The latest geopolitical risk analysis as it’s published — every assessment backed by a claim-level evidence ledger, drawn from satellite, maritime, energy and open sources. Read the ten newest in full, free.
The Strait of Hormuz is very likely to remain functionally restricted over the next 72 hours, with moderate confidence, despite reported US mine clear
Very likely, with moderate confidence, ordinary commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz will remain materially below pre-war levels through 7
Very likely (65-80%; moderate confidence) that reciprocal US-CENTCOM strikes (26-28 June) and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maritime
Russia is very likely sustaining a more intense conventional phase of the war, with reported advances in Donetsk and Sumy and preparations for stronger ballistic missile strikes against Kyiv and Ukrainian infrastructure. Tactical nuclear use remains very unlikely in the next 14 days, but the reporting contains conflicting assessments and warrants continued monitoring.
The US-Iran conflict is very likely to remain militarily active around the Strait of Hormuz over the next 0-14 days, with shipping constrained and competing US and Iranian claims over control of the waterway. Mediation by Oman, Qatar and Pakistan is active, but a comprehensive settlement is unlikely in the next 1-3 months. US sanctions and military deployments are likely to sustain pressure while the scope of sanctions, negotiations and casualty figures remains disputed.
The SAF and RSF are very likely to remain in armed conflict through September, while reported strikes inside Chad have raised the risk of a wider security crisis. Humanitarian pressure is very likely to persist in Khartoum, Geissan and other affected areas. The US push for a nationwide arms embargo is unlikely to produce immediate battlefield effects.
China is likely to sustain coercive pressure on Taiwan through military activity and political influence, but the supplied record for 21 to 28 August 2026 does not establish a new dated PLA live-fire exercise or an imminent amphibious operation. Taiwan's NT$240 billion unmanned-systems budget and Beijing's 24 August PLA Rocket Force procurement notice are the main new developments, while current operational reporting remains sparse and partly undated.
Russian-linked hybrid activity affecting Europe is very likely continuing and increasingly targets defence, industrial and logistics infrastructure, although the supplied reporting does not establish a single Kremlin-directed campaign. A direct Russian invasion of Latvia is unlikely in the next three months, while further sabotage attempts, coercive threats and defensive hardening remain the principal near-term concerns.
US-Iran military confrontation is likely to remain elevated over the next 14 days, while the Strait of Hormuz remains dangerous despite US reports of mine clearance. Commercial traffic is continuing, but high tanker earnings, conflicting flow estimates and a SEVERE maritime threat assessment indicate that reliable normalisation is unlikely soon.
Jihadist violence in Niger, particularly in Tillabéri, is likely to remain elevated, with JNIM reporting an attack on Niamey’s international airport and adjoining military complex. The approved reporting still does not establish a coordinated jihadist surge across West Africa, while Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso appear likely to rely on their AES framework rather than restore Western military partnerships.
Commercial shipping risk in the southern Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb is very likely to remain elevated over the next 0-14 days. Traffic was below normal on 27 August 2026, but the approaches to the Suez Canal remained operational, indicating constrained passage rather than a confirmed system-wide closure. Houthi responsibility for the 24 August tanker fire 63 nautical miles west of Yanbu remains unresolved.
The conflict is likely to remain active over the next 0-14 days, with Israeli military activity in Syria and the US-Iran contest over the Strait of Hormuz the clearest routes to wider instability. Normal commercial traffic through Hormuz is unlikely to return quickly, even as US mine clearance and Iran-Oman-Qatar talks create a roughly even chance of limited, controlled passage.
The conflict is likely to remain active and geographically distributed over the next 14 days. The Strait of Hormuz is partially navigable, but very likely to remain functionally restricted rather than fully open, while Qatar and Oman pursue limited arrangements that are unlikely to produce a full settlement soon.