns, trends, and full analysis. Updated continuously.

Daily · August 24, 2026

Hormuz traffic likely to remain constrained; complete closure unverified

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is likely to remain in the prior briefing's constrained category over the next 72 hours, at 70-80 per cent probability and moderate confidence. JMIC continues to rate the threat as severe, Kpler reports 95 confirmed crossings and a 19.5 per cent weekly decline, while reported Iraqi tanker passage and US claims of more than 8 million barrels per day may describe different traffic categories. The US Treasury sanctions process, Iranian threats against Gulf interests, Houthi/Ansar Allah maritime activity, Russian strikes on Ukraine and Israeli operations in Gaza and Lebanon are likely to sustain pressure on shipping, energy and civilians.

Daily · August 23, 2026

Hormuz Traffic Remains Constrained Amid Unverified US Interdictions and Separate Red Sea Piracy

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is likely to remain constrained over the next 72 hours, with a 70-80 per cent probability and moderate confidence, but the reporting does not establish a complete closure. A further verified incident involving a named commercial vessel in Hormuz has a 40-50 per cent probability, while a further incident in the Gulf of Aden or Bab al-Mandab has a 40-50 per cent probability, both with low confidence.

Daily · August 22, 2026

Hormuz remains constrained as UAE suspends Iran trade; carrier movement unconfirmed

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is likely to remain constrained over the next 72 hours, defined as 10 to 19 verified commercial transits in 24 hours or a 20 to 49 per cent fall from the seven-day baseline. A further verified security incident in Hormuz is assessed at 40 to 50 per cent, a further verified incident in Bab al-Mandab at 40 to 50 per cent, and material rerouting across either waterway at 60 to 70 per cent; the combined disjunctive probability of at least one of these events is 65 to 75 per cent. A coercively enforced 24-hour closure remains very unlikely at roughly 10 per cent, low confidence.

Daily · August 21, 2026

Hormuz traffic remains constrained as UAE missile claim and Al-Mokha closure sustain maritime pressure

Commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is likely to remain constrained over the next 72 hours, with a further verified vessel incident or material routing disruption in Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab assessed at 65-75 percent, moderate confidence. A physically enforced 24-hour closure of Hormuz is unlikely at roughly 10 percent, low confidence, because six commodity vessels crossed on 20 August and no mine-laying campaign or comprehensive exclusion zone is reported.

Daily · August 20, 2026

Hormuz Physically Unresolved, Red Sea Threat Persists, No New 24-Hour Closure Evidence

The Strait of Hormuz is likely to remain commercially constrained over the next 72 hours, with another incident or material routing disruption in Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab likely at 60-70%, while a physically enforced 24-hour closure is unlikely at 20-30%. Confidence is moderate for continued disruption, but low for the strait's physical status, Iranian responsibility for individual attacks and the reported US threat against Oman.

Daily · August 19, 2026

Hormuz Shipping Risk Leads: No New 18-19 August Strike Confirmed, but Disruption Persists

Commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab is likely (60-70%) to face another reported security incident or material routing disruption in the next 72 hours, while a sustained Hormuz closure is unlikely (20-30%). Confidence is moderate for continued disruption, but low for Iranian responsibility for all reported attacks and for the current operating status of Hormuz. The China Coast Guard remains a separate pressure point for the Philippines, although the supplied vessel count has an unresolved three-vessel discrepancy.

Daily · August 12, 2026

Nigeria-Alliance of Sahel States rupture eliminates security cooperation; Taiwan Strait calm confirmed by multiple sources

Based on Burkina Faso's 6 August protest (Admiralty C), Likely (60-75%) Nigeria-Alliance diplomatic relations have collapsed, eliminating near-term prospects for ECOWAS-Alliance security cooperation; Confidence: Moderate. Almost certain (95-99%) the Taiwan Strait remains free of military activity as NASA FIRMS recorded zero high-confidence thermal detections during 11-12 August 2026 and corroborated by PLA Eastern Theater Command communications intercepts (Admiralty A); Confidence: High.

Daily · August 8, 2026

Ghana's Security Proposal Advances as Venezuela Burial Crisis Deepens

Very likely (75-90%) Ghana's proposal for a joint ECOWAS-Alliance of Sahel States security grouping will receive formal responses from leaders of ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) within 72 hours; Confidence: High. Very likely (75-90%) Venezuela's earthquake death toll exceeds 3,500 with political claims of chavismo divisions and U.S. strategy shifts remaining unsubstantiated due to reliance on single low-reliability Venezuelan state media and Telegram channels; Confidence: Low.

Daily · August 7, 2026

Ghana Proposes New Security Framework to Counter Sahel Jihadist Expansion

Very likely (75-90%) Ghana's proposal for a regional security grouping will receive formal responses from the Alliance of Sahel States and ECOWAS within 72 hours; Confidence: High. Very likely (75-90%) the alleged nationwide protests in Bolivia demanding President Paz's resignation are unsubstantiated for 6-7 August 2026; Confidence: Low.

Daily · August 1, 2026

JNIM maintains operational advantage after killing Mali's defence minister; Venezuelan earthquake death toll confirmed

Very likely (75-90%) JNIM maintains operational initiative across Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso following the 25 April 2026 killing of Malian defence minister Sadio Camara and confirmed Shahed-136 drone strikes against Malian positions at Inafarak (12 July) and Talahandak (17 July 2026); Confidence: High. Very likely (75-90%) Venezuela's earthquake death toll exceeds 3,500 with evidence contradicting government burial protocols; Confidence: Moderate.

Daily · July 18, 2026

US expands strikes and enforces blockade; Iran strikes Gulf bases; Strait of Hormuz transits cut ~50%

Very likely (75-90%) that US forces expanded strike operations inside Iran on 16-17 July 2026 and are enforcing a maritime blockade that has reduced insured commercial transits through the southern Strait of Hormuz by roughly 50%; Confidence: Moderate, corroborated by US Central Command and Department of Defense statements, Kpler and Vortexa flow data, and an IMO advisory, but reduced by inconsistent casualty reporting and several single-source Iranian state media claims.

Daily · July 17, 2026

U.S. strikes extend to Tehran‑area targets; Iranian missile/drone retaliation and Houthi preparations sharply constrain Strait of Hormuz transit (16 Jul 2026)

Very likely (75-90%) that U.S. forces expanded strike operations on 15-16 July 2026 to include coastal‑defence and missile nodes on Greater Tunb, Qeshm, Kish and Abu Musa and select sites in areas adjacent to Tehran; confidence: moderate, U.S. Central Command and Department of Defense strike statements and independent reporting corroborate multi‑day strike waves, but Iranian target lists and casualty claims remain inconsistent. Very likely (75-90%) that Iranian missile and drone strikes, together with Iran‑linked maritime attacks and U.S. blockade enforcement, are sharply constraining insured commercial transit through the southern Strait of Hormuz for the next 24-72 hours; confidence: high, supported by International Maritime Organization advisories, India’s Directorate General of Shipping guidance and industry/insurer route avoidance.

Daily · July 16, 2026

15 July 2026: US strikes near Bandar Abbas and tanker attacks in Omani waters sustain severe Strait of Hormuz crisis

Very likely (75-90%) that US forces struck Iranian coastal-defence and naval infrastructure near Bandar Abbas and Greater Tunb Island on 15 July 2026; very likely (75-90%) that two tankers, MT Al Bahiyah and MT Mombasa, were struck in or near Omani waters on 15 July 2026, causing at least one confirmed Indian seafarer fatality; and very likely (75-90%) that the US-declared naval blockade effective 14 July 2026, 20:00 UTC, remains enforced and insured commercial transit through the southern Strait of Hormuz is severely constrained. Overall confidence: high.

Daily · July 15, 2026

14 Jul 2026, US reinstates naval blockade; CENTCOM strikes and Iranian missile/drone attacks sharply constrain Strait of Hormuz

Very likely (75-90%) that US Central Command and Iranian forces exchanged reciprocal strikes on 13-14 July 2026 and that the United States reinstated a naval blockade of Iranian ports effective 14 July 2026, 20:00 UTC; these actions have very likely (75-90%) constrained visible, insured commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz for at least the next 24-72 hours. Confidence: high, based on CENTCOM public strike claims (CENTCOM press releases, 12-14 Jul 2026, Source grade A), the Oman Ministry of Defence rescue statement for GFS Galaxy (14 Jul 2026, Source grade A), and insurer and AIS market indicators (Lloyd’s List/MarineTraffic, 14 Jul 2026, Source grade A/B).

Daily · July 14, 2026

US-Iran exchanges widen; Hormuz functionally constrained after containership strike off Oman (13 Jul 2026)

Very likely (75-90%) US Central Command and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will exchange additional strikes over the next 24-72 hours, keeping the Strait of Hormuz operationally constrained and sustaining severe risk to commercial shipping; confidence: moderate, based on CENTCOM public strike claims (13 Jul 2026, source grade A), corroborating host‑state intercept reports from Jordan and Kuwait (grade B), and maritime incident reporting on the Cyprus‑flagged GFS Galaxy (grade A/B), while several Iranian casualty and infrastructure claims remain single‑source (grade C).

Weekly · July 13, 2026

US‑CENTCOM strikes 8-12 July compress Strait of Hormuz traffic; Maersk limited Suez return; JNIM offensive in Mali, Ukraine deep strikes, RSF consolidation (8-13 July 2026)

Very likely (70-85%), confidence: moderate, successive US CENTCOM strike waves inside Iran on 8-12 July 2026 and Iranian missile/drone reprisals have materially reduced commercial transits through the Strait of Hormuz and raised shipping risk across Hormuz and the southern Red Sea. Very likely (70-85%), confidence: moderate, coordinated JNIM and Azawad Liberation Front operations in Mali (4 July) and Ukraine’s 10-11 July deep strikes against Russian energy and Azov shipping will sustain pressure on regional logistics and energy flows for the next 1-4 weeks.

Daily · July 13, 2026

CENTCOM reports roughly 140 strikes inside Iran; IRGC claims Strait of Hormuz closed, tanker transits collapse and markets reprice (11-12 July 2026)

Very likely (75-90%) US Central Command and Iranian forces will continue reciprocal strikes over the next 24-72 hours after CENTCOM reported striking roughly 140 Iranian military targets and the IRGC publicly claimed closure of the Strait of Hormuz; confidence: moderate.

Daily · July 12, 2026

US‑Iran strikes keep Strait of Hormuz functionally constrained; Maersk resumes limited Suez services; Russia fires mixed ballistic‑cruise drone salvo at Kyiv on 11 July 2026

Very likely (79%) US and Iranian forces continued reciprocal strikes through 8-11 July 2026, keeping the Strait of Hormuz functionally constrained and sharply reducing tanker transits; confidence: high. Russia conducted a mixed ballistic, cruise and drone strike on Kyiv on 11 July 2026 that injured at least 11 civilians and exposed Ukraine's acute ballistic interceptor shortfall; confidence: high.

Daily · July 11, 2026

US‑Iran strikes expand on 9-10 July; Strait of Hormuz functionally constrained, Maersk probes Suez; RSF seizes El Fashir; Houthi, typhoon and Ukraine developments raise regional risk

Very likely US and Iranian forces will continue tit‑for‑tat strikes over the next 24 to 72 hours, keeping the Strait of Hormuz functionally constrained and sustaining acute shipping and energy‑market disruption; confidence: high. Maersk’s limited resumption of Suez transits and a reported Houthi attack 56 km off Al Hudaydah are unlikely to restore normal Red Sea trade this window; confidence: moderate.

Daily · July 10, 2026

US Conducts ~90 Strikes on Iranian Coastal and Transport Nodes (9 Jul); Iran Retaliates at US-Linked Sites in Bahrain and Kuwait; Strait of Hormuz Near Standstill

Almost certainly (95-99%); confidence: high, US Central Command and the US Department of Defense reported a second night of strikes on Iran on 9 July 2026 that struck roughly 90 targets. Very likely (70-89%); confidence: moderate, Iran retaliated with missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles toward US-linked sites in Bahrain and Kuwait that Gulf states reported intercepting. Very likely (70-89%); confidence: high, commercial transit through the Strait of Hormuz is functionally constrained, with MarineTraffic/ExactEarth AIS snapshots and UKMTO/JMIC advisories showing single-digit tanker transits and higher war‑risk premiums over the next 24-72 hours. Principal sources: US Central Command and US DoD statements (09 Jul 2026; A), UKMTO and JMIC advisories (09 Jul 2026; A), MarineTraffic and ExactEarth AIS snapshots (09 Jul 2026; A), Bahrain and Kuwait Ministry of Defence statements (09 Jul 2026; B), Iranian Health Ministry and IRGC/Tasnim (09 Jul 2026; C, D).